Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Ontological Commitment in Quantum Field Theory.

Andrew Wayne

Published Jan 1, 1994• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Related papers

Chapter 6. Ontological Commitment in Quantum Physics

Raphael Neelamkavil

Peter Lang eBooks•Jul 11, 2016•0 citations

Measurement and Ontology: What Kind of Evidence Can We Have for Quantum Fields?

Brigitte Falkenburg

In the following, I deal with the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT) from a Kantian point of view, in terms of parts of empirical reality and their relations. In contradistinction to a formal ontology of QFT that is based primarily on the formal structure of the theory, I focus on the ways in which quantum fields can be measured, and on the structural features of empirical reality to which these measurements give rise. To approach the ontology of quantum fields in terms of measurement results in two paradoxes. First, ontology is about the structure of independent entities which belong to the furniture of the world, but measurements rely on interaction. Second, experimental evidence for quantum field theories is mainly based on particle tracks and other local phenomena. Thus, what kind of evidence can we have for the field structure of quantum fields? My paper attempts to unravel these paradoxes in the following steps. First, I give a rough sketch of the appearances of particle physics, the kinds of experimental evidence which count as tests of quantum electrodynamcs (QED) and the standard model of particle physics (1). In an intermezzo on Kant's view of scientific experience, I explain in which terms we might conceive of empirical reality beyond the claims of strict empiricism (2). Finally, I apply these ideas to the appearances of particle physics and suggest that they commit us to a relational ontology of QFT (3).

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Nov 1, 2002•0 citations

Ontological Aspects of Quantum Field Theory

WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks•Jan 1, 2002•10 citations

Geometric Monism and the Ontology of Quantum Entities: A Continuous-Geometric Alternative to Particle and Wavefunction Ontologies

Andre Peter Steynberg

The ontology of quantum theory remains contested. Particle ontology struggles with the non-classical behavior of quantum entities, while wavefunction realism appears to locate the fundamental ontology in a high-dimensional mathematical state space rather than in ordinary physical space. Quantum field theory further complicates particle ontology by treating particle number as representation-dependent and, in interacting theories, often only emergent or approximate. This paper develops a philosophy-facing account of Geometric Monism (GM), a continuous-geometric ontology in which quantum entities are modeled as finite torsional standing-wave structures in a 5-dimensionalm geometric manifold governed by a universal Planck Stiffness κT = c4/G.The aim is not to replace the predictive formalism of quantum mechanics or quantum field theory. Rather, the paper asks whether the entities represented by those formalisms may be interpreted as continuous geometric structures rather than point particles, abstract wavefunctions, or merely emergent field excitations. GM distinguishes between continuous entity ontology and localized interaction events. To resolve the scale mismatch between the fundamental geometric stiffness and empirical observables, GM proposes a tripartite ontology: a Planck-scale topological core, a dimensional matching transition layer, and a macroscopic exterior dressing field. Observed measurement outcomes arise through boundary-conditioned interactions with this macroscopic dressing in accessible 4-dimensional spacetime.The paper presents the core ontological commitments of GM, including the active but observationally constrained embedding coordinate, the tripartite scale ontology, and the exact 40-degree operational microscopic sector obtained by imposing the Anti-Axial Constraint on the 5-dimensional torsion tensor. These commitments are compared with point-particle ontology, wavefunction realism, Bohmian mechanics, Everettian interpretations, and structural realism. The result is a proposed continuous-geometric primitive ontology: quantum objects are real, multi-scale geometric entities, while probabilities and measurement outcomes arise from localized boundary access to their macroscopic field extensions. Furthermore, the paper outlines the rigorous mathematical stability proofs required to validate such continuous ontologies.

•Apr 30, 2026•0 citations

Realism and Ontology in Quantum Mechanics and String Theory

Richard Dawid, Guilherme Franzmann

Dualities in physics have challenged traditional forms of scientific realism by undermining the idea that theories describe a unique underlying ontology. In this paper, we develop a new perspective on scientific realism that responds to this challenge. We argue that while realist commitment remains appropriate at the level of a theory's full formal structure, ontological commitment should be treated as tied to specific empirical contexts rather than to a fixed, real ontology. Our proposal draws inspiration from Dennett's notion of a "compression algorithm" as a defining criterion of a scientific theory. On this basis, we separate realism from ontological commitment. To clarify the stakes of this distinction, we contrast our approach with common core realism, which locates ontology in the invariant structure shared by dual models. Focusing on dualities in quantum mechanics and string theory, we show how our view accommodates ontological pluralism while preserving a robust form of structural realism.

physics.hist-phCross-listedarXiv:2512.17124•Dec 22, 2025•0 citations

QUANTUM MECHANICS AND ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

Peter Lewis

Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy•Jan 1, 1993•0 citations
In the following, I deal with the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT) from a Kantian point of view, in terms of parts of empirical reality and their relations. In contradistinction to a formal ontology of QFT that is based primarily on the formal structure of the theory, I focus on the ways in which quantum fields can be measured, and on the structural features of empirical reality to which these measurements give rise. To approach the ontology of quantum fields in terms of measurement results in two paradoxes. First, ontology is about the structure of independent entities which belong to the furniture of the world, but measurements rely on interaction. Second, experimental evidence for quantum field theories is mainly based on particle tracks and other local phenomena. Thus, what kind of evidence can we have for the field structure of quantum fields? My paper attempts to unravel these paradoxes in the following steps. First, I give a rough sketch of the appearances of particle physics, the kinds of experimental evidence which count as tests of quantum electrodynamcs (QED) and the standard model of particle physics (1). In an intermezzo on Kant's view of scientific experience, I explain in which terms we might conceive of empirical reality beyond the claims of strict empiricism (2). Finally, I apply these ideas to the appearances of particle physics and suggest that they commit us to a relational ontology of QFT (3).
The ontology of quantum theory remains contested. Particle ontology struggles with the non-classical behavior of quantum entities, while wavefunction realism appears to locate the fundamental ontology in a high-dimensional mathematical state space rather than in ordinary physical space. Quantum field theory further complicates particle ontology by treating particle number as representation-dependent and, in interacting theories, often only emergent or approximate. This paper develops a philosophy-facing account of Geometric Monism (GM), a continuous-geometric ontology in which quantum entities are modeled as finite torsional standing-wave structures in a 5-dimensionalm geometric manifold governed by a universal Planck Stiffness κT = c4/G.The aim is not to replace the predictive formalism of quantum mechanics or quantum field theory. Rather, the paper asks whether the entities represented by those formalisms may be interpreted as continuous geometric structures rather than point particles, abstract wavefunctions, or merely emergent field excitations. GM distinguishes between continuous entity ontology and localized interaction events. To resolve the scale mismatch between the fundamental geometric stiffness and empirical observables, GM proposes a tripartite ontology: a Planck-scale topological core, a dimensional matching transition layer, and a macroscopic exterior dressing field. Observed measurement outcomes arise through boundary-conditioned interactions with this macroscopic dressing in accessible 4-dimensional spacetime.The paper presents the core ontological commitments of GM, including the active but observationally constrained embedding coordinate, the tripartite scale ontology, and the exact 40-degree operational microscopic sector obtained by imposing the Anti-Axial Constraint on the 5-dimensional torsion tensor. These commitments are compared with point-particle ontology, wavefunction realism, Bohmian mechanics, Everettian interpretations, and structural realism. The result is a proposed continuous-geometric primitive ontology: quantum objects are real, multi-scale geometric entities, while probabilities and measurement outcomes arise from localized boundary access to their macroscopic field extensions. Furthermore, the paper outlines the rigorous mathematical stability proofs required to validate such continuous ontologies.
Dualities in physics have challenged traditional forms of scientific realism by undermining the idea that theories describe a unique underlying ontology. In this paper, we develop a new perspective on scientific realism that responds to this challenge. We argue that while realist commitment remains appropriate at the level of a theory's full formal structure, ontological commitment should be treated as tied to specific empirical contexts rather than to a fixed, real ontology. Our proposal draws inspiration from Dennett's notion of a "compression algorithm" as a defining criterion of a scientific theory. On this basis, we separate realism from ontological commitment. To clarify the stakes of this distinction, we contrast our approach with common core realism, which locates ontology in the invariant structure shared by dual models. Focusing on dualities in quantum mechanics and string theory, we show how our view accommodates ontological pluralism while preserving a robust form of structural realism.