In this paper, I argue that the Shrapnel-Costa no-go theorem undermines the last remaining viability of the view that the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics is essentially classical: that is, the view that physical reality is underpinned by objectively real, counterfactually definite, uniquely spatiotemporally defined, local, dynamical entities with determinate valued properties, and where typically 'quantum' behaviour emerges as a function of our own in-principle ignorance of such entities. Call this view Einstein-Bell realism. One can show that the causally symmetric local hidden variable approach to interpreting quantum theory is the most natural interpretation that follows from Einstein-Bell realism, where causal symmetry plays a significant role in circumventing the nonclassical consequences of the traditional no-go theorems. However, Shrapnel and Costa argue that exotic causal structures, such as causal symmetry, are incapable of explaining quantum behaviour as arising as a result of noncontextual ontological properties of the world. This is particularly worrying for Einstein-Bell realism and classical ontology. In the first instance, the obvious consequence of the theorem is a straightforward rejection of Einstein-Bell realism. However, more than this, I argue that, even where there looks to be a possibility of accounting for contextual ontic variables within a causally symmetric framework, the cost of such an account undermines a key advantage of causal symmetry: that accepting causal symmetry is more economical than rejecting a classical ontology. Either way, it looks like we should give up on classical ontology.
In this paper, I argue that the Shrapnel-Costa no-go theorem undermines the last remaining viability of the view that the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics is essentially classical: that is, the view that physical reality is underpinned by objectively real, counterfactually definite, uniquely spatiotemporally defined, local, dynamical entities with determinate valued properties, and where typically 'quantum' behaviour emerges as a function of our own in-principle ignorance of such entities. Call this view Einstein-Bell realism. One can show that the causally symmetric local hidden variable approach to interpreting quantum theory is the most natural interpretation that follows from Einstein-Bell realism, where causal symmetry plays a significant role in circumventing the nonclassical consequences of the traditional no-go theorems. However, Shrapnel and Costa argue that exotic causal structures, such as causal symmetry, are incapable of explaining quantum behaviour as arising as a result of noncontextual ontological properties of the world. This is particularly worrying for Einstein-Bell realism and classical ontology. In the first instance, the obvious consequence of the theorem is a straightforward rejection of Einstein-Bell realism. However, more than this, I argue that, even where there looks to be a possibility of accounting for contextual ontic variables within a causally symmetric framework, the cost of such an account undermines a key advantage of causal symmetry: that accepting causal symmetry is more economical than rejecting a classical ontology. Either way, it looks like we should give up on classical ontology.
Standard quantum mechanics poses serious challenges to some principles deeply entrenched in traditional metaphysics. In particular, the theory defies the ontological category of individual object through three of its features: contextuality, non-separability, and indistinguishability. The difficulties have prompted the development of non-traditional ontological frameworks intended to account for the quantum domain. Some approaches advocate replacing the classical conception of a realm of objects endowed with properties by an ontology that either dispenses with the category of object altogether or treats it as a derivative notion. The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation (MHI) of quantum mechanics and Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) exemplify this position. MHI proposes an ontology in which quantum systems are non-objectual bundles of properties linked by definite physical relations. The OSR defends the ontological primacy of structures, within which objects are construed as nodes of relations. The aim of this article is to compare these two ontological approaches, highlighting both their points of convergence and their divergences, particularly in light of the ontological challenges posed by quantum mechanics. With this aim, the article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the ontology of MHI, introducing the distinction between type-properties and case-properties, characterizing quantum systems as non-objectual bundles, and analyzing the role of symmetry groups in providing physical content to the theory and governing actualization. Section 3 turns to OSR, examining its motivations, its distinction between physical and mathematical structures, and the modal character of structures. Section 4 offers a systematic comparison of the two approaches, considering their respective motivations and scope, their shared commitment to an object-free ontology, the role played by symmetry groups within each framework, and their contrasting interpretations of modality. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
As far as classical physics is concerned, it is possible to trace causal relations between physical objects (i.e. particles in this case) back to intrinsic properties of these objects (such as their mass and charge). On this view, causal relations turn out to be internal instead of external relations, supervening on intrinsic properties of the relata (as proposed by Heil and Lowe). However, one can raise doubts about this view already in Newtonian mechanics. The decisive blow to this view comes from quantum physics, with Bell’s theorem proving that no dynamics based on local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects (i.e. substances such as particles) in favour of an ontology of structures (as claimed by French and Ladyman). Any of the known proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in space-time is committed to objects. However, on any of these proposals, what determines the dynamics of these objects are not local, intrinsic properties, but a global or holistic property instantiated by all the objects together – that is, a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this paper thus amounts to combining ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances. This suggestion is illustrated by drawing on the ontology of quantum physics worked out by Bohm and Bell. 1.
In this chapter it is argued that the decisive argument against the reducibility of causal relations comes from quantum physics. Bell’s theorem proves that no dynamics based on the local, intrinsic properties of quantum objects can yield the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics. Nonetheless, it is argued that quantum entanglement by no means implies that we have to abandon an ontology of objects in favour of an ontology of structures. All extant proposals for a quantum ontology of matter in spacetime are committed to objects, whose dynamics are determined not by their local, intrinsic properties, but by an holistic property instantiated by all the objects together—a structure that takes all the objects in the universe as its relata. The view set out in this chapter combines ontic structural realism with an ontology of objects that can be conceived as substances.
Bell's theorem is popularly stated as the inconsistency of quantum theory with local realism. Realism is here formalized by the ontological models framework, where elements of reality are points of a measurable space and probabilities obey the Kolmogorov axioms. In the Bell scenario, locally causal ontological models posit a common cause supporting a global valuation, a joint assignment of outcomes to all measurements at once, across incompatible contexts. Within this notion of realism, Bell's theorem makes any realist explanation of the quantum predictions conspiratorial: any mechanism, whether superluminal, superdeterministic, or retrocausal, must be finely tuned so as never to manifest operationally. We redefine realism through a new ontological framework that generalizes the standard one. The elements of reality, which we call records, are no longer points but relational parts of a point-free generalization of a topological space (sublocales of a locale). A record shared by two incompatible contexts establishes the sameness of a measurement across them, without such pairwise identities composing into a global valuation, and the common cause is then a web of such records. Within this framework, Bell's no-go theorem becomes a go theorem: local causality, restated for records, is no longer at odds with the quantum statistics. This is possible because modularity, the inclusion-exclusion law of classical probability, fails across incompatible contexts, so that the probability theory generalizes Kolmogorov's. We exhibit explicit models reproducing several quantum strategies, including the optimal CHSH violation. More broadly, locally causal models of this kind attain every Bell-CHSH value up to the algebraic maximum. A realist explanation of the quantum predictions need not be conspiratorial; every causal influence posited by these models is reflected in the operational predictions.
Bell's theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known as "local causality" is not compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell's theorem. However, another assumption of Bell's theorem is the use of classical logic. One part of this assumption is the principle of "ontic definiteness", that is, that it must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell's inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed.
This paper starts with the observation that the combination of the so-calld EPR argument and Bell's theorem reveals one of the most paradoxical features of quantum reality, i.e. the no-separability of two contingent events. If we accept the conclusion of the revised EPR argument together with Bell's theorem, we are necessarily led to the denial of local causality which was presupposed by the original version of Einstein's criticism against quantum physics.. As the concept of local causality is a cornerstone of Einstein's theory of relativity, we next consider the problem of compatibility between the theory of relativity and quantum physics. Popper's proposal of going back to Lorentz's theory is examined and rejected because the quantum correlation of EPR is not to be interpreted as “an action at a distance” which we can control and use as the operational definition of absolute simultaneity. An inquiry into something like aether as hidden reality behind the theory of relativity is considered as retrogressive as the so-called hidden variable theory of quantum physics. Accepting the non-separability of local elements of reality as the undeniable fact, we discuss the possibility of a realistic interpretation of quantum physics which transcends scientific materialism and classical determinism. As an example of such projects, Stapp's theory is examined with respect to a Whiteheadean process philosophy which provides the meta-physical background for his realistic interpretation of quantum physics. Finally, we present another version of quantum meta-physics based on “the philosophy of organism” which is broad enough to include observer and observed, local causality and non-local correlation, space and time, and potentiality and actuality in the inseparable unity of physical reality.