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International Conference on Transparent Optical Networks

On minimal assumptions to obtain a universally composable quantum bit commitment

Mariano Lemus, Preeti Yadav, Paulo Mateus, Nikola Paunković, André Souto

Published Jul 1, 2019• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is well known, due to the no-go theorems, that perfectly secure bit commitment is impossible. For that reason, there exist many proposals for bit commitment protocols that are secure under certain assumptions (such as the existence of a trusted party, computational hardness, or noisy memories). In this paper, we investigate the minimal assumptions required to obtain a secure bit commitment protocol. We show that it is possible to construct a bit commitment scheme with two parties Alice and Bob as long as there is a third party that is willing to broadcast either entangled qubits for the parties or to produce classical strings that are xor-correlated. We also show that the bit commitment scheme proposed is universally composable.

DOI
10.1109/icton.2019.8840386

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It is well known, due to the no-go theorems, that perfectly secure bit commitment is impossible. For that reason, there exist many proposals for bit commitment protocols that are secure under certain assumptions (such as the existence of a trusted party, computational hardness, or noisy memories). In this paper, we investigate the minimal assumptions required to obtain a secure bit commitment protocol. We show that it is possible to construct a bit commitment scheme with two parties Alice and Bob as long as there is a third party that is willing to broadcast either entangled qubits for the parties or to produce classical strings that are xor-correlated. We also show that the bit commitment scheme proposed is universally composable.
Quantum bit commitment has been known to be impossible by the independent proofs of Mayers, and Lo and Chau, under the assumption that the whole quantum states right before the unveiling phase are static to users. We here provide an unconditionally secure non-static quantum bit commitment protocol with a trusted third party, which is not directly involved in any communications between users and can be limited not to get any information of commitment without being detected by users. We also prove that our quantum bit commitment protocol is not secure without the help of the trusted third party. The proof is basically different from the Mayers-Lo-Chau's no-go theorem, because we do not assume the staticity of the finally shared quantum states between users.
There had been well known claims of unconditionally secure quantum protocols for bit commitment. However, we, and independently Mayers, showed that all proposed quantum bit commitment schemes are, in principle, insecure because the sender, Alice, can almost always cheat successfully by using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type of attack and delaying her measurements. One might wonder if secure quantum bit commitment protocols exist at all. We answer this question by showing that the same type of attack by Alice will, in principle, break any bit commitment scheme. The cheating strategy generally requires a quantum computer. We emphasize the generality of this ``no-go theorem'': Unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes based on quantum mechanics---fully quantum, classical or quantum but with measurements---are all ruled out by this result. Since bit commitment is a useful primitive for building up more sophisticated protocols such as zero-knowledge proofs, our results cast very serious doubt on the security of quantum cryptography in the so-called ``post-cold-war'' applications. We also show that ideal quantum coin tossing is impossible because of the EPR attack. This no-go theorem for ideal quantum coin tossing may help to shed some lights on the possibility of non-ideal protocols.
Unconditionally secure nonrelativistic bit commitment is known to be impossible in both the classical and the quantum world. However, when committing to a string of n bits at once, how far can we stretch the quantum limits? In this Letter, we introduce a framework of quantum schemes where Alice commits a string of n bits to Bob, in such a way that she can only cheat on a bits and Bob can learn at most b bits of information before the reveal phase. Our results are twofold: we show by an explicit construction that in the traditional approach, where the reveal and guess probabilities form the security criteria, no good schemes can exist: a + b is at least n. If, however, we use a more liberal criterion of security, the accessible information, we construct schemes where a = 4log2(n) + O(1) and b = 4, which is impossible classically. Our findings significantly extend known no-go results for quantum bit commitment.
Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is analyzed, and gaps are found. Two variants of a bit commitment scheme utilizing anonymous quantum states and decoy states are presented. In the first variant, the exact verifying measurement is independent of the committed bit value, thus the second party can make it before the first party opens, making possible an unconditional security proof based on no-cloning. In the second variant, the impossibility proof fails because quantum entanglement purification of a mixed state does not render the protocol determinate. Whether impossibility holds in this or similar protocols is an open question, although preliminary results already show that the impossibility proof cannot work as it stands.
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive and a cornerstone for numerous two-party cryptographic protocols, including zero-knowledge proofs. However, it has been proven that unconditionally secure bit commitment, both classical and quantum, is impossible. In this work, we demonstrate that imposing a restriction on the committing party to perform only separable operations enables secure quantum bit-commitment schemes. Specifically, we prove that in any perfectly hiding bit-commitment protocol, an honestly committing party limited to separable operations will be detected with high probability if they attempt to alter their commitment. To illustrate our findings, we present an example protocol.