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Cambridge University Press eBooks

The Tiger and the Shark: Empirical Roots of Wave-Particle Dualism

Bruce R. Wheaton, Thomas Kühn

Published Sep 30, 1983• 83 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The early twentieth century brought about the rejection by physicists of the doctrine of determinism - the belief that complete knowledge of the initial conditions of an interaction in nature allows precise and unambiguous prediction of the outcome. This book traces the origins of a central problem leading to this change in viewpoint and paradoxes raised by attempts to formulate a consistent theory of the nature of light. It outlines the different approaches adopted by members of different national cultures to the apparent inconsistencies, explains why Einstein's early (1905) attempt at a resolution was not taken seriously for fifteen years, and describes the mixture of ideas that created a route to a new, antideterministic formulation of the laws of nature. Dr Wheaton describes the experimental work on the new forms of radiation found at the turn of the century and shows how the interpretation of energy transfer from X-rays to matter gradually transformed a classical wave explanation of light to one based on particle like quanta of energy, and further, he explains how influential scientists came reluctantly to accept a wavelike interpretation of matter as well. This new and distinctively different account of one of the major theoretical shifts in modern physical thought will be of fundamental interest to physical scientists and philosophers, as well as to historians of science.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9780511759338

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THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER THE most fundamental questions which are raised in modern science are concerned with matter and energy. which are said to be different aspects of the same reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves, and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter. It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less temporary entities within the wave field whose form and behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves, which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is merely a device for computing the probability of finding a particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both. The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities. This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis219 WILLIAM H. KANE concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated. After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings. On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which include as special cases the facts and correlations already established. The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building blocks out of which all bodies are made. Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can there be a wave without something waving? How can anything come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the very questions which the primary data of experience raise in our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of natural things we must account for change. We must explain in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing is and how it comes into being and ceases to be. It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin- THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE 221 ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology...

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The British Journal for the History of Science•Sep 1, 1997•4 citations
The early twentieth century brought about the rejection by physicists of the doctrine of determinism - the belief that complete knowledge of the initial conditions of an interaction in nature allows precise and unambiguous prediction of the outcome. This book traces the origins of a central problem leading to this change in viewpoint and paradoxes raised by attempts to formulate a consistent theory of the nature of light. It outlines the different approaches adopted by members of different national cultures to the apparent inconsistencies, explains why Einstein's early (1905) attempt at a resolution was not taken seriously for fifteen years, and describes the mixture of ideas that created a route to a new, antideterministic formulation of the laws of nature. Dr Wheaton describes the experimental work on the new forms of radiation found at the turn of the century and shows how the interpretation of energy transfer from X-rays to matter gradually transformed a classical wave explanation of light to one based on particle like quanta of energy, and further, he explains how influential scientists came reluctantly to accept a wavelike interpretation of matter as well. This new and distinctively different account of one of the major theoretical shifts in modern physical thought will be of fundamental interest to physical scientists and philosophers, as well as to historians of science.
Although the calculation of the Compton effect on the basis of the theory of light quantum is well known through text books in modern physics, it is not so well known that Compton attempted to explain the result of X-ray scattering by means of the effect of interference, but confronted with a serious difficulty, and thus turned to the theory of light quantum. About the time of the discovery of the Compton effect, Schrödinger derived, by making use of the conservation law of energy and momentum, from the standpoint of the theory of light quantum, the formula for the Doppler effect, and Duane, by applying the quantum condition and also from the viewpoint of the theory of light quantum, the Bragg formula for X-ray scattering. It is interesting to see the process by which they came to apply the theory of light theory to wave phenomena. It should be noted especially that de Broglie's wave theory actually resulted from the theory of light quantum. As we shall see in the text, de Broglie's attempt to understand the particle-nature of light quantum by means of the rest mass of light quantum brought forth, rather, the concept of the wave-nature of material particles. Bohr, who was in doubt about the theory of light quantum, proposed in collaboration with Kramers and Slater the law of statistical conservation of energy and momentum and treated the dispersion of light as a typical wave phenomenon. They proposed the law of statistical conservation of energy and momentum and treated the dispersion of light as a typical wave phenomenon. Their proposal of the law of statistical conservation of energy and momentum was, however, negated immediately by Compton and Simon's experiment with the use of a Wilson chamber. It is scarcely told, so far, in textbooks on the history of science that Kramers and Heisenberg, in generalizing Kramers' wave-theoretical formula for the dispersion of light to include the case of incoherent scattering of light, took account of Smekal's study of the scattering of light on the basis of the theory of light quantum.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE THROUGH MOTION AND MATTER THE most fundamental questions which are raised in modern science are concerned with matter and energy. which are said to be different aspects of the same reality. This reality is described in terms of particles and waves, and there is good experimental evidence for both. Particles can be recognized by their tracks in a photographic emulsion or in a cloud chamber, and they can be recorded with a Geiger counter. Diffraction and interference phenomena serve for the study of the continuous field or wave character of matter, which is manifested not only by light but also by electrons, neutrons and protons. Thus particles appear as waves and waves as particles: the two seem inseparable. Yet the difficulty of combining these two aspects of things in a unified picture is so great that it has been called the main stumbling block which prevents the formation of a stable and certain concept of matter. It has been suggested that the particles may be more or less temporary entities within the wave field whose form and behavior are determined by the laws of the waves themselves, which in certain cases permit waves to appear as if they were permanent substantial beings. Or perhaps the wa.ve field is merely a device for computing the probability of finding a particle of given properties at a given position. At any rate most theoreticians will probably admit that the individual particle is not a well-defined and permanent entity whose identity or sameness can be detected experimentally. In a word, the modern analysis of matter leaves us uncertain whether the world is a system o£ waves or particles or both. The only thing which seems certain is that there are no welldefined and permanent entities. This picture of physical reality may at first seem very dis219 WILLIAM H. KANE concerting and quite opposed to ordinary ways of thinking. For reassurance we may take hasty refuge in the common view that nothing is certain in science, nothing finaL New data will surely be uncovered, and new principles will be formulated. After all, science gives us only a tentative and partial view which is always subject to revision and revaluation. But the hypotheses of science are not opposed to previous valid findings. On the contrary, agreement with the data of experience is what validates a scientific principle. When new data exceed the limits of former principles, new hypotheses must be formulated which include as special cases the facts and correlations already established. The primary datum of our sensory experience is the fact of change in the world around us and in us. When we realize that we ourselves were born and will die; that we came into being and will cease to be in this world at least; that not only organisms of all kinds but also the chemical compounds are generated and corrupted, why is it surprising to be told by modern scientists that even the chemical atoms and the elementary particles of which they are composed are not permanent entities but transitory things? Perhaps it is because we had become accustomed to think of the atoms as indestructible building blocks out of which all bodies are made. Perhaps there is also a deeper reason for wonder. If everything is changing, how can there be anything even relatively permanent in the world? ·what are air and water, rocks and trees, animals and men? How can there even be change? Can there be a wave without something waving? How can anything come to be and cease to be in this world? To these questions there is no certain answer in modern science. Yet these are the very questions which the primary data of experience raise in our minds. If we desire a fundamental understanding of natural things we must account for change. We must explain in terms of its own proper principles what a changeable thing is and how it comes into being and ceases to be. It is not customary in modern science to look for basic prin- THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO NATURAL SCIENCE 221 ciples. Often we are told by philosophers of science and scientific methodology...
At the atomic scale, the distinction between particles and waves breaks down. The realization, early in the twentieth century, that light consists of discrete packages, or “photons,” prompted the converse suggestion that particles could behave like waves. Confirmation of this idea came in 1927, from an experiment involving the scattering of electrons from a crystal. Today, “wave-particle duality” is central to quantum mechanics, and the wave properties of subatomic particles are widely used in microscopy and crystallography. Electron diffraction techniques are widely used to characterize atomic arrangements on solid surfaces and inside thin films, and to investigate the structures of molecules in gases. The dual nature of waves and particles is part of the “spookiness” of quantum mechanics, which cannot be explained in any classical way. It used to be that one could only imagine an experiment that would simultaneously demonstrate the particle and wave nature of electrons.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, it became clear that microscopic particles do not obey Newton's laws of classical mechanics. The idea of light quanta was at odds with the established wisdom that light is a wave phenomenon, of course, but no other explanation of the photoelectric effect seemed possible. The next step in the development of quantum mechanics was taken by Niels Bohr, who introduced postulates about the discreteness of the energy of the bound electrons in an atom similar to the discreteness of the energy of light quanta. Modern quantum mechanics was founded by Werner Heisenberg, Max Born, Erwin Schroedinger, Paul Adrian Maurice Dirac, Wolfgang Pauli, Enrico Fermi, and others. In quantum mechanics, it is in general fundamentally impossible to determine the exact outcome of an experiment; one can only determine the probability of any given outcome.
As has become evident from historical studies, science does not proceed in the coherent and predictable way that basic science texts would have us believe. I will argue that an excellent counter-example is an episode from the historical development of quantum mechanics in which the incompatibility of the particle and the wave representations of the electron and light were destined to be encompassed by two mathematically equivalent, but conceptually quite different theories. I shall argue that the appearance of two such different, yet equivalent, quantum theories was not surprising at all and I claim even predictable. As Einstein himself wrote in 1909: ‘It is my opinion that the next phase in the development of theoretical physics will bring us a theory of light that can be interpreted as a kind of fusion of the wave and the [particle] theory.’ Certainly, the interpretative content of Werner Heisenberg's and Erwin Schrödinger's theories could not have been more different. By mid-1926, the theoretical foundations had been laid for a scientific and emotional battleground between the particle and the wave. I suggest that an important element in the debate was not the incompatibility itself but actually coming to terms with ambiguity in science. For, in the end, ambiguous and vague interpretations of the same phenomena became part of science, where science was supposed to give a clear and unambiguous description of nature.