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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics Letters

On quantum measurements

S. A. Granovskij

Published Mar 1, 2007• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Is the reduction of the wavefunction a real physical process? A mental experiment providing an answer to this question is considered.
DOI
10.1134/s0021364007010195

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Abstract Two questions standardly arise about the connections between quantum mechanics and consciousness: “how can consciousness impose a reduction of the physical system’s quantum state?”; and, conversely, “how can consciousness be produced by a quantum process?”. In this paper, such questions are not answered, but considered as symptoms of a cultural bias. Indeed, they involve two terms, consciousness and physical systems, which make the mental attractor of dualism irresistible. As an antidote, the monistic standpoint of phenomenology is adopted. According to phenomenology, consciousness is no thing or property that may exist, but a misleading name for the precondition for any ascription of existence. Several standard conundrums of quantum mechanics are revisited from this standpoint. In particular, the measurement problem (with its concept of state reduction) is immediately dissolved if one adopts a phenomenology-compatible interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is the case of QBism, which starts everything afresh from a first-person standpoint.
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We suggest a new answer to this intriguing question and argue that the answer may have implications for the solutions to the measurement problem. The main basis of our analysis is the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. First of all, based on this doctrine, we argue that an observer in a quantum superposition or a quantum observer has a definite conscious experience, which is neither disjunctive nor illusive. The inconsistency of this result with the bare theory is further analyzed, and it is shown that an appropriate use of the strategy of analyzing the disposition of an observer to answer a particular question also leads to the same result. Next, we argue that this new result seems to disfavor Everett's and Bohm's approaches to quantum mechanics when considering the doctrine of psychophysical supervenience. This suggests that dynamical collapse theories are in the right direction to solve the measurement problem. Thirdly, we analyze the concrete content of the conscious experience of a quantum observer. It is argued that the mental content of a quantum observer is related to both the amplitude and relative phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in, and it is composed of the mental content corresponding to every branch of the superposition. In addition, we argue that when assuming the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch determines the vividness of the mental content corresponding to the branch, the structured tails problem of dynamical collapse theories can be solved.