Uncertainty may result from (1) an impossibility to measure what we want to measure, or an impossibility to observe the system, (2) the limited precision of our measurement, (3) the measurement fundamentally disturbing the system and, as such, causing the information to be unreliable, (4) an uncertainty that is inherent to Nature (Copenhagen interpretation). We agree with Lorentz’s and Einstein’s viewpoint: there is no need to elevate indeterminism to a philosophical principle. The more important question is: how does quantum physics model it? How does it deal with it? This paper wants to offer some thoughts on that, supporting Lorentz’s (and Einstein’s) position: we only have statistical indeterminism. Quantum physics should, therefore, not be seen as a radical departure from classical physics. Quantum-mechanical uncertainty is nothing but statistical indeterminism. This is, effectively, the fifth interpretation of uncertainty which should be added to the list above, and may well be the final one. The position is illustrated with a detailed discussion of the wavefunction(s) in the context of Schrodinger’s wave equation for the hydrogen atom. We also further explore the question in regard to the (possible) physical dimension of the real and imaginary part of the wavefunction. To paraphrase Feynman, we wonder what could be ‘sloshing back and forth’ between the real and imaginary part of the wavefunction? We think it is kinetic and potential energy. We, therefore, briefly present our two-dimensional oscillator model again, but using the metaphor of a multi-piston radial engine as a metaphor this time.
Uncertainty may result from (1) an impossibility to measure what we want to measure, or an impossibility to observe the system, (2) the limited precision of our measurement, (3) the measurement fundamentally disturbing the system and, as such, causing the information to be unreliable, (4) an uncertainty that is inherent to Nature (Copenhagen interpretation). We agree with Lorentz’s and Einstein’s viewpoint: there is no need to elevate indeterminism to a philosophical principle. The more important question is: how does quantum physics model it? How does it deal with it? This paper wants to offer some thoughts on that, supporting Lorentz’s (and Einstein’s) position: we only have statistical indeterminism. Quantum physics should, therefore, not be seen as a radical departure from classical physics. Quantum-mechanical uncertainty is nothing but statistical indeterminism. This is, effectively, the fifth interpretation of uncertainty which should be added to the list above, and may well be the final one. The position is illustrated with a detailed discussion of the wavefunction(s) in the context of Schrodinger’s wave equation for the hydrogen atom. We also further explore the question in regard to the (possible) physical dimension of the real and imaginary part of the wavefunction. To paraphrase Feynman, we wonder what could be ‘sloshing back and forth’ between the real and imaginary part of the wavefunction? We think it is kinetic and potential energy. We, therefore, briefly present our two-dimensional oscillator model again, but using the metaphor of a multi-piston radial engine as a metaphor this time.
Abstract Quantum mechanics is our most successful and versatile account of the basic constituents of matter, of their interaction and of their compounds. We introduce the theory via a sketch of its history and lay out its mathematical structure in some detail. Before this background we address the important and controversial question of how to interpret that structure. We contextualise our own position, which is linked to our account of ontological emergence as detailed in Chap. 2 , and which is mathematically best expressed in the Heisenberg picture of quantum dynamics. Indeterminism and irreversible processes are fundamental for our approach. We discuss the dialectics of the deterministic challenge to our position and argue that indeterminism in the form of quantum randomness has turned from a philosophical riddle to a technological resource. This claim is supported by a discussion of quantum information science, including some of its basic protocols. Towards the end of the chapter we argue that agency and quantum mechanics come as a package deal. For one, quantum mechanics describes the world as offering open possibilities for the future at a fundamental physical level, which is needed for real higher-order organisation, including agency. Of course, this does not in any way show that the actual existence of agents in our world is guaranteed. But it does show that general agency scepticism has no basis in physics. Second, we show that quantum mechanics is best understood as a theory that describes our agential interactions with nature, and not as a theory that represents nature from the point of view of an inert, detached observer.
This book examines in detail two of the fundamental questions raised by quantum mechanics. Is the world indeterministic? Are there connections between spatially separated objects? In the first part of the book after outlining the formalism of quantum mechanics and introducing the measurement problem, the author examines several interpretations, focusing on how each proposes to solve the measurement problem and on how each treats probability. In the second part, the author argues that there can be non-trivial relationships between probability (specifically, determinism and indeterminism) and non-locality in an interpretation of quantum mechanics. The author then re-examines some of the interpretations of part one of the book in the light of this argument, and considers how they are with regard to locality and Lorentz invariance. One of the important lessons that comes out of this discussion is that any examination of locality, and of the relationship between quantum mechanics and the theory of relativity, should be undertaken in the context of a detailed interpretation of quantum mechanics. The book will appeal to anyone with an interest in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, including researchers in the philosophy of physics and theoretical physics, as well as graduate students in those fields.
The word 'uncertainty', in the context of quantum mechanics, usually evokes an impression of an essential unknowability of what might actually be going on at the quantum level of activity, as is made explicit in Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and in the fact that the theory normally provides only probabilities for the results of quantum measurement. These issues limit our ultimate understanding of the behaviour of things, if we take quantum mechanics to represent an absolute truth. But they do not cause us to put that very 'truth' into question. This article addresses the issue of quantum 'uncertainty' from a different perspective, raising the question of whether this term might be applied to the theory itself, despite its unrefuted huge success over an enormously diverse range of observed phenomena. There are, indeed, seeming internal contradictions in the theory that lead us to infer that a total faith in it at all levels of scale leads us to almost fantastical implications.
This paper further explores the structural similarities between the elementary quantum-mechanical wavefunction and circularly polarized electromagnetic waves to further tune a possible physical interpretation of the wavefunction. The interpretation that is offered analyzes the real and the imaginary part of the wavefunction as oscillations which each carry half of the total energy of the particle. These oscillations are perpendicular to each other, and the interplay between both may describe how energy propagates through space over time. The model is based on three fundamental premises: 1.The dimension of the matter-wave field vector is force per unit mass (N/kg), as opposed to the force per unit charge (N/C) dimension of the electric field vector. This dimension is an acceleration (m/s2), which is the dimension of the gravitational field. 2.This gravitational disturbance may cause a charged mass to move about some center, combining linear and circular motion. This interpretation may reconcile the wave-particle duality to some extent: fields interfere but if, at the same time, they do drive a pointlike particle, this may explain why, as Feynman puts it, “when you do find the electron some place, the entire charge is there.” This hybrid hypothesis is supported by an elegant yet simple derivation of the Compton radius of an electron. 3.In light of the direction of the magnetic moment of an electron in an inhomogeneous magnetic field, the plane which circumscribes the circulatory motion of the electron should also comprise the direction of its linear motion. Hence, unlike an electromagnetic wave, the plane of the two-dimensional oscillation cannot be perpendicular to the direction of motion of our electron. Finally, this paper addresses an issue which has hampered other physical interpretations of the wavefunction: amplitude transformations when going from one representation (or reference frame) to another. Indeed, the author re-visits the original mathematical arguments here and shows that the proposed model, and the related physical interpretation of the wavefunction, are not incompatible with the key results and mainstream logic in this regard.
Because the particles follow a wave pattern of probability prescribed by schrodinger equation and we are guided by uncertainty principles, we often wrongly interpret the nature of reality. Heisenberg only prescribes the measurement problems of very small due to limitations of wave length of the observing beam and that is the natural limitation but wrongly we say that nature is acting indeterministi. Thus we wrongly understand uncertainty principles connecting t to saying that nature can never be precisely defined in momentum and position.In the same way we measure time in relativity theory confusing the very notion of time.