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Oxford University Press eBooks

Epilogue A Game of Theories: The Quantum Representation of Reality

Jim Baggott

Published Jan 10, 2020• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

The Quantum Cookbook shows that whilst quantum mechanics is mathematically challenging, some basic knowledge and a bit of effort will carry you a long way. It also explains how quantum mechanics was derived from the physics. The abstract formalism based on state vectors in Hilbert space was introduced only when it was deemed desirable to lend the theory greater mathematical consistency, and to reject some of its historical baggage. The best way to come to terms with this formalism is to understand how and why it came about. Debates about interpretation continue to this day and, by providing some historical context, you should get the impression that any lack of comprehension of its meaning on your part is absolutely not your fault. Quantum mechanics challenges our comprehension of what any (and all) scientific theories are meant to be telling us about the nature of reality. It’s okay to have doubts.

DOI
10.1093/oso/9780198827856.003.0014

Related papers

The Quantum Cookbook: Mathematical Recipes for the Foundations for Quantum Mechanics

Jim Baggott

The Quantum Cookbook provides a unique bridge between popular exposition and formal textbook presentation, based on derivations of the iconic equations of quantum mechanics. This is a book for curious readers with some background in physics and sufficient mathematical capability. It aims not to teach readers how to do quantum mechanics but rather helps them to understand how to think about quantum mechanics. Each derivation is presented as a ‘recipe’ with listed ingredients, including standard results from the mathematician’s toolkit, set out in a series of easy-to-follow steps. The recipes have been written sympathetically, for readers who—like the author—will often struggle to follow the logic of a derivation which misses out steps that are ‘obvious’, or which use techniques that readers are assumed to know. The simple truth is that quantum mechanics did not suddenly materialize overnight in the minds of its creators, fully formed, complete with all its axioms and principles. It was instead tortured from much more familiar classical physical descriptions, over a period of decades, as physicists struggled to interpret a series of ever more baffling experimental results. Only later was a much higher level of abstraction introduced into quantum mechanics, in an attempt to establish a secure mathematical foundation that would eradicate all the confusing classical misconceptions inherited from its birth and early childhood. Whilst there are some obvious exceptions, for the most part these derivations are triumphs of physical intuition over mathematical rigour and consistency.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Jan 10, 2020•5 citations

Three experiments

Alexander E. Wendt

Quantum theory is a mathematical formalism that allows physicists to predict the probability of observing different outcomes in experiments on sub-atomic systems. It has been tested more rigorously than any theory in science, and has never been wrong. However, strictly speaking it does not “explain” the behavior of sub-atomic systems, since it does not propose a mechanism to account for it. It tells us that they will behave in certain ways, but not why. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a theory in the sense familiar to social scientists, namely a body of laws that explains some part of reality. The explanatory question is the subject of the interpretive debates that surround the theory, not of the theory per se. That said, the literature routinely refers to quantum mechanics as a theory, and I shall use the terms interchangeably below.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Apr 20, 2015•0 citations

Dirac, Von Neumann, and the Derivation of the Quantum Formalism: State Vectors in Hilbert Space

Jim Baggott

The evolution of quantum mechanics through the 1920s was profoundly messy. Some physicists believed that it was necessary to throw out much of the conceptual baggage that early quantum mechanics tended to carry around with it and re-establish the theory on much firmer ground. It was at this critical stage that the search for deeper insights into the underlying reality was set aside in favour of mathematical expediency. All the conceptual problems appeared to be coming from the wavefunctions. But whatever was to replace them needed to retain all the properties and relationships that had so far been discovered. Dirac and von Neumann chose to derive a new quantum formalism by replacing the wavefunctions with state vectors operating in an abstract Hilbert space, and formally embedding all the most important definitions and relations within a system of axioms.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Jan 10, 2020•0 citations

Introduction

James Robert Brown

Feynman diagrams have fascinated physicists and philosophers since they were introduced to the world about 70 years ago. Clearly, they help in calculation; they have allowed nearly impossible problems to be solved with relative ease. This is agreed by all, but that is probably where the consensus ends. Are they pictures of physical processes? Are they just devices for keeping track of mathematical formulae, that do the real work? Are they some sort of mix of both?They are almost as famous as representations of the Bohr atom, even though most people could not give even a sketchy account of what they do. In spite of this they have taken on a role as a cultural icon. Feynman used them to decorate his own van (Fig. 1). The van was even used in an episode of the popular TV series The Big Bang Theory. They have been used as art work in everything from posters, to coffee mugs, to wallpaper. But none of this is particularly helpful in understanding how they work.If we ask working physicists who use Feynman diagrams what it is they are doing, we get a variety of responses. One is puzzlement; a shrug of indifference. Even those very skilled at using Feynman diagrams might be hard pressed to explain (to a philosopher’s satisfaction) what’s happening. After all, most of us can ride a bike but would be similarly hard pressed to explain in any detail what we’re doing. A more common response might go like this: The diagram, or series of diagrams, is a schematic picture of some physical process, say, two electrons interacting, which we then link to mathematical terms. After writing out the mathematical terms in the form of a series, we calculate and get the probability of an interaction happening. This sounds good initially, but runs into trouble when we ask what a “picture of a physical process” could mean? This is, after all, the quantum world where things do not move continuously through space and time. It seems doubtful the diagrams could be diagrams of things in the physical realm. They are connected to physical reality and they are connected to wonderfully accurate predictions. And yet, mystery remains.The following articles on Feynman diagrams address several timely issues, both historical and contemporary. These are metaphysical and epistemological questions related to models and how we represent the world. The papers are united by these themes, but otherwise are independent of one another. They are arranged alphabetically and can be read in any order.James Robert Brown, “How Do Feynman Diagrams Work?” takes the view that they are not representations or models of the world at all. Like others, he stresses that they cannot be pictures of reality, since, thanks to the Heisenberg relations, there can be no such thing as a trajectory. Rather than seek some other more abstract type of representation, he introduces a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive flow charts. The latter could be a representation of physical reality, but not the former. A prescriptive flow chart is more like a recipe to bake a cake. He takes Feynman diagrams to be this sort of thing.Mauro Dorato and Emanuele Rossanese, “The Nature of Representation in Feynman Diagrams,” also reject the idea that Feynman diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual physical processes. But unlike Brown, they do not abandon the thought that they can be models in some sense. They appeal to a famous account by RIG Hughes, known as the Denotation, Deduction, and Interpretation theory of models, where “models” are to be interpreted as merely inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.Letitia Meynell, “Picturing Feynman Diagrams and the Epistemology of Understanding,” assumes that Feynman diagrams are pictorial representations but agrees with Brown and Dorato and Rossanese that they do not represent actual physical processes. She then takes up the following puzzle: If Feynman diagrams represent states of affairs, but do not do so truthfully, what can their epistemic value be? She argues that Feynman diagrams have been epistemically powerful (at least in part) because, as pictorial representations, they facilitate an understanding of QED, and particle physics more generally. Appealing to Feynman’s own remarks, she draws out what it might mean to have an understanding of something that is not factive. Although her approach allows for a thin sense of substantively non-factive epistemic success, it is continuous with a factive sense of understanding that is more familiar in the sciences.Michael Stöltzner, “Feynman Diagrams: Modeling between Physics and Mathematics,” analyzes Feynman diagrams within the context of recent debates about models in science and against the backdrop of other diagrammatic methods in mathematical physics when dealing with infinite or asymptotic series. This allows one to avoid the dichotomy of whether Feynman diagrams represent mathematical or physical objects, or a mere tool mediating between them. Along those lines one does not, however, obtain a universal answer to the question as to what Feynman diagrams represent. A single Feynman diagram, in actual scientific practice, can stand for a single mathematical expression or for a physical phenomenon depending on whether the diagram stands for a single term in an infinite series or for a subseries that is given a physical interpretation. Stöltzner’s reading of the representation problem also derives support from the historical fact that Feynman was initially motivated by the Breit-Schrödinger model of a quivering electron and from interpreting this model within the context of stochastic processes.Adrian Wüthrich, “The Exigencies of War and the Stink of a Theoretical Problem,” approaches these topics from an historian’s point of view, shedding light on the issues by focussing on debates in this historical context. As he put it in his subtitle, Wüthrich’s aim is to understand the genesis of Feynman’s electrodynamics as mechanistic modelling at different levels. Feynman’s idiosyncratic method of dealing with quantum electrodynamic phenomena has been cast as an instance of a non-rigorous, modular and rule-based style of theorizing. Given such a characterization, it seems natural that significant changes in Feynman’s style were triggered by work he was assigned during World War II, where quick fixes may have counted more than derivations from first principles. Indeed, Feynman’s theoretical proposals of an improved electrodynamics do bear traces of Feynman’s war-related work, which immediately preceded it. However, Wüthrich explains, the attempt to apply the vocabulary of the “new mechanistic philosophy” to lesser known pieces of archival evidence brings to the fore a new kind of shift in Feynman’s style. Feynman’s disposition for such a shift may also have been fostered during the war, but it was forced upon him by a specific theoretical difficulty, which was largely unrelated to his war-time research.These articles contain some technicalities, but they should all be sufficiently accessible to general readers who would like to know more about Feynman diagrams and how they relate to theories, models, mathematics, and the world. The best philosophy of science is intimately linked to and draws upon current science and its history. It pays close attention to details: the details of theorizing, the details of models and how they function, the details of experimentation and measurement, and so on. We hope this collection of five articles on Feynman diagrams, by focussing closely on detail, will contribute to a better understanding of these strange but highly productive ciphers and symbols.

Perspectives on Science•Jul 31, 2018•1 citation

The Formalism of Quantum Mechanics

David Tong

The universe we live in is both strange and interesting. This strangeness comes about because, at the most fundamental level, the universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. This is the most spectacularly accurate and powerful theory ever devised, one that has given us insights into many aspects of the world, from the structure of matter to the meaning of information. This textbook provides a comprehensive account of all things quantum. It starts by introducing the wavefunction and its interpretation as an ephemeral wave of complex probability, before delving into the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and exploring its diverse applications, from atomic physics and scattering, to quantum computing. Designed to be accessible, this volume is suitable for both students and researchers, beginning with the basics before progressing to more advanced topics.

Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 19, 2025•0 citations

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Quantum Interpretations

Olival Freire, Guido Bacciagaluppi, Olivier Darrigol +4 more

Quantum mechanics approaches its centenary with an impressive record. It became the backbone of most research in physics, led to applications such as the transistor and laser, and prompted an upheaval in the philosophy of science. Its scope and its precision have been constantly growing, and it is now promising more powerful computers and safer cryptography. This century of conquests has also been a time of ongoing debates about the foundations and interpretation of the theory, which has been referred to as the quantum controversy. The controversy has been unusually long and remains open. Jammer called it “a story without an ending” and Laloë described this coexistence of successes and doubts with the metaphor of the colossus with feet of clay. This Handbook is a survey on this history. Some of the so-called “interpretations” are not interpretations of a fixed formalism, they are different theories, thus it has been a debate about the interpretations and the foundations of quantum mechanics. In this volume, the “history of interpretations” is used for the sake of brevity. The successive parts of the Handbook deal with the scientific and philosophical issues under debate, historical landmarks, places and contexts, historical and philosophical theses, and the proliferation of interpretations. This Handbook may serve those interested in the history of quantum mechanics and those who are engaged with, or attracted by current research on quantum information, as it may give them a flavor of the history that led to or lay the groundwork for the current investigations.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Mar 7, 2022•82 citations
The Quantum Cookbook shows that whilst quantum mechanics is mathematically challenging, some basic knowledge and a bit of effort will carry you a long way. It also explains how quantum mechanics was derived from the physics. The abstract formalism based on state vectors in Hilbert space was introduced only when it was deemed desirable to lend the theory greater mathematical consistency, and to reject some of its historical baggage. The best way to come to terms with this formalism is to understand how and why it came about. Debates about interpretation continue to this day and, by providing some historical context, you should get the impression that any lack of comprehension of its meaning on your part is absolutely not your fault. Quantum mechanics challenges our comprehension of what any (and all) scientific theories are meant to be telling us about the nature of reality. It’s okay to have doubts.
The Quantum Cookbook provides a unique bridge between popular exposition and formal textbook presentation, based on derivations of the iconic equations of quantum mechanics. This is a book for curious readers with some background in physics and sufficient mathematical capability. It aims not to teach readers how to do quantum mechanics but rather helps them to understand how to think about quantum mechanics. Each derivation is presented as a ‘recipe’ with listed ingredients, including standard results from the mathematician’s toolkit, set out in a series of easy-to-follow steps. The recipes have been written sympathetically, for readers who—like the author—will often struggle to follow the logic of a derivation which misses out steps that are ‘obvious’, or which use techniques that readers are assumed to know. The simple truth is that quantum mechanics did not suddenly materialize overnight in the minds of its creators, fully formed, complete with all its axioms and principles. It was instead tortured from much more familiar classical physical descriptions, over a period of decades, as physicists struggled to interpret a series of ever more baffling experimental results. Only later was a much higher level of abstraction introduced into quantum mechanics, in an attempt to establish a secure mathematical foundation that would eradicate all the confusing classical misconceptions inherited from its birth and early childhood. Whilst there are some obvious exceptions, for the most part these derivations are triumphs of physical intuition over mathematical rigour and consistency.
Quantum theory is a mathematical formalism that allows physicists to predict the probability of observing different outcomes in experiments on sub-atomic systems. It has been tested more rigorously than any theory in science, and has never been wrong. However, strictly speaking it does not “explain” the behavior of sub-atomic systems, since it does not propose a mechanism to account for it. It tells us that they will behave in certain ways, but not why. Thus, quantum mechanics is not a theory in the sense familiar to social scientists, namely a body of laws that explains some part of reality. The explanatory question is the subject of the interpretive debates that surround the theory, not of the theory per se. That said, the literature routinely refers to quantum mechanics as a theory, and I shall use the terms interchangeably below.
The evolution of quantum mechanics through the 1920s was profoundly messy. Some physicists believed that it was necessary to throw out much of the conceptual baggage that early quantum mechanics tended to carry around with it and re-establish the theory on much firmer ground. It was at this critical stage that the search for deeper insights into the underlying reality was set aside in favour of mathematical expediency. All the conceptual problems appeared to be coming from the wavefunctions. But whatever was to replace them needed to retain all the properties and relationships that had so far been discovered. Dirac and von Neumann chose to derive a new quantum formalism by replacing the wavefunctions with state vectors operating in an abstract Hilbert space, and formally embedding all the most important definitions and relations within a system of axioms.
Feynman diagrams have fascinated physicists and philosophers since they were introduced to the world about 70 years ago. Clearly, they help in calculation; they have allowed nearly impossible problems to be solved with relative ease. This is agreed by all, but that is probably where the consensus ends. Are they pictures of physical processes? Are they just devices for keeping track of mathematical formulae, that do the real work? Are they some sort of mix of both?They are almost as famous as representations of the Bohr atom, even though most people could not give even a sketchy account of what they do. In spite of this they have taken on a role as a cultural icon. Feynman used them to decorate his own van (Fig. 1). The van was even used in an episode of the popular TV series The Big Bang Theory. They have been used as art work in everything from posters, to coffee mugs, to wallpaper. But none of this is particularly helpful in understanding how they work.If we ask working physicists who use Feynman diagrams what it is they are doing, we get a variety of responses. One is puzzlement; a shrug of indifference. Even those very skilled at using Feynman diagrams might be hard pressed to explain (to a philosopher’s satisfaction) what’s happening. After all, most of us can ride a bike but would be similarly hard pressed to explain in any detail what we’re doing. A more common response might go like this: The diagram, or series of diagrams, is a schematic picture of some physical process, say, two electrons interacting, which we then link to mathematical terms. After writing out the mathematical terms in the form of a series, we calculate and get the probability of an interaction happening. This sounds good initially, but runs into trouble when we ask what a “picture of a physical process” could mean? This is, after all, the quantum world where things do not move continuously through space and time. It seems doubtful the diagrams could be diagrams of things in the physical realm. They are connected to physical reality and they are connected to wonderfully accurate predictions. And yet, mystery remains.The following articles on Feynman diagrams address several timely issues, both historical and contemporary. These are metaphysical and epistemological questions related to models and how we represent the world. The papers are united by these themes, but otherwise are independent of one another. They are arranged alphabetically and can be read in any order.James Robert Brown, “How Do Feynman Diagrams Work?” takes the view that they are not representations or models of the world at all. Like others, he stresses that they cannot be pictures of reality, since, thanks to the Heisenberg relations, there can be no such thing as a trajectory. Rather than seek some other more abstract type of representation, he introduces a distinction between descriptive and prescriptive flow charts. The latter could be a representation of physical reality, but not the former. A prescriptive flow chart is more like a recipe to bake a cake. He takes Feynman diagrams to be this sort of thing.Mauro Dorato and Emanuele Rossanese, “The Nature of Representation in Feynman Diagrams,” also reject the idea that Feynman diagrams can be considered to be pictures or depictions of actual physical processes. But unlike Brown, they do not abandon the thought that they can be models in some sense. They appeal to a famous account by RIG Hughes, known as the Denotation, Deduction, and Interpretation theory of models, where “models” are to be interpreted as merely inferential, non-representational devices constructed in given social contexts by the community of physicists.Letitia Meynell, “Picturing Feynman Diagrams and the Epistemology of Understanding,” assumes that Feynman diagrams are pictorial representations but agrees with Brown and Dorato and Rossanese that they do not represent actual physical processes. She then takes up the following puzzle: If Feynman diagrams represent states of affairs, but do not do so truthfully, what can their epistemic value be? She argues that Feynman diagrams have been epistemically powerful (at least in part) because, as pictorial representations, they facilitate an understanding of QED, and particle physics more generally. Appealing to Feynman’s own remarks, she draws out what it might mean to have an understanding of something that is not factive. Although her approach allows for a thin sense of substantively non-factive epistemic success, it is continuous with a factive sense of understanding that is more familiar in the sciences.Michael Stöltzner, “Feynman Diagrams: Modeling between Physics and Mathematics,” analyzes Feynman diagrams within the context of recent debates about models in science and against the backdrop of other diagrammatic methods in mathematical physics when dealing with infinite or asymptotic series. This allows one to avoid the dichotomy of whether Feynman diagrams represent mathematical or physical objects, or a mere tool mediating between them. Along those lines one does not, however, obtain a universal answer to the question as to what Feynman diagrams represent. A single Feynman diagram, in actual scientific practice, can stand for a single mathematical expression or for a physical phenomenon depending on whether the diagram stands for a single term in an infinite series or for a subseries that is given a physical interpretation. Stöltzner’s reading of the representation problem also derives support from the historical fact that Feynman was initially motivated by the Breit-Schrödinger model of a quivering electron and from interpreting this model within the context of stochastic processes.Adrian Wüthrich, “The Exigencies of War and the Stink of a Theoretical Problem,” approaches these topics from an historian’s point of view, shedding light on the issues by focussing on debates in this historical context. As he put it in his subtitle, Wüthrich’s aim is to understand the genesis of Feynman’s electrodynamics as mechanistic modelling at different levels. Feynman’s idiosyncratic method of dealing with quantum electrodynamic phenomena has been cast as an instance of a non-rigorous, modular and rule-based style of theorizing. Given such a characterization, it seems natural that significant changes in Feynman’s style were triggered by work he was assigned during World War II, where quick fixes may have counted more than derivations from first principles. Indeed, Feynman’s theoretical proposals of an improved electrodynamics do bear traces of Feynman’s war-related work, which immediately preceded it. However, Wüthrich explains, the attempt to apply the vocabulary of the “new mechanistic philosophy” to lesser known pieces of archival evidence brings to the fore a new kind of shift in Feynman’s style. Feynman’s disposition for such a shift may also have been fostered during the war, but it was forced upon him by a specific theoretical difficulty, which was largely unrelated to his war-time research.These articles contain some technicalities, but they should all be sufficiently accessible to general readers who would like to know more about Feynman diagrams and how they relate to theories, models, mathematics, and the world. The best philosophy of science is intimately linked to and draws upon current science and its history. It pays close attention to details: the details of theorizing, the details of models and how they function, the details of experimentation and measurement, and so on. We hope this collection of five articles on Feynman diagrams, by focussing closely on detail, will contribute to a better understanding of these strange but highly productive ciphers and symbols.
The universe we live in is both strange and interesting. This strangeness comes about because, at the most fundamental level, the universe is governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. This is the most spectacularly accurate and powerful theory ever devised, one that has given us insights into many aspects of the world, from the structure of matter to the meaning of information. This textbook provides a comprehensive account of all things quantum. It starts by introducing the wavefunction and its interpretation as an ephemeral wave of complex probability, before delving into the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and exploring its diverse applications, from atomic physics and scattering, to quantum computing. Designed to be accessible, this volume is suitable for both students and researchers, beginning with the basics before progressing to more advanced topics.
Quantum mechanics approaches its centenary with an impressive record. It became the backbone of most research in physics, led to applications such as the transistor and laser, and prompted an upheaval in the philosophy of science. Its scope and its precision have been constantly growing, and it is now promising more powerful computers and safer cryptography. This century of conquests has also been a time of ongoing debates about the foundations and interpretation of the theory, which has been referred to as the quantum controversy. The controversy has been unusually long and remains open. Jammer called it “a story without an ending” and Laloë described this coexistence of successes and doubts with the metaphor of the colossus with feet of clay. This Handbook is a survey on this history. Some of the so-called “interpretations” are not interpretations of a fixed formalism, they are different theories, thus it has been a debate about the interpretations and the foundations of quantum mechanics. In this volume, the “history of interpretations” is used for the sake of brevity. The successive parts of the Handbook deal with the scientific and philosophical issues under debate, historical landmarks, places and contexts, historical and philosophical theses, and the proliferation of interpretations. This Handbook may serve those interested in the history of quantum mechanics and those who are engaged with, or attracted by current research on quantum information, as it may give them a flavor of the history that led to or lay the groundwork for the current investigations.