The deterministic relationship between cause and effect is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions.Though progress is being made, the lack of theoretical predictions and experiments in quantum gravity makes it difficult to use empirical evidence to justify a theory of causality at quantum level in normal circumstances, i. e. by predicting the value of a well-confirmed experimental result.For a variety of reasons, the problem of the deterministic relationship between cause and effect is related to basic problems of physics as such.Despite the common belief, it is a remarkable fact that a theory of causality should be consistent with a theory of everything and is because of this linked to problems of a theory of everything.Thus far, solving the problem of causality will help us to solve the problems of the theory of everything (at quantum level).
The deterministic relationship between cause and effect is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions.Though progress is being made, the lack of theoretical predictions and experiments in quantum gravity makes it difficult to use empirical evidence to justify a theory of causality at quantum level in normal circumstances, i. e. by predicting the value of a well-confirmed experimental result.For a variety of reasons, the problem of the deterministic relationship between cause and effect is related to basic problems of physics as such.Despite the common belief, it is a remarkable fact that a theory of causality should be consistent with a theory of everything and is because of this linked to problems of a theory of everything.Thus far, solving the problem of causality will help us to solve the problems of the theory of everything (at quantum level).
In this chapter we introduce the postulate of causality, and derive the mathematical structure of a causal OPT. We show how the present definition of causality is equivalent to the Einsteinian one, and argue that it is the only possible notion once it is stripped from its spurious deterministic connotation. In addition, the notion of causality used here is compliant with the historical philosophical concept since David Hume, and with the idea used in common reasoning, inference, and modeling in human sciences. In brief, the present notion of causality can be stated as the requirement of no signaling from the future . This is also the only requisite for an OPT in order to satisfy the principle of no signaling without interaction . In mathematical terms in an OPT the causality postulate is equivalent to the uniqueness of the deterministic effect, which in turn is equivalent to the ability to normalize states. The notion of causality is so naturally embedded in our understanding of reality that it often remains unconsciously implicit in foundational research, even in recent axiomatizations. Causality: From Cinderella to Principle Causality has been the object of a very extensive literature encompassing hundreds of books and technical articles in a wide spectrum of disciplines, ranging from pure philosophy to economics, law, natural sciences, and obviously, physics. Also due to its involvement in such heterogeneous blend of disciplines, causality has long been a vexed notion. Perhaps the most natural connection between concepts of causality in different branches of knowledge is the one at the borderline between physics and philosophy, since the early work of Aristotle, up to the cornerstone of Renée Descartes, who broke the ground for the modern view of David Hume and Immanuel Kant, through to contemporary works on physical causation. Causality has always remained in the realm of philosophy, staying only in the background of physics, without the status of a “law” or the rank of a “principle.” Most of the time causality creeps into physical theories in the form of ad hoc assumptions based on empirical evidences, as when we discard advanced potentials in electrodynamics or when we motivate the Kramers–Kronig relations. In other cases, causality is embodied in the “interpretation” of the theory, as for the Special Relativity of Einstein.
In a recent number of Blackfriars (July, 1949) Dr A. W. Gledhill has discussed very competently some aspects of the statistical method as used in modern physics. He has tried to show there ‘that modern physical theory does not contradict the principle of causality’. Having made a study of this subject over quite a number of years, the writer, while agreeing with some of Dr Gledhill’s conclusions, feels nevertheless that there are a few points which have not been covered as adequately as the importance of the subject for modern philosophy seems to warrant. In order to understand the controversy about the validity or non-validity of the principle of causality, which has been initiated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, it is necessary to realise, first of all, that when a physicist speaks about causality, he usually does not mean the same thing as a scholastic philosopher. In scholastic philosophy one distinguishes different kinds of causes, such as the material, the efficient, the final, as well as the formal and exemplary causes. The classical physicist, on the other hand, since the time of Galileo, admits only efficient causes. Let us therefore give a brief sketch of the development of this concept of scientific causality and show the reasons for this limitation. The purpose of a scientific theory is the prediction of events among the natural objects which form the field of enquiry of the particular science concerned. Evidently, the more certain the prediction, the better the theory on which it is based.
Two mysteries -loosely connected?The Authors who have suggested a deep connection between the solution of the mind-body problem and the understanding of quantum mechanics are too numerous to list.But what exactly would be the alleged structural fit between these two deeply puzzling theoretical issues?Can a genuine philosophical issue -which by its very nature is conceptual in nature -ultimately be resolved by advances in the empirical sciences?The connection is all too often asserted to lie in the subjects confounding natures, but the mere fact that two problems are of equal impenetrability to the human mind does not imply that there is a profound interdependence between the two.There is however an obvious way in which quantum mechanics might have a bearing on the philosophical mind-body problem: if quantum mechanics implies that for some physical events there is no physical cause, then at least the very strong variants of the so-called "principle of causal closure" of the physical realm lose much of their corroborative underpinning in physics as practiced by real physicists as such, and are thus constrained to the speculative physicalism advanced by metaphysicians.However, unless one assumes a strong version of the principle of sufficient reason, which would exclude chance events in principle, even events supposedly not caused by some physical cause are not immediately thereby caused by some nonphysical cause.Moreover the fact is that not all of the interpretations of quantum mechanics imply indeterministic 'choices' of events: neither the many-worlds interpretation nor a Bohmian hidden variable interpretation assume indeterminism.Even in the most obvious theoretical nexus
Explaining observations in terms of cause-and-effect (causal) relations is central to empirical science. However, in his seminal 1964 work [1], John Bell showed that the correlations between entangled quantum systems cannot be explained in terms of, possibly hidden, cause and effect relations. After four decades of experimental effort, Bell's prediction has recently been confirmed in an unambiguous way by a series of loophole-free Bell-test experiments [2-4]. These experiments, however, cannot reveal where exactly quantum mechanics breaks with our classical notion of cause and effect. Specifically, Bell's theorem is based on the central assumptions of realism and local causality. Realism posits that physical systems have real, objective properties, independent of whether we observe them or not, and local causality assumes that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the speed of light.
In general, a physical theory is based on some fundamental principles concerning space, time, matter, and the laws prescribing how matter is distributed in space and how it evolves in time, and even how spacetime itself changes in response to the changes of matter. The spectrum of the known theories is very diverse, since they are based on different assumptions. Some theories assume that space and time are totally independent, some that they are warped in a continuum named "spacetime", and some even that there are more dimensions than the usual 3+1. Most theories consider that space and time are continuous, but many recent theories consider them to be discrete. Most dynamical laws of fundamental Physics are deterministic, but apparently Quantum Mechanics shows that they may have an indeterministic component. Despite these distinctions between various theories, our intuition and experience tells us that they have a lot in common. In this paper I will try to capture the common features in a single mathematical structure. This is not a Theory of Everything, but only a mathematical structure which is common to most physical theories known so far. We will see that these theories can be obtained as particular cases of this structure, which I will call "world". In particular, the worlds described by the Classical Mechanics, the Theory of Relativity and the Quantum Mechanics are examples of worlds according to this definition, but also some theories attempting to unify gravity and QM, like String Theory. The purpose of this distillation is to provide a mathematical common background to both physical and metaphysical discussions about the various theories of the World.
Until now, orthodox science has not had any real reason to question the “locality” assumption about reality, which maintains that all cause-and-effect relationships are mediated by some form of local interaction: One cue ball strikes another cue ball at a definite locus; the cog wheels of machines inter mesh locally because the teeth of the wheels actually touch and push each other. “Locality” underlies a11 our commonsensical beliefs about normal cause-effect, rational interactions in science and everyday life. Jung, however, found it necessary to postulate “synchronicity” as an a causal reality to account for many psychological phenomena that apparently could not be accounted for in terms of this ordinary view of local, cause-effect relationships. The recent experimental confirmation of Bell's Theorem may be the first scientific evidence against the locality assumption. It suggests that non-locality at the quantum level underlies all phenomena—even at the common everyday level of reality as we experience it. We can only wonder if this research, summarized here by physicist Nick Herbert, can serve as a new empirical foundation for Jung's concept of synchronicity. of particular interest is Herbert's statement that nonlocal “unmediated connections are present not only in rare and exotic circumstances, but underlie all the events of everyday life.” If this is true, then it would support Meier's general theory of synchronicity versus Jung's special theory [see interview with CA. Meier in this issue]. Herbert has re-edited and clarified his description of “How Bell Proved Reality Cannot be Local” from his book, Quantum Reality (1985. Doubleday). Herbert will be a speaker at the Fall Conference on “God, Consciousness, and Quantum Reality,” to be sponsored by Psychological Perspectives on November 12, 1988.