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Communications in computer and information science

Post-quantum Hash-Based Signatures for Secure Boot

Panos Kampanakis, Peter Panburana, Michael Curcio, Chirag Shroff

Published Jan 1, 2021• 13 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-72725-3_5

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One of the modern directions in the field of information security is post-quantum cryptography. Its purpose is to develop new quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms. An important section of post-quantum cryptography is electronic digital signature algorithms. There are a number of different approaches to designing post-quantum signatures. One of the main approaches to designing post-quantum cryptographic digital signature algorithms is hash-based post-quantum digital signature schemes. Hash-based post-quantum digital signature schemes are one of the main types of post-quantum cryptographic digital signature algorithms. They are quite efficient and provably secure. Their reliable security has been established against both classical and quantum attacks. There are many types of digital signatures for solving various information security problems, such as group signatures, ring signatures, blind signatures, verifiably encrypted signatures, etc. This paper proposes a new cryptographic protocol of verifiably encrypted signature with possibility of verification after a specified time based on the post-quantum cryptographic algorithm of hash-based digital signature, TANBA-SPHINCS+. The protocol is an efficient combination of the postquantum digital signature algorithm TANBA-SPHINCS+, the cryptographic protocol providing data encryption for a specified time, ECTLC, and the verifiably encrypted signature scheme.
This paper proposes a new post-quantum signature scheme, Syrga2, based on hash functions. As known, existing post-quantum algorithms are classified based on their structures. The proposed Syrga2 scheme belongs to the class of multi-use signatures with state retention. A distinctive feature of state-retaining signatures is achieving a compromise between performance and signature size. This scheme enables the creation of a secure signature for r messages using a single pair of secret and public keys. The strength of signature algorithms based on hash functions depends on the properties of the hash function used in their structure. Additionally, for such algorithms, it is possible to specify the security level precisely. In the proposed scheme, the HBC-256 algorithm developed at the Institute of Information and Computational Technologies (IICT) is used as the hash function. The security of the HBC-256 algorithm has been thoroughly studied in other works by the authors. In contrast to the Syrga1 scheme presented in previous works by the authors, the Syrga2 scheme provides for the definition of different security levels determined by the parameter τ. This paper experimentally demonstrates the impossibility of breaking the proposed scheme using a chosen-plaintext attack. Additionally, the scheme’s performance is evaluated for signature creation, signing, and message verification.