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arXiv:2610.16493

Bell's go theorem: regaining local causality with a new notion of realism

Lorenzo Catani, Nesta van der Schaaf, Rui Soares Barbosa

quant-phSubmitted Oct 12, 2026• Announced Oct 13, 2026• 0 citations
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Abstract

Bell's theorem is popularly stated as the inconsistency of quantum theory with local realism. Realism is here formalized by the ontological models framework, where elements of reality are points of a measurable space and probabilities obey the Kolmogorov axioms. In the Bell scenario, locally causal ontological models posit a common cause supporting a global valuation, a joint assignment of outcomes to all measurements at once, across incompatible contexts. Within this notion of realism, Bell's theorem makes any realist explanation of the quantum predictions conspiratorial: any mechanism, whether superluminal, superdeterministic, or retrocausal, must be finely tuned so as never to manifest operationally. We redefine realism through a new ontological framework that generalizes the standard one. The elements of reality, which we call records, are no longer points but relational parts of a point-free generalization of a topological space (sublocales of a locale). A record shared by two incompatible contexts establishes the sameness of a measurement across them, without such pairwise identities composing into a global valuation, and the common cause is then a web of such records. Within this framework, Bell's no-go theorem becomes a go theorem: local causality, restated for records, is no longer at odds with the quantum statistics. This is possible because modularity, the inclusion-exclusion law of classical probability, fails across incompatible contexts, so that the probability theory generalizes Kolmogorov's. We exhibit explicit models reproducing several quantum strategies, including the optimal CHSH violation. More broadly, locally causal models of this kind attain every Bell-CHSH value up to the algebraic maximum. A realist explanation of the quantum predictions need not be conspiratorial; every causal influence posited by these models is reflected in the operational predictions.

AI Summary

The paper asks whether Bell correlations can admit a realist common-cause account after replacing the standard ontological-model framework rather than abandoning locality. It introduces “localic ontological models,” whose ontic records are sublocales of a locale rather than points of a measurable space. Preparation weights are normalized and additive within each measurement context but need not admit a globally normalized, modular extension across incompatible contexts. For the binary-input, binary-output Bell scenario, an explicit locale contains 16 context-specific cores and 16 pairwise shared glues. Axioms concerning shared measurements and completed experimental records imply that overlaps between incompatible contexts contain no points. Local causality is formulated as response factorization together with agreement on shared measurements wherever records overlap. Explicit nonnegative weights and deterministic responses produce no-signalling correlations with every CHSH value from $S=2$ to the algebraic maximum $S=4$. The paper also gives representations of the optimal quantum CHSH strategy, attaining $2\sqrt{2}$, a stabilizer strategy using the same preparation weight, and a product-state strategy using the same measurement responses as the optimal strategy. These are existence constructions, not a model of all quantum states, measurements, and transformations. No-signalling is imposed on the weights rather than derived from the localic locality condition. A subsystem-composition rule, dynamics, and a principle distinguishing quantum correlations from stronger no-signalling correlations remain open; the proposed connection between minimum shared weight and the Tsirelson bound is speculative.

Little sign of AI-generated textOverclaimsStrong assumptionsMissing comparison

Central claim may not hold: The paper claims an explanation without conspiratorial fine-tuning, but imposes no-signalling as an additional restriction on weights without establishing why that restriction is free of fine-tuning. The stated localic locality conditions permit signalling through context-dependent averaging domains, so local response functions alone do not justify the paper's conclusion that no operationally concealed causal influence remains.

Written by gpt-6.1-sol from the paper's full text. Automated: it can be wrong.

Comments
The core argument is told without mathematics in "A simple story" (Sec. I); the models proving the main result are in Secs. III F and IV B (Figs. 2 and 4). 43 pages, 6 figures

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Bell's theorem is popularly stated as the inconsistency of quantum theory with local realism. Realism is here formalized by the ontological models framework, where elements of reality are points of a measurable space and probabilities obey the Kolmogorov axioms. In the Bell scenario, locally causal ontological models posit a common cause supporting a global valuation, a joint assignment of outcomes to all measurements at once, across incompatible contexts. Within this notion of realism, Bell's theorem makes any realist explanation of the quantum predictions conspiratorial: any mechanism, whether superluminal, superdeterministic, or retrocausal, must be finely tuned so as never to manifest operationally. We redefine realism through a new ontological framework that generalizes the standard one. The elements of reality, which we call records, are no longer points but relational parts of a point-free generalization of a topological space (sublocales of a locale). A record shared by two incompatible contexts establishes the sameness of a measurement across them, without such pairwise identities composing into a global valuation, and the common cause is then a web of such records. Within this framework, Bell's no-go theorem becomes a go theorem: local causality, restated for records, is no longer at odds with the quantum statistics. This is possible because modularity, the inclusion-exclusion law of classical probability, fails across incompatible contexts, so that the probability theory generalizes Kolmogorov's. We exhibit explicit models reproducing several quantum strategies, including the optimal CHSH violation. More broadly, locally causal models of this kind attain every Bell-CHSH value up to the algebraic maximum. A realist explanation of the quantum predictions need not be conspiratorial; every causal influence posited by these models is reflected in the operational predictions.
The paper asks whether Bell correlations can admit a realist common-cause account after replacing the standard ontological-model framework rather than abandoning locality. It introduces “localic ontological models,” whose ontic records are sublocales of a locale rather than points of a measurable space. Preparation weights are normalized and additive within each measurement context but need not admit a globally normalized, modular extension across incompatible contexts.
For the binary-input, binary-output Bell scenario, an explicit locale contains 16 context-specific cores and 16 pairwise shared glues. Axioms concerning shared measurements and completed experimental records imply that overlaps between incompatible contexts contain no points. Local causality is formulated as response factorization together with agreement on shared measurements wherever records overlap. Explicit nonnegative weights and deterministic responses produce no-signalling correlations with every CHSH value from S=2S=2S=2 to the algebraic maximum S=4S=4S=4. The paper also gives representations of the optimal quantum CHSH strategy, attaining 222\sqrt{2}22​, a stabilizer strategy using the same preparation weight, and a product-state strategy using the same measurement responses as the optimal strategy.
These are existence constructions, not a model of all quantum states, measurements, and transformations. No-signalling is imposed on the weights rather than derived from the localic locality condition. A subsystem-composition rule, dynamics, and a principle distinguishing quantum correlations from stronger no-signalling correlations remain open; the proposed connection between minimum shared weight and the Tsirelson bound is speculative.
Bell's theorem states that no description of a Bell experiment can be simultaneously local, realistic in the sense of counterfactual definiteness, and free of conspiracy between settings and hidden state. The recent generation of experiments has confirmed the predicted violation of the CHSH inequality, so one of the assumptions must be abandoned. Which one, and how one reconstructs a coherent worldview after doing so, is a question on which many authors disagree. This paper is written by three such authors. All three reject both counterfactual definiteness and conspiratorial violation of statistical independence of setting choices and state. After a joint exposition of the classical half of Bell's theorem in the language of Pearl-style causal graphs, a joint summary of the loophole-free experiments, and a joint survey of the recent literature, each author states where they have presently arrived. Gill accepts irreducible and non-local quantum randomness and finds the choice between locality and realism a false dichotomy. In his later works, Bell derives counterfactual definiteness from classical local causality, and that is what has to go. The metaphysical concepts "realism", "locality", "causality" need to be reconsidered. Helland reconstructs the Hilbert-space formalism from a theory of accessible variables, and from this theory he concludes that every observer must be limited in a specific sense. Jongejan proposes a geometric hidden-variable construction in which the degree of violation of the CHSH inequality depends on the number of dimensions of space, Tsirelson's bound corresponding to three dimensions. The authors conclude with a discussion.
This open letter challenges Annals of Physics' Editors and Bell's supporters on this front: in the context of Bell's theorem -- after AoP (2016:67) -- ‘it's a proven scientific fact that a violation of local realism has been demonstrated theoretically and experimentally.' We show that such claims under the Bellian canon are curtailed by its foundation on a naive realism that is known to be false; ie, under Bohr's old insight (in our terms), a test may disturb the tested system. Further: (i) We define a general all-embracing local realism -- CLR, commonsense local realism -- the union of local-causality (no causal influence propagates superluminally) and physical-realism (some physical properties change interactively). (ii) Under CLR, with EPR-based variables (and without QM), a thought-experiment delivers a local-realistic account of EPRB and GHZ in 3-space. (iii) Under EPR, mixing common-sense with undergrad math/physics in the classical way so favored by Einstein, we interpret QM locally and realistically. (iv) We find the flaw in Bell's theorem: Bell's 1964:(14a) ≠ Bell's 1964:(14b) under EPRB. (v) EPR (1935) famously argue that additional variables will bring locality and causality to QM's completion; we show that they are right. (vi) Even more famously, Bell (1964) cried ‘impossible' against such variables; we give the shortest possible refutation of his claim. (vii) Using Bell's (1988:88) moot gloss on a fragment of von Neumann's work, we conclude: ‘There's nothing to Bell's theorem -- nor Bellian variants like CHSH (1969), Mermin (1990), Peres (1995); nor Bellian endorsements like those by Bricmont, du Sautoy, Goldstein et al., Maudlin, Norsen, Shimony -- it's not just flawed, it's silly; its assumptions nonsense; it's not merely false but foolish' and misleading. (viii) Our results accord with common-sense, QM, Einstein's principles, EPR's belief and Bell's hopes and expectations.
Rebooting Einstein's ideas about local-causality, an engineer brings local-causality to quantum theory via operators and variables in 3-space. Taking realism to be the view that external reality exists and has definite properties, his core principle is common-sense local realism (CLR): the union of local-causality (no causal influence propagates superluminally) and physical-realism (some physical properties change interactively). Endorsing Einstein-separability — system X is independent of what is done with system Y that is spatially separated from X — Bell's famous mission is advanced. That is, by means of parameters λ, a more complete specification of EPRB's physics is successful. A consequent locally-causal refutation of Bell's theorem allows EPRB correlations to be explained in a classical way, in line with Einstein's ideas, without reference to Hilbert space, quantum states, etc. Conclusion: Bell's theorem is based on a mathematical error; an error in reduction is inconsistent with Bell's opening assumptions.
An open letter to Bellians and the Annals of Physics' Editors re -- it's a proven scientific fact: a violation of local realism has been demonstrated theoretically and experimentally -- after AoP (2016:67). EPR (1935) famously argue that additional variables will bring locality and causality to QM's completion; we show that they are right. Even more famously, Bell (1964) cried ‘impossible' against such variables; we give the shortest possible refutation of his claims. With EPR-based variables (and without QM), an old thought-experiment delivers a commonsensical locally-causal account of EPRB and GHZ in 3-space. We then name the flaw in Bell's theorem – Bell's error -- Bell's 1964:(14a) ≠ Bell's 1964:(14b) under EPRB. Thus, given Bell's (1988:88) gloss on a snippet of von Neumann's work, ‘There's nothing to Bell's theorem -- nor variants like CHSH (1969), Mermin (1990), Peres (1995) -- it's not just flawed, it's silly; not merely false but foolish.' In short, we show that the whole Bellian canon -- with its no-name brand of local realism -- is all of those, and misleading too. Under EPR, mixing common-sense with undergrad math/physics in the classical way so favored by Einstein, we interpret QM locally and realistically. We thus define a new brand of local realism -- CLR, commonsense local realism -- the union of local-causality (no causal influence propagates superluminally) and physical-realism (some physical properties change interactively). Long may EPR rule OK we say.
Bell's theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known as "local causality" is not compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell's theorem. However, another assumption of Bell's theorem is the use of classical logic. One part of this assumption is the principle of "ontic definiteness", that is, that it must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell's inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed.
Eschewing naive realism, we define true (classical/quantum) realism:= some existents (ie, some Bell-beables) may change interactively. We then show that Bell's mathematical ideas re local causality—from his 1964:(1)-(2) to his 1990a:(6.9.3)—are valid under true realism. But we refute Bell's analyses (and his ‘local realism’), as we resolve his consequent ‘action-at-a-distance’ dilemma in favor of true locality:= no influence propagates superluminally. In short: defining beables by properties and values—and allowing that locally-causal interactions may yield new beables—we predict the probabilities of such interaction outcomes via equivalence-classes that are weaker (hence more general) than the corresponding classes in EPR/Bell. In this way delivering the same results as quantum theory and experiment—using EPRB, CHSH, GHZ and 3-space—we also advance QM's reconstruction in spacetime with a new vector-product for geometric algebra. True local realism thus supports local causality, resolves Bell's dilemma, negates nonlocality, demystifies QM, rejects naive realism, eliminates the quantum/classical divide (since observables are clearly beables; being or not being, prior to an interaction, but certainly existing thereafter), etc: all at the level of undergraduate math and logic, and all contra the analyses and impossibility-claims of Bell and many others. We also show that Bayes' Law and Malus' Law hold, undiminished, under true local realism and the quantum.