Certified randomness using a trapped-ion quantum processor
Minzhao Liu, Ruslan Shaydulin, Pradeep Niroula, Matthew P. DeCross, Shih-Han Hung, Wen Yu Kon, Enrique Cervero-Martín, Kaushik Chakraborty, Omar Amer, Scott Aaronson, Atithi Acharya, Yuri Alexeev, K. Jordan Berg, Shouvanik Chakrabarti, Florian J. Curchod, Joan Dreiling, Neal R. Erickson, Cameron Foltz, Michael Foss‐Feig, David Hayes, Travis S. Humble, Niraj Kumar, Jeffrey M. Larson, Danylo Lykov, Michael Mills, Steven A. Moses, Brian Neyenhuis, Shaltiel Eloul, Peter Siegfried, J. Walker, Charles Lim, Marco Pistoia
Abstract Although quantum computers can perform a wide range of practically important tasks beyond the abilities of classical computers 1,2 , realizing this potential remains a challenge. An example is to use an untrusted remote device to generate random bits that can be certified to contain a certain amount of entropy 3 . Certified randomness has many applications but is impossible to achieve solely by classical computation. Here we demonstrate the generation of certifiably random bits using the 56-qubit Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion quantum computer accessed over the Internet. Our protocol leverages the classical hardness of recent random circuit sampling demonstrations 4,5 : a client generates quantum ‘challenge’ circuits using a small randomness seed, sends them to an untrusted quantum server to execute and verifies the results of the server. We analyse the security of our protocol against a restricted class of realistic near-term adversaries. Using classical verification with measured combined sustained performance of 1.1 × 10 18 floating-point operations per second across multiple supercomputers, we certify 71,313 bits of entropy under this restricted adversary and additional assumptions. Our results demonstrate a step towards the practical applicability of present-day quantum computers.
Abstract Although quantum computers can perform a wide range of practically important tasks beyond the abilities of classical computers 1,2 , realizing this potential remains a challenge. An example is to use an untrusted remote device to generate random bits that can be certified to contain a certain amount of entropy 3 . Certified randomness has many applications but is impossible to achieve solely by classical computation. Here we demonstrate the generation of certifiably random bits using the 56-qubit Quantinuum H2-1 trapped-ion quantum computer accessed over the Internet. Our protocol leverages the classical hardness of recent random circuit sampling demonstrations 4,5 : a client generates quantum ‘challenge’ circuits using a small randomness seed, sends them to an untrusted quantum server to execute and verifies the results of the server. We analyse the security of our protocol against a restricted class of realistic near-term adversaries. Using classical verification with measured combined sustained performance of 1.1 × 10 18 floating-point operations per second across multiple supercomputers, we certify 71,313 bits of entropy under this restricted adversary and additional assumptions. Our results demonstrate a step towards the practical applicability of present-day quantum computers.
Cryptography depends on truly unpredictable numbers, but physical sources emit biased or correlated bits. Quantum mechanics enables the amplification of imperfect randomness into nearly perfect randomness, but prior demonstrations have required physically co-located, loophole-free Bell tests, constraining the feasibility of remote operation. Here we realize certified randomness amplification across a network by dynamically probing large, entangled quantum states on Quantinuum's 98-qubit Helios trapped-ion quantum processor. Our protocol is secure even if the remote device acts maliciously or is compromised by an intercepting adversary, provided the samples are generated quickly enough to preclude classical simulation of the quantum circuits. We stream quantum gates in real time to the quantum processor, maintain quantum state coherence for ≈0.9 seconds, and then reveal the measurement bases to the quantum processor only milliseconds before measurement. This limits the time for classical spoofing to 30 ms and constrains the location of hypothetical adversaries to a 4,500 km radius. We achieve a fidelity of 0.586 on random circuits with 64 qubits and 276 two-qubit gates, enabling the amplification of realistic imperfect randomness with a low entropy rate into nearly perfect randomness.
Gate-based quantum computers can accelerate computational tasks beyond classical capabilities. Random circuit sampling is a task that has experimentally demonstrated algorithmic quantum advantage on near-term devices, but its practical utility has been limited. Recently, certified randomness generation based on random circuits was demonstrated on a trapped-ion quantum computer, advancing near-term applications. In this work, we connect single-device certified randomness to classically verifiable position verification, a classical communication primitive that avoids long-distance quantum communication challenges. We present a generic compiler that converts any such certified randomness protocol into a secure classically verifiable position verification scheme, extend it to multi-round protocols, and show its equivalence to a relaxed certified randomness variant. Our near-term instantiation based on random circuit sampling demonstrates classically verifiable position verification as a practical application for near-term devices. This article establishes a connection between single-device certified randomness and classically verifiable position verification. Through this connection, it shows that the latter can be implemented using noisy intermediate-scale quantum devices.
The generation of certified random bits is an emerging near-term application of quantum computers. Potential applications, such as randomness beacons and CRS generation, require nearly uniform randomness, whose rate (the ratio of min-entropy to bitlength) is ~ 1. However, existing protocols for certified randomness either produce weakly random strings with rate o(1), or they require a trusted random seed.
We show how to certify randomness with the optimal rate ~ 1 without requiring any trusted randomness from the verifier. Our protocol is secure unconditionally in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). This improves the result of Coladangelo et al., who certified weakly random strings unconditionally in the QROM, and answers a question posed by Aaronson and Hung.
We also define and construct a proof of conditional min-entropy, which certifies optimal min-entropy even conditioned on an adversarially chosen transcript. We show an application of this primitive to randomness beacons, where each pulse should have high min-entropy conditioned on all previous messages.
We propose an application for near-term quantum devices: namely, generating cryptographically certified random bits, to use (for example) in proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies. Our protocol repurposes the existing “quantum supremacy” experiments, based on random circuit sampling, that Google and USTC have successfully carried out starting in 2019. We show that, whenever the outputs of these experiments pass the now-standard Linear Cross-Entropy Benchmark (LXEB), under plausible hardness assumptions they necessarily contain Ω(n) min-entropy, where n is the number of qubits. To achieve a net gain in randomness, we use a small random seed to produce pseudorandom challenge circuits. In response to the challenge circuits, the quantum computer generates output strings that, after verification, can then be fed into a randomness extractor to produce certified nearly-uniform bits—thereby “bootstrapping” from pseudorandomness to genuine randomness. We prove our protocol sound in two senses: (i) under a hardness assumption called Long List Quantum Supremacy Verification, which we justify in the random oracle model, and (ii) unconditionally in the random oracle model against an eavesdropper who could share arbitrary entanglement with the device. (Note that our protocol’s output is unpredictable even to a computationally unbounded adversary who can see the random oracle.) Currently, the central drawback of our protocol is the exponential cost of verification, which in practice will limit its implementation to at most n∼ 60 qubits, a regime where attacks are expensive but not impossible. Modulo that drawback, our protocol appears to be the only practical application of quantum computing that both requires a QC and is physically realizable today.
Abstract With today’s quantum processors venturing into regimes beyond the capabilities of classical devices, we face the challenge to verify that these devices perform as intended, even when we cannot check their results on classical computers. In a recent breakthrough in computer science, a protocol was developed that allows the verification of the output of a computation performed by an untrusted quantum device based only on classical resources. Here, we follow these ideas, and demonstrate in a first, proof-of-principle experiment the verification of the output of a quantum computation using only classical means on a small trapped-ion quantum processor. We contrast this to verification protocols, which require trust and detailed hardware knowledge, as in gate-level benchmarking, or additional quantum resources in case we do not have access to or trust in the device to be tested. While our experimental demonstration uses a simplified version of Mahadev’s protocol we demonstrate the necessary steps for verifying fully untrusted devices. A scaled-up version of our protocol will allow for classical verification, requiring no hardware access or detailed knowledge of the tested device. Its security relies on post–quantum secure trapdoor functions within an interactive proof. The conceptually straightforward, but technologically challenging scaled-up version of the interactive proofs, considered here, can be used for a variety of additional tasks such as verifying quantum advantage, generating and certifying quantum randomness, or composable remote state preparation.
Quantum speed limits are usually regarded as fundamental restrictions, constraining the amount of computation that can be achieved within some given time and energy. Complementary to this intuition, here we show that these limitations are also of operational value: they enable the secure generation of certified randomness. We consider a prepare-and-measure scenario with some (experimentally determined or promised) upper bound on the energy uncertainty Δ E of the average prepared quantum state, but without any further assumptions on the devices, Hilbert space or Hamiltonian. Given that we can freely choose the time at which to apply the untrusted preparation procedure, we show that this scenario admits the generation of randomness that is secure against adversaries with additional classical information. We show how to determine the amount of certified randomness given the observed correlations, discuss how interactions with the environment are taken into account, and sketch a conceivable experimental implementation. In particular, we show that single-mode coherent states admit this kind of certification of nonzero randomness in some parameter regimes, reinforcing existing demonstrations of nonclassicality in the simple harmonic oscillator. Our results extend earlier efforts to devise semi-device-independent protocols grounded in reasonable physical assumptions, and they contribute to the understanding of time-energy uncertainty relations via their operational consequences.