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CRC Press eBooks

Where is the Problem?

Jean-Marc Lévy-Leblond

Published Oct 19, 2017• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The reduction of the state vector is rightly held as one of the most puzzling aspects of quantum theory. Before adding a few more pages to the inflatory literature on the subject, I wish to voice a somewhat sobering remark. Namely, there is a striking contrast between the amount of theoretical discussions about the nature and significance of this notion, and its practical import. Indeed, the so-called "axiom" of reduction of the state vector has a rather limited use in the effective working of quantum theory. There are very few situations where we really need to assert that, after a measurement, the state vector has been reduced to the eigenvector of the physical property corresponding to the eigenvalue resulting from the measurement ("observed"). Most of the time, in effect, the system under investigation is forgotten or discarded after the measurement - or even destroyed by it (photons). We rarely make successive observations of the same system, so that we do not usually need to know what the state of a system is after a measurement. One might argue that the reduction of the state vector is operationally used mainly to describe the preparation of a system before acting upon it, that is, to ensure that we are indeed dealing with spin up electrons or velocity selected protons such as we wish to experiment about. Anyway, the statement of reduction is to be considered more as a kind of consistency condition to be required at the beginning or end of a theoretical analysis than as an effective tool of this analysis - such as, for instance, the statement of unitary evolution, which leads to the concrete construction of the evolution operator, hence the S-matrix, cross-sections, etc. In other words, the practical status of the state vector reduction, even if it is considered as an axiom of quantum theory, is different enough from that of the constructive axioms of the theory.

DOI
10.1201/9780203741467-1

Related papers

The Measurement Problem and the Reduction Postulate of Quantum Mechanics

Rodolfo Gambini

It is well known, that the causal Schrödinger evolution of a quantum state is not compatible with the reduction postulate, even when decoherence is taken into account. The violation of the causal evolution, introduced by the standard reduction postulate distinguishes certain systems (as the measurement devices), whose states are very close to statistical mixtures (as the ones resulting from the process of decoherence). In these systems, this violation has not any observable effect. In arbitrary quantum systems, the transition from the initial density matrix to a diagonal matrix predicted by the standard reduction postulate, would lead to a complete breakdown of the Schrödinger evolution, and consequently would destroy all the predictive power of quantum mechanics. What we show here, is that there is a modified version of the postulate that allows to treat all the quantum mechanical systems on equal footing. The standard reduction postulate may be considered as a good approximation, useful for practical purposes, of this modified version which is consistent with the Schrödinger evolution and via decoherence with the experimental results. Within this approach, the physical role played by the reduction postulate is as a tool for the computation of relative probabilities and consequently for the determination of the probabilities of consistent histories.

arXiv:quant-ph/9803025•Mar 11, 1998•1 citation

State vector reduction. Part 1: Dynamical reduction theories; changing quantum theory so the statevector represents reality

G. C. Ghirardi, Philip Pearle

Unknown eBooks•Feb 1, 1991•0 citations

Fitch's knowability axioms are incompatible with quantum theory

Patrick Thomas Fraser, Nuriya Nurgalieva, Lídia del Rio

How can we consistently model the knowledge of the natural world provided by physical theories? Philosophers frequently use epistemic logic to model reasoning and knowledge abstractly, and to formally study the ramifications of epistemic assumptions. One famous example is Fitch's paradox, which begins with minimal knowledge axioms and derives the counter-intuitive result that agent knows every true statement. Accounting for knowledge that arises from physical theories complicates matters further. For example, quantum mechanics allows observers to model other agents as quantum systems themselves, and to make predictions about measurements performed on each others' memories. Moreover, complex thought experiments in which agents' memories are modelled as quantum systems show that multi-agent reasoning chains can yield paradoxical results. Here, we bridge the gap between quantum paradoxes and foundational problems in epistemic logic, by relating the assumptions behind the recent Frauchiger-Renner quantum thought experiment and the axioms for knowledge used in Fitch's knowability paradox. Our results indicate that agents' knowledge of quantum systems must violate at least one of the following assumptions: it cannot be distributive over conjunction, have a kind of internal continuity, and yield a constructive interpretation all at once. Indeed, knowledge provided by quantum mechanics apparently contradicts traditional notions of how knowledge behaves; for instance, it may not be possible to universally assign objective truth values to claims about agent knowledge. We discuss the relations of this work to results in quantum contextuality and explore possible modifications to standard epistemic logic that could make it consistent with quantum theory.

•Sep 1, 2020•2 citations

Interpreting Quantum Theories

James Owen Weatherall

Most philosophical work on quantum physics has concerned simple systems. And for good reason. Even one or two particle systems can exhibit the striking features we have come to associate with quantum physics—features such as entanglement, interference, and nonlocality. But as far as physics goes, such systems barely scrape the surface. In particular, they have only a finite number of degrees of freedom, which means their states are characterized by a finite number of independent parameters. The systems studied in fields such as high-energy particle physics and many-body physics, meanwhile, have uncountably many degrees of freedom. They are far more complicated than the usual philosophical fare.This is not troubling as long as the conceptual heart of quantum physics can be effectively condensed down. But what if philosophers' toy systems are fundamentally different from realistic ones? That would be a problem. And indeed, as Laura Ruetsche convincingly argues in Interpreting Quantum Theories, systems with uncountable degrees of freedom—what Ruetsche collectively calls QM∞—are fundamentally different from the systems that have become the stock and trade of philosophy of physics, in ways that change the interpretational project.Ruetsche's book does two things exceedingly well. The first is to provide a (comparatively) accessible and philosophically oriented introduction to the algebraic approach to quantum physics, which is essential for understanding QM∞. This is a valuable contribution. The algebraic approach is the setting for much recent philosophical work. And yet learning it is notoriously difficult, as even pedagogical texts are aimed at research-level mathematicians. Ruetsche's book is technically demanding, but it works to bring nonmathematicians along. It is, without a doubt, the best place to enter this literature.Second, the book sets the agenda for future work on QM∞, by effectively and judiciously drawing important foundational questions out of a sprawling and difficult physics literature. In this regard, it is a close cousin to John Earman's (1995) excellent Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks, which has had a significant influence on subsequent philosophy of spacetime physics. Philosophers of physics will be addressing the questions Ruetsche has raised, in many cases for the first time, for years to come.Interpreting Quantum Theories centers on what might be called the problem of inequivalent representations. The quantum theories that philosophers are accustomed to are set in a mathematical structure known as a (separable) Hilbert space, which is an at-most countably infinite dimensional complex vector space. Rays in a Hilbert space represent possible states of a physical system, and self-adjoint operators on that Hilbert space correspond to properties of the system.To treat QM∞, meanwhile, physicists pass to a generalization of this formalism. Now one begins with an abstract algebra of operators corresponding to the various properties associated with the system. States in this more general framework are linear functionals on the algebra whose value at each operator is interpreted as the expectation value of a measurement of that property in that state.The trouble with this more general framework is that the interpretational tools of Hilbert space quantum theories do not directly apply. Some solace comes from recognizing that any (appropriate) algebra of operators admits a representation in terms of the operators on a Hilbert space. This suggests that one can always move back to the more familiar Hilbert space formalism. But this is a pyrrhic victory. In general these Hilbert space representations are neither unique nor empirically equivalent. In particular, these inequivalent representations, interpreted in the familiar way, yield disagreements about which algebraic states are physically realizable.Faced with this situation, Ruetsche presents several principled options—what she calls “pristine” interpretations of QM∞. The two most significant are what she calls “Hilbert Space Conservatism” and “Algebraic Imperialism.” The Conservative claims that, for a given system, there is one true Hilbert space representation, which should be interpreted in the familiar ways. The Imperialist, meanwhile, insists that only the abstract algebra matters: the physical states are the algebraic states, properties correspond to the operators in the algebra, and if our old methods do not apply, so much the worse for our methods.At this level of description, Imperialists may appear to have the advantage, since they need not fret over which representation to choose. But there's a catch. As we have seen, there is a sense in which Imperialists generally recognize a broader range of possible physical states. But Conservatives allow for more properties. This is because when one represents the abstract algebra as operators on a Hilbert space, the operators in the representation naturally approximate additional operators on that Hilbert space, in a way that is unavailable in the abstract setting. Thus each interpretation suffers from limitations that the other does not.To adjudicate between the interpretations, Ruetsche takes them to the trenches, to see which provides the resources to support the actual explanatory and representational practices of physics. After a masterful survey, she concludes that neither interpretation has all of the requisite resources. In particular, she argues, physicists regularly make essential use of operators that are only available to Conservatives, while making equally essential use of multiple inequivalent representations—which only Imperialists can support. More, the particular mix of Conservatism and Imperialism varies between applications, apparently ruling out a stable interpretation of the formalism that can be articulated independently of the messy details. We are left with what Ruetsche calls “adulterated” interpretations.Philosophers' practice notwithstanding, it might seem unsurprising that we cannot separate our interpretation of physical theories from the pragmatics of their application to the world. After all, we are interested in these theories only insofar as they are successfully applied. But Ruetsche believes the problem is more acute. It is not merely that pragmatic considerations enter the debate between Conservatives and Imperialists. Ruetsche argues that there may not be any consistent, general interpretation of QM∞ compatible with practice. And this, she claims, makes realism about QM∞ untenable.The idea that the applications of a broad class of our best physical theories undermine their consistent interpretation in a way that renders realism incoherent is striking. Insofar as Ruetsche's case is convincing, it should have serious repercussions for general philosophy of science—both because it bears on important debates and because it shows how generalist questions depend on the details of particular scientific theories and their applications. Indeed, Ruetsche's skepticism about the terms of the realism debate and her radical particularism should influence general philosophy of science. But that said, her argument ultimately leaves room for disagreement.Ruetsche's basic claim is that Conservatism and Imperialism each support practices that the other cannot and that both kinds of practice are essential. But there is an important asymmetry here. Conservatives suffer because they fail to represent putative physical possibilities appealed to in practice. Imperialists, meanwhile, need to justify that in certain applications, they may limit attention to a subset of the physical possibilities their interpretation admits, and then use resources that only make sense in those limited regimes.The trouble is that the Imperialists' opportunism is neither unusual in physics nor difficult to motivate. In spacetime physics, for instance, properties such as the total mass of the universe or global time can be defined only in very special cases. And yet such properties are used in practice, because often the salient spacetimes are precisely the ones in which these quantities make (approximate) sense. To make her case that adulteration in QM∞ undermines realism, Ruetsche would need to establish that the representation-dependent quantities used in applications of QM∞ are different in kind from analogous quantities that appear throughout physics. And here it is not clear that she succeeds.None of this undercuts the importance of the book, however. Indeed, Ruetsche acknowledges that her argument may depend on how one understands idealization in physics. And even if one takes the view just described, there is a great deal of work to do on how Imperialism can support the practices Ruetsche identifies—work that will surely proceed within the framework Ruetsche has laid out, by addressing questions Ruetsche has raised. And so, wherever our study of QM∞ takes us, Ruetsche's book is sure to play a central role.

The Philosophical Review•Apr 1, 2015•0 citations

On quantum measurements

S. A. Granovskij

Is the reduction of the wavefunction a real physical process? A mental experiment providing an answer to this question is considered.

Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics Letters•Mar 1, 2007•0 citations

A microscopic model of wave-function dephasing and decoherence in the double-slit experiment

Satish Ramakrishna

The act of measurement on a quantum state is supposed to "dephase" (dephasing refers to the phenomenon that the states lose phase coherence; then the phases get randomized in interaction with a bath of other oscillators, which is referred to as "decoherence"), then "decohere" and "collapse" (or more precisely "register" and "reduce") the state into one of several eigenstates of the operator corresponding to the observable being measured. This measurement process is sometimes described as outside standard quantum-mechanical evolution and not calculable from Schrödinger's equation. Progress has, however, been made in studying this problem with two main calculation tools-one uses a time-independent Hamiltonian, while a rather more general approach proving that decoherence occurs under some generic conditions. The two general approaches to the study of wave-function collapse are as follows. The first approach, called the "consistent" or "decoherent"' histories approach, studies microscopic histories that diverge probabilistically and explains collapse as an event in our particular history. The other, referred to as the "environmental decoherence" approach studies the effect of the environment upon the quantum system, to explain wave-function decoherence which is produced by irreversible effects of various sorts. However, as we know, wave-function collapse is not related to thermal connection with the environment, rather, it is inherent to how measurements are performed by macroscopic apparata. In the "environmental decoherence" approach, one studies decoherence using a Markovian-approximated Master equation to study the time-evolution of the reduced density matrix (post dephasing) and obtains the long-time dependence of the off-diagonal elements of this matrix. The calculation in this paper studies the evolution of a quantum system starting with "dephasing" followed by the effects of the environment with some differences from prior analyses. We start from the Schrödinger equation for the state of the system, with a time-dependent Hamiltonian that reflects the actual microscopic interactions that are occurring. Then we systematically solve (exactly) for the time-evolved state, without invoking a Markovian approximation when writing out the effective time-evolution equation, i.e., keeping the evolution unitary until the end. This approach is useful, and it shows that the system wave-function will explicitly "un-collapse" if the measurement apparatus is sufficiently small. However, in the limit of a macroscopic system, this "dephasing" quickly leads to "decoherence"-collapse is a temporary state that will simply take extremely long (of the order of multiple universe lifetimes) to reverse. This has been attempted previously and our calculation is particularly simple and calculable. We make some connections to the work by Linden et al. while doing so. The calculation in this paper has interesting implications for the interpretation of the Wigner's friend experiment, as well as the Mott experiment, which is explored in "Connection to some general theoretical results" and "Recurrence times" (especially the enumerated points in "Recurrence times"). The upshot is that as long as Wigner's friend is macroscopically large (or uses a macroscopically large measuring instrument), no one needs to worry that Wigner would see something different from his friend. Indeed, Wigner's friend does not even need to be conscious during the measurement that she conducts. It also allows one to reasonably interpret some of the more recent thought experiments proposed. In particular, as a result of the mathematical analysis, the short-time behavior of a collapsing system, at least the one considered in this paper, is not exponential. Instead, it is the usual Fermi-golden rule result. The long-term behavior is, of course, still exponential. This is a second novel feature of the paper-we connect the short-term Fermi-golden rule (quadratic-in-time behavior) transition probability to the exponential long-time behavior of a collapsing wave-function in one continuous mathematical formulation.

arXiv:1911.08586•Scientific Reports•Oct 25, 2021•3 citations
The reduction of the state vector is rightly held as one of the most puzzling aspects of quantum theory. Before adding a few more pages to the inflatory literature on the subject, I wish to voice a somewhat sobering remark. Namely, there is a striking contrast between the amount of theoretical discussions about the nature and significance of this notion, and its practical import. Indeed, the so-called "axiom" of reduction of the state vector has a rather limited use in the effective working of quantum theory. There are very few situations where we really need to assert that, after a measurement, the state vector has been reduced to the eigenvector of the physical property corresponding to the eigenvalue resulting from the measurement ("observed"). Most of the time, in effect, the system under investigation is forgotten or discarded after the measurement - or even destroyed by it (photons). We rarely make successive observations of the same system, so that we do not usually need to know what the state of a system is after a measurement. One might argue that the reduction of the state vector is operationally used mainly to describe the preparation of a system before acting upon it, that is, to ensure that we are indeed dealing with spin up electrons or velocity selected protons such as we wish to experiment about. Anyway, the statement of reduction is to be considered more as a kind of consistency condition to be required at the beginning or end of a theoretical analysis than as an effective tool of this analysis - such as, for instance, the statement of unitary evolution, which leads to the concrete construction of the evolution operator, hence the S-matrix, cross-sections, etc. In other words, the practical status of the state vector reduction, even if it is considered as an axiom of quantum theory, is different enough from that of the constructive axioms of the theory.
It is well known, that the causal Schrödinger evolution of a quantum state is not compatible with the reduction postulate, even when decoherence is taken into account. The violation of the causal evolution, introduced by the standard reduction postulate distinguishes certain systems (as the measurement devices), whose states are very close to statistical mixtures (as the ones resulting from the process of decoherence). In these systems, this violation has not any observable effect. In arbitrary quantum systems, the transition from the initial density matrix to a diagonal matrix predicted by the standard reduction postulate, would lead to a complete breakdown of the Schrödinger evolution, and consequently would destroy all the predictive power of quantum mechanics. What we show here, is that there is a modified version of the postulate that allows to treat all the quantum mechanical systems on equal footing. The standard reduction postulate may be considered as a good approximation, useful for practical purposes, of this modified version which is consistent with the Schrödinger evolution and via decoherence with the experimental results. Within this approach, the physical role played by the reduction postulate is as a tool for the computation of relative probabilities and consequently for the determination of the probabilities of consistent histories.
How can we consistently model the knowledge of the natural world provided by physical theories? Philosophers frequently use epistemic logic to model reasoning and knowledge abstractly, and to formally study the ramifications of epistemic assumptions. One famous example is Fitch's paradox, which begins with minimal knowledge axioms and derives the counter-intuitive result that agent knows every true statement. Accounting for knowledge that arises from physical theories complicates matters further. For example, quantum mechanics allows observers to model other agents as quantum systems themselves, and to make predictions about measurements performed on each others' memories. Moreover, complex thought experiments in which agents' memories are modelled as quantum systems show that multi-agent reasoning chains can yield paradoxical results. Here, we bridge the gap between quantum paradoxes and foundational problems in epistemic logic, by relating the assumptions behind the recent Frauchiger-Renner quantum thought experiment and the axioms for knowledge used in Fitch's knowability paradox. Our results indicate that agents' knowledge of quantum systems must violate at least one of the following assumptions: it cannot be distributive over conjunction, have a kind of internal continuity, and yield a constructive interpretation all at once. Indeed, knowledge provided by quantum mechanics apparently contradicts traditional notions of how knowledge behaves; for instance, it may not be possible to universally assign objective truth values to claims about agent knowledge. We discuss the relations of this work to results in quantum contextuality and explore possible modifications to standard epistemic logic that could make it consistent with quantum theory.
Most philosophical work on quantum physics has concerned simple systems. And for good reason. Even one or two particle systems can exhibit the striking features we have come to associate with quantum physics—features such as entanglement, interference, and nonlocality. But as far as physics goes, such systems barely scrape the surface. In particular, they have only a finite number of degrees of freedom, which means their states are characterized by a finite number of independent parameters. The systems studied in fields such as high-energy particle physics and many-body physics, meanwhile, have uncountably many degrees of freedom. They are far more complicated than the usual philosophical fare.This is not troubling as long as the conceptual heart of quantum physics can be effectively condensed down. But what if philosophers' toy systems are fundamentally different from realistic ones? That would be a problem. And indeed, as Laura Ruetsche convincingly argues in Interpreting Quantum Theories, systems with uncountable degrees of freedom—what Ruetsche collectively calls QM∞—are fundamentally different from the systems that have become the stock and trade of philosophy of physics, in ways that change the interpretational project.Ruetsche's book does two things exceedingly well. The first is to provide a (comparatively) accessible and philosophically oriented introduction to the algebraic approach to quantum physics, which is essential for understanding QM∞. This is a valuable contribution. The algebraic approach is the setting for much recent philosophical work. And yet learning it is notoriously difficult, as even pedagogical texts are aimed at research-level mathematicians. Ruetsche's book is technically demanding, but it works to bring nonmathematicians along. It is, without a doubt, the best place to enter this literature.Second, the book sets the agenda for future work on QM∞, by effectively and judiciously drawing important foundational questions out of a sprawling and difficult physics literature. In this regard, it is a close cousin to John Earman's (1995) excellent Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers, and Shrieks, which has had a significant influence on subsequent philosophy of spacetime physics. Philosophers of physics will be addressing the questions Ruetsche has raised, in many cases for the first time, for years to come.Interpreting Quantum Theories centers on what might be called the problem of inequivalent representations. The quantum theories that philosophers are accustomed to are set in a mathematical structure known as a (separable) Hilbert space, which is an at-most countably infinite dimensional complex vector space. Rays in a Hilbert space represent possible states of a physical system, and self-adjoint operators on that Hilbert space correspond to properties of the system.To treat QM∞, meanwhile, physicists pass to a generalization of this formalism. Now one begins with an abstract algebra of operators corresponding to the various properties associated with the system. States in this more general framework are linear functionals on the algebra whose value at each operator is interpreted as the expectation value of a measurement of that property in that state.The trouble with this more general framework is that the interpretational tools of Hilbert space quantum theories do not directly apply. Some solace comes from recognizing that any (appropriate) algebra of operators admits a representation in terms of the operators on a Hilbert space. This suggests that one can always move back to the more familiar Hilbert space formalism. But this is a pyrrhic victory. In general these Hilbert space representations are neither unique nor empirically equivalent. In particular, these inequivalent representations, interpreted in the familiar way, yield disagreements about which algebraic states are physically realizable.Faced with this situation, Ruetsche presents several principled options—what she calls “pristine” interpretations of QM∞. The two most significant are what she calls “Hilbert Space Conservatism” and “Algebraic Imperialism.” The Conservative claims that, for a given system, there is one true Hilbert space representation, which should be interpreted in the familiar ways. The Imperialist, meanwhile, insists that only the abstract algebra matters: the physical states are the algebraic states, properties correspond to the operators in the algebra, and if our old methods do not apply, so much the worse for our methods.At this level of description, Imperialists may appear to have the advantage, since they need not fret over which representation to choose. But there's a catch. As we have seen, there is a sense in which Imperialists generally recognize a broader range of possible physical states. But Conservatives allow for more properties. This is because when one represents the abstract algebra as operators on a Hilbert space, the operators in the representation naturally approximate additional operators on that Hilbert space, in a way that is unavailable in the abstract setting. Thus each interpretation suffers from limitations that the other does not.To adjudicate between the interpretations, Ruetsche takes them to the trenches, to see which provides the resources to support the actual explanatory and representational practices of physics. After a masterful survey, she concludes that neither interpretation has all of the requisite resources. In particular, she argues, physicists regularly make essential use of operators that are only available to Conservatives, while making equally essential use of multiple inequivalent representations—which only Imperialists can support. More, the particular mix of Conservatism and Imperialism varies between applications, apparently ruling out a stable interpretation of the formalism that can be articulated independently of the messy details. We are left with what Ruetsche calls “adulterated” interpretations.Philosophers' practice notwithstanding, it might seem unsurprising that we cannot separate our interpretation of physical theories from the pragmatics of their application to the world. After all, we are interested in these theories only insofar as they are successfully applied. But Ruetsche believes the problem is more acute. It is not merely that pragmatic considerations enter the debate between Conservatives and Imperialists. Ruetsche argues that there may not be any consistent, general interpretation of QM∞ compatible with practice. And this, she claims, makes realism about QM∞ untenable.The idea that the applications of a broad class of our best physical theories undermine their consistent interpretation in a way that renders realism incoherent is striking. Insofar as Ruetsche's case is convincing, it should have serious repercussions for general philosophy of science—both because it bears on important debates and because it shows how generalist questions depend on the details of particular scientific theories and their applications. Indeed, Ruetsche's skepticism about the terms of the realism debate and her radical particularism should influence general philosophy of science. But that said, her argument ultimately leaves room for disagreement.Ruetsche's basic claim is that Conservatism and Imperialism each support practices that the other cannot and that both kinds of practice are essential. But there is an important asymmetry here. Conservatives suffer because they fail to represent putative physical possibilities appealed to in practice. Imperialists, meanwhile, need to justify that in certain applications, they may limit attention to a subset of the physical possibilities their interpretation admits, and then use resources that only make sense in those limited regimes.The trouble is that the Imperialists' opportunism is neither unusual in physics nor difficult to motivate. In spacetime physics, for instance, properties such as the total mass of the universe or global time can be defined only in very special cases. And yet such properties are used in practice, because often the salient spacetimes are precisely the ones in which these quantities make (approximate) sense. To make her case that adulteration in QM∞ undermines realism, Ruetsche would need to establish that the representation-dependent quantities used in applications of QM∞ are different in kind from analogous quantities that appear throughout physics. And here it is not clear that she succeeds.None of this undercuts the importance of the book, however. Indeed, Ruetsche acknowledges that her argument may depend on how one understands idealization in physics. And even if one takes the view just described, there is a great deal of work to do on how Imperialism can support the practices Ruetsche identifies—work that will surely proceed within the framework Ruetsche has laid out, by addressing questions Ruetsche has raised. And so, wherever our study of QM∞ takes us, Ruetsche's book is sure to play a central role.
The act of measurement on a quantum state is supposed to "dephase" (dephasing refers to the phenomenon that the states lose phase coherence; then the phases get randomized in interaction with a bath of other oscillators, which is referred to as "decoherence"), then "decohere" and "collapse" (or more precisely "register" and "reduce") the state into one of several eigenstates of the operator corresponding to the observable being measured. This measurement process is sometimes described as outside standard quantum-mechanical evolution and not calculable from Schrödinger's equation. Progress has, however, been made in studying this problem with two main calculation tools-one uses a time-independent Hamiltonian, while a rather more general approach proving that decoherence occurs under some generic conditions. The two general approaches to the study of wave-function collapse are as follows. The first approach, called the "consistent" or "decoherent"' histories approach, studies microscopic histories that diverge probabilistically and explains collapse as an event in our particular history. The other, referred to as the "environmental decoherence" approach studies the effect of the environment upon the quantum system, to explain wave-function decoherence which is produced by irreversible effects of various sorts. However, as we know, wave-function collapse is not related to thermal connection with the environment, rather, it is inherent to how measurements are performed by macroscopic apparata. In the "environmental decoherence" approach, one studies decoherence using a Markovian-approximated Master equation to study the time-evolution of the reduced density matrix (post dephasing) and obtains the long-time dependence of the off-diagonal elements of this matrix. The calculation in this paper studies the evolution of a quantum system starting with "dephasing" followed by the effects of the environment with some differences from prior analyses. We start from the Schrödinger equation for the state of the system, with a time-dependent Hamiltonian that reflects the actual microscopic interactions that are occurring. Then we systematically solve (exactly) for the time-evolved state, without invoking a Markovian approximation when writing out the effective time-evolution equation, i.e., keeping the evolution unitary until the end. This approach is useful, and it shows that the system wave-function will explicitly "un-collapse" if the measurement apparatus is sufficiently small. However, in the limit of a macroscopic system, this "dephasing" quickly leads to "decoherence"-collapse is a temporary state that will simply take extremely long (of the order of multiple universe lifetimes) to reverse. This has been attempted previously and our calculation is particularly simple and calculable. We make some connections to the work by Linden et al. while doing so. The calculation in this paper has interesting implications for the interpretation of the Wigner's friend experiment, as well as the Mott experiment, which is explored in "Connection to some general theoretical results" and "Recurrence times" (especially the enumerated points in "Recurrence times"). The upshot is that as long as Wigner's friend is macroscopically large (or uses a macroscopically large measuring instrument), no one needs to worry that Wigner would see something different from his friend. Indeed, Wigner's friend does not even need to be conscious during the measurement that she conducts. It also allows one to reasonably interpret some of the more recent thought experiments proposed. In particular, as a result of the mathematical analysis, the short-time behavior of a collapsing system, at least the one considered in this paper, is not exponential. Instead, it is the usual Fermi-golden rule result. The long-term behavior is, of course, still exponential. This is a second novel feature of the paper-we connect the short-term Fermi-golden rule (quadratic-in-time behavior) transition probability to the exponential long-time behavior of a collapsing wave-function in one continuous mathematical formulation.