Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Protecting the output of a quantum computer with random circuit samplers

Zixin Huang, Pieter Kok, Cosmo Lupo

Published Mar 25, 2020• 2 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Random quantum circuit samplers have been used to demonstrate the exponential speed-up of quantum processors beyond what is tractable classically [Arute, K. et al., Nature 574, 505 (2019)]. However, useful applications for these samplers have so far been elusive. Here, we propose random circuit as efficient devices for protecting the output of a quantum computer. We consider a scenario where the server performs universal fault-tolerant quantum computation and the user gains access to the output using a pseudo-random circuit. We show that a private key much smaller than the size of the output may prevent unauthorised access. For an $n$-qubit computation, a standard approach requires an $n$-bit key to scramble the state. We provide an information-theoretic proof showing that obfuscation can be achieved with order $n - H_\mathrm{min}(\mathsf{X})$ secret bits, where $H_\mathrm{min}(\mathsf{X})$ is the min-entropy of the output of the computation. As interesting computations are expected to have large min-entropy, this represents a substantial reduction of the key size.

Related papers

Certified Randomness from Quantum Supremacy

Scott Aaronson, Shih-Han Hung

We propose an application for near-term quantum devices: namely, generating cryptographically certified random bits, to use (for example) in proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies. Our protocol repurposes the existing “quantum supremacy” experiments, based on random circuit sampling, that Google and USTC have successfully carried out starting in 2019. We show that, whenever the outputs of these experiments pass the now-standard Linear Cross-Entropy Benchmark (LXEB), under plausible hardness assumptions they necessarily contain Ω(n) min-entropy, where n is the number of qubits. To achieve a net gain in randomness, we use a small random seed to produce pseudorandom challenge circuits. In response to the challenge circuits, the quantum computer generates output strings that, after verification, can then be fed into a randomness extractor to produce certified nearly-uniform bits—thereby “bootstrapping” from pseudorandomness to genuine randomness. We prove our protocol sound in two senses: (i) under a hardness assumption called Long List Quantum Supremacy Verification, which we justify in the random oracle model, and (ii) unconditionally in the random oracle model against an eavesdropper who could share arbitrary entanglement with the device. (Note that our protocol’s output is unpredictable even to a computationally unbounded adversary who can see the random oracle.) Currently, the central drawback of our protocol is the exponential cost of verification, which in practice will limit its implementation to at most n∼ 60 qubits, a regime where attacks are expensive but not impossible. Modulo that drawback, our protocol appears to be the only practical application of quantum computing that both requires a QC and is physically realizable today.

arXiv:2303.01625•ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•May 16, 2023•42 citations

Quantum supremacy and random circuits

Ramis Movassagh

As Moore's law reaches its limits, quantum computers are emerging with the promise of dramatically outperforming classical computers. We have witnessed the advent of quantum processors with over $50$ quantum bits (qubits), which are expected to be beyond the reach of classical simulation. Quantum supremacy is the event at which the old Extended Church-Turing Thesis is overturned: A quantum computer performs a task that is practically impossible for any classical (super)computer. The demonstration requires both a solid theoretical guarantee and an experimental realization. The lead candidate is Random Circuit Sampling (RCS), which is the task of sampling from the output distribution of random quantum circuits. Google recently announced a $53-$qubit experimental demonstration of RCS. Soon after, classical algorithms appeared that challenge the supremacy of random circuits by estimating their outputs. How hard is it to classically simulate the output of random quantum circuits? We prove that estimating the output probabilities of random quantum circuits is formidably hard ($\#P$-Hard) for any classical computer. This makes RCS the strongest candidate for demonstrating quantum supremacy relative to all other proposals. The robustness to the estimation error that we prove may serve as a new hardness criterion for the performance of classical algorithms. To achieve this, we introduce the Cayley path interpolation between any two gates of a quantum computation and convolve recent advances in quantum complexity and information with probability and random matrices. Furthermore, we apply algebraic geometry to generalize the well-known Berlekamp-Welch algorithm that is widely used in coding theory and cryptography. Our results imply that there is an exponential hardness barrier for the classical simulation of most quantum circuits.

arXiv:1909.06210•Sep 11, 2019•75 citations

Random Quantum Circuits Beyond Moment Matching

Shih-Han Hung

Random quantum circuits aim to efficiently reproduce the statistical properties of ideal random quantum evolution. One approach is to construct approximate unitary designs, which match the moments of Haar-random unitaries up to a prescribed order with controlled error. We establish quantitative guarantees for how accurately these designs reproduce the distribution of each output probability. We show that, for every strong $\varepsilon$-approximate unitary $k$-design on $n$ qubits, the distribution of each output probability is within $O(k^{-1/2}(1+k/2^n)^{-1/2}+\varepsilon)$ in Kolmogorov distance of the Porter-Thomas distribution, a beta distribution with parameters $1$ and $2^n-1$. This bound is optimal up to constant factors, implying that a substantially better uniform bound requires additional structure. We then show that a mild form of local invariance suffices. We prove that any such design that is invariant under unitary translations acting on a single qubit approximates Porter-Thomas to total variation distance $O(k^{-1/2}+\varepsilon)$. Every strong $\varepsilon$-approximate unitary $k$-design invariant on $\log k+O(1)$ qubits achieves error $2^{-Ω(k)}+O(\varepsilon)$ in Kolmogorov distance and $2^{-Ω(k)}+O(\varepsilon\log(2/\varepsilon))$ in total variation distance. These results identify the distributional accuracy guaranteed by moment matching and the structure that improves it. As an application, we show that the Shannon entropy of the output distribution of a strong $\varepsilon$-approximate $k$-design is concentrated around its Haar value $n-Θ(1)$: its mean differs from the Haar mean by $O(k^{-1/4}+\varepsilon^{1/2})$ and its standard deviation is $O(2^{-n/2}+k^{-1/8}+\varepsilon^{1/4})$. Consequently, a trusted device sampling such circuits generates $n-O(1)$ bits of entropy per sample, which makes them useful for random number generation.

quant-pharXiv:2610.02135•Oct 2, 2026•0 citations

Leveraging Quantum Circuit Cutting for Obfuscation and Intellectual Property Protection

George Typaldos, Wei Tang, Jakub M. Szefer

Circuit cutting is a novel technique in the field of quantum computing that offers a promising approach for breaking up large quantum circuits into smaller ones that can be executed on smaller quantum computers. Circuit cutting offers a scalable and hybrid computing approach, by combining classical and quantum computers to run large quantum circuits. At the same time, quantum circuits represent the fundamental building blocks of quantum algorithms, and obfuscation techniques are crucial for protecting the sensitive information and intellectual property encoded in these circuits. This paper constitutes the first security analysis of circuit cutting techniques as a means to protect quantum circuits, and not just for cutting bigger quantum circuits to fit on smaller devices. As cloud providers are in control of quantum computers and give access to users, utilizing cloud-based quantum computers for executing quantum circuits involves considerable security risks. This work demonstrates that quantum circuits can be effectively obfuscated by using quantum circuit cutting techniques. If users are worried about an adversary who attempts to reverse-engineer the original quantum algorithm, circuit cutting can be used as a security measure. To further provide configurable obfuscation level, i.e. number of possible circuits that the cloud provider would have to guess, this work proposes a novel dummy-subcircuits technique. This technique introduces dummy subcircuits with additional qubit cut points to create more confusion for the cloud provider and further help to obfuscate the user's original circuits with limited cost.

IEEE International Conference on Quantum Computing and Engineering (QCE)•Sep 15, 2024•5 citations

Certified randomness using a trapped-ion quantum processor

Minzhao Liu, Ruslan Shaydulin, Pradeep Niroula +29 more

Abstract Although quantum computers can perform a wide range of practically important tasks beyond the abilities of classical computers 1,2 , realizing this potential remains a challenge. An example is to use an untrusted remote device to generate random bits that can be certified to contain a certain amount of entropy 3 . Certified randomness has many applications but is impossible to achieve solely by classical computation. Here we demonstrate the generation of certifiably random bits using the 56-qubit Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion quantum computer accessed over the Internet. Our protocol leverages the classical hardness of recent random circuit sampling demonstrations 4,5 : a client generates quantum ‘challenge’ circuits using a small randomness seed, sends them to an untrusted quantum server to execute and verifies the results of the server. We analyse the security of our protocol against a restricted class of realistic near-term adversaries. Using classical verification with measured combined sustained performance of 1.1 × 10 18 floating-point operations per second across multiple supercomputers, we certify 71,313 bits of entropy under this restricted adversary and additional assumptions. Our results demonstrate a step towards the practical applicability of present-day quantum computers.

arXiv:2503.20498•Nature•Mar 26, 2025•56 citations

Quantum Logic Locking for Security

Rasit Onur Topaloglu

Having access to a unique quantum circuit that one wants to protect against use by others is a very likely scenario in industrial computing. However, currently, users rely on classical computer security schemes, which have known shortcomings. In this paper, we introduce a novel protection scheme along with a survey of other known methods to protect quantum information. In particular, we review physically unclonable functions (PUFs), obfuscation, and introduce quantum logic locking (QLL). The latter technique provisions end users to protect their circuit from an adversary through the use of a secret key.

J — Multidisciplinary Scientific Journal•Jul 12, 2023•15 citations
Random quantum circuit samplers have been used to demonstrate the exponential speed-up of quantum processors beyond what is tractable classically [Arute, K. et al., Nature 574, 505 (2019)]. However, useful applications for these samplers have so far been elusive. Here, we propose random circuit as efficient devices for protecting the output of a quantum computer. We consider a scenario where the server performs universal fault-tolerant quantum computation and the user gains access to the output using a pseudo-random circuit. We show that a private key much smaller than the size of the output may prevent unauthorised access. For an nnn-qubit computation, a standard approach requires an nnn-bit key to scramble the state. We provide an information-theoretic proof showing that obfuscation can be achieved with order n−Hmin(X)n - H_\mathrm{min}(\mathsf{X})n−Hmin​(X) secret bits, where Hmin(X)H_\mathrm{min}(\mathsf{X})Hmin​(X) is the min-entropy of the output of the computation. As interesting computations are expected to have large min-entropy, this represents a substantial reduction of the key size.
We propose an application for near-term quantum devices: namely, generating cryptographically certified random bits, to use (for example) in proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies. Our protocol repurposes the existing “quantum supremacy” experiments, based on random circuit sampling, that Google and USTC have successfully carried out starting in 2019. We show that, whenever the outputs of these experiments pass the now-standard Linear Cross-Entropy Benchmark (LXEB), under plausible hardness assumptions they necessarily contain Ω(n) min-entropy, where n is the number of qubits. To achieve a net gain in randomness, we use a small random seed to produce pseudorandom challenge circuits. In response to the challenge circuits, the quantum computer generates output strings that, after verification, can then be fed into a randomness extractor to produce certified nearly-uniform bits—thereby “bootstrapping” from pseudorandomness to genuine randomness. We prove our protocol sound in two senses: (i) under a hardness assumption called Long List Quantum Supremacy Verification, which we justify in the random oracle model, and (ii) unconditionally in the random oracle model against an eavesdropper who could share arbitrary entanglement with the device. (Note that our protocol’s output is unpredictable even to a computationally unbounded adversary who can see the random oracle.) Currently, the central drawback of our protocol is the exponential cost of verification, which in practice will limit its implementation to at most n∼ 60 qubits, a regime where attacks are expensive but not impossible. Modulo that drawback, our protocol appears to be the only practical application of quantum computing that both requires a QC and is physically realizable today.
As Moore's law reaches its limits, quantum computers are emerging with the promise of dramatically outperforming classical computers. We have witnessed the advent of quantum processors with over 505050 quantum bits (qubits), which are expected to be beyond the reach of classical simulation. Quantum supremacy is the event at which the old Extended Church-Turing Thesis is overturned: A quantum computer performs a task that is practically impossible for any classical (super)computer. The demonstration requires both a solid theoretical guarantee and an experimental realization. The lead candidate is Random Circuit Sampling (RCS), which is the task of sampling from the output distribution of random quantum circuits. Google recently announced a 53−53-53−qubit experimental demonstration of RCS. Soon after, classical algorithms appeared that challenge the supremacy of random circuits by estimating their outputs. How hard is it to classically simulate the output of random quantum circuits? We prove that estimating the output probabilities of random quantum circuits is formidably hard (#P\#P#P-Hard) for any classical computer. This makes RCS the strongest candidate for demonstrating quantum supremacy relative to all other proposals. The robustness to the estimation error that we prove may serve as a new hardness criterion for the performance of classical algorithms. To achieve this, we introduce the Cayley path interpolation between any two gates of a quantum computation and convolve recent advances in quantum complexity and information with probability and random matrices. Furthermore, we apply algebraic geometry to generalize the well-known Berlekamp-Welch algorithm that is widely used in coding theory and cryptography. Our results imply that there is an exponential hardness barrier for the classical simulation of most quantum circuits.
Random quantum circuits aim to efficiently reproduce the statistical properties of ideal random quantum evolution. One approach is to construct approximate unitary designs, which match the moments of Haar-random unitaries up to a prescribed order with controlled error. We establish quantitative guarantees for how accurately these designs reproduce the distribution of each output probability. We show that, for every strong ε\varepsilonε-approximate unitary kkk-design on nnn qubits, the distribution of each output probability is within O(k−1/2(1+k/2n)−1/2+ε)O(k^{-1/2}(1+k/2^n)^{-1/2}+\varepsilon)O(k−1/2(1+k/2n)−1/2+ε) in Kolmogorov distance of the Porter-Thomas distribution, a beta distribution with parameters 111 and 2n−12^n-12n−1. This bound is optimal up to constant factors, implying that a substantially better uniform bound requires additional structure. We then show that a mild form of local invariance suffices. We prove that any such design that is invariant under unitary translations acting on a single qubit approximates Porter-Thomas to total variation distance O(k−1/2+ε)O(k^{-1/2}+\varepsilon)O(k−1/2+ε). Every strong ε\varepsilonε-approximate unitary kkk-design invariant on log⁡k+O(1)\log k+O(1)logk+O(1) qubits achieves error 2−Ω(k)+O(ε)2^{-Ω(k)}+O(\varepsilon)2−Ω(k)+O(ε) in Kolmogorov distance and 2−Ω(k)+O(εlog⁡(2/ε))2^{-Ω(k)}+O(\varepsilon\log(2/\varepsilon))2−Ω(k)+O(εlog(2/ε)) in total variation distance. These results identify the distributional accuracy guaranteed by moment matching and the structure that improves it. As an application, we show that the Shannon entropy of the output distribution of a strong ε\varepsilonε-approximate kkk-design is concentrated around its Haar value n−Θ(1)n-Θ(1)n−Θ(1): its mean differs from the Haar mean by O(k−1/4+ε1/2)O(k^{-1/4}+\varepsilon^{1/2})O(k−1/4+ε1/2) and its standard deviation is O(2−n/2+k−1/8+ε1/4)O(2^{-n/2}+k^{-1/8}+\varepsilon^{1/4})O(2−n/2+k−1/8+ε1/4). Consequently, a trusted device sampling such circuits generates n−O(1)n-O(1)n−O(1) bits of entropy per sample, which makes them useful for random number generation.
Circuit cutting is a novel technique in the field of quantum computing that offers a promising approach for breaking up large quantum circuits into smaller ones that can be executed on smaller quantum computers. Circuit cutting offers a scalable and hybrid computing approach, by combining classical and quantum computers to run large quantum circuits. At the same time, quantum circuits represent the fundamental building blocks of quantum algorithms, and obfuscation techniques are crucial for protecting the sensitive information and intellectual property encoded in these circuits. This paper constitutes the first security analysis of circuit cutting techniques as a means to protect quantum circuits, and not just for cutting bigger quantum circuits to fit on smaller devices. As cloud providers are in control of quantum computers and give access to users, utilizing cloud-based quantum computers for executing quantum circuits involves considerable security risks. This work demonstrates that quantum circuits can be effectively obfuscated by using quantum circuit cutting techniques. If users are worried about an adversary who attempts to reverse-engineer the original quantum algorithm, circuit cutting can be used as a security measure. To further provide configurable obfuscation level, i.e. number of possible circuits that the cloud provider would have to guess, this work proposes a novel dummy-subcircuits technique. This technique introduces dummy subcircuits with additional qubit cut points to create more confusion for the cloud provider and further help to obfuscate the user's original circuits with limited cost.
Abstract Although quantum computers can perform a wide range of practically important tasks beyond the abilities of classical computers 1,2 , realizing this potential remains a challenge. An example is to use an untrusted remote device to generate random bits that can be certified to contain a certain amount of entropy 3 . Certified randomness has many applications but is impossible to achieve solely by classical computation. Here we demonstrate the generation of certifiably random bits using the 56-qubit Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion quantum computer accessed over the Internet. Our protocol leverages the classical hardness of recent random circuit sampling demonstrations 4,5 : a client generates quantum ‘challenge’ circuits using a small randomness seed, sends them to an untrusted quantum server to execute and verifies the results of the server. We analyse the security of our protocol against a restricted class of realistic near-term adversaries. Using classical verification with measured combined sustained performance of 1.1 × 10 18 floating-point operations per second across multiple supercomputers, we certify 71,313 bits of entropy under this restricted adversary and additional assumptions. Our results demonstrate a step towards the practical applicability of present-day quantum computers.
Having access to a unique quantum circuit that one wants to protect against use by others is a very likely scenario in industrial computing. However, currently, users rely on classical computer security schemes, which have known shortcomings. In this paper, we introduce a novel protection scheme along with a survey of other known methods to protect quantum information. In particular, we review physically unclonable functions (PUFs), obfuscation, and introduce quantum logic locking (QLL). The latter technique provisions end users to protect their circuit from an adversary through the use of a secret key.