Future nuclear arms-control agreements may call for reductions of the total number of nuclear weapons and warheads in the world arsenals. Such agreements would require new trusted verification mechanisms to confirm that items presented to inspectors are nuclear warheads and not spoofs. Proliferation and national security concerns require, however, that inspectors gain no warhead design information through this process. To address this paradox, considerable efforts have been directed towards the development of "information barriers." These barriers consist of automated measurement systems that process sensitive information but only display the results of internal analysis in a binary valid/invalid manner. These systems are, by their nature, at risk of electronic tampering and snooping – and their trusted implementation has so far proved extremely difficult to realize. This thesis takes radically different directions to address this challenge. It demonstrates new approaches to information protection and trusted instruments for nuclear warhead verification that are based on the cryptographic concepts of zero-knowledge proofs and physically unclonable functions. To the author's knowledge, this thesis provides the first demonstration of a zero-knowledge physical measurement technique. Using fast neutron differential radiography and superheated emulsion detectors, such a technique can show two objects have identical geometry and opacity to 14-MeV neutrons without revealing what these properties are. This zero-knowledge feature no longer holds when the objects compared are significantly different. Such a technique could form the basis of a template-matching verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. The thesis then introduces and demonstrates key elements of an optical physical unclonable function sensitive to neutrons and based on superheated emulsions. Such sensors are unique objects that cannot be cloned or simulated. The data they produce are a function of both their internal disordered structure and the physical quantity they measure. Due to their sensitivity against any structural variation, including through neutron irradiation, it is possible to show that they – or the data they have recorded -- have not been tampered with. Such sensors could be used by adversarial parties in sensitive facilities without the risk of being compromised.
Future nuclear arms-control agreements may call for reductions of the total number of nuclear weapons and warheads in the world arsenals. Such agreements would require new trusted verification mechanisms to confirm that items presented to inspectors are nuclear warheads and not spoofs. Proliferation and national security concerns require, however, that inspectors gain no warhead design information through this process. To address this paradox, considerable efforts have been directed towards the development of "information barriers." These barriers consist of automated measurement systems that process sensitive information but only display the results of internal analysis in a binary valid/invalid manner. These systems are, by their nature, at risk of electronic tampering and snooping – and their trusted implementation has so far proved extremely difficult to realize. This thesis takes radically different directions to address this challenge. It demonstrates new approaches to information protection and trusted instruments for nuclear warhead verification that are based on the cryptographic concepts of zero-knowledge proofs and physically unclonable functions. To the author's knowledge, this thesis provides the first demonstration of a zero-knowledge physical measurement technique. Using fast neutron differential radiography and superheated emulsion detectors, such a technique can show two objects have identical geometry and opacity to 14-MeV neutrons without revealing what these properties are. This zero-knowledge feature no longer holds when the objects compared are significantly different. Such a technique could form the basis of a template-matching verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. The thesis then introduces and demonstrates key elements of an optical physical unclonable function sensitive to neutrons and based on superheated emulsions. Such sensors are unique objects that cannot be cloned or simulated. The data they produce are a function of both their internal disordered structure and the physical quantity they measure. Due to their sensitivity against any structural variation, including through neutron irradiation, it is possible to show that they – or the data they have recorded -- have not been tampered with. Such sensors could be used by adversarial parties in sensitive facilities without the risk of being compromised.
Classical sensor security relies on cryptographic algorithms executed on trusted hardware. This approach has significant shortcomings, however. Hardware can be manipulated, including below transistor level, and cryptographic keys are at risk of extraction attacks. A further weakness is that sensor media themselves are assumed to be trusted, and any authentication and encryption is done ex situ and a posteriori. Here we propose and demonstrate a different approach to sensor security that does not rely on classical cryptography and trusted electronics. We designed passive sensor media that inherently produce secure and trustworthy data, and whose honest and non-malicious nature can be easily established. As a proof-of-concept, we manufactured and characterized the properties of non-electronic, physical unclonable, optically complex media sensitive to neutrons for use in a high-security scenario: the inspection of a military facility to confirm the absence or presence of nuclear weapons and fissile materials.
How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times.
Glaser, Barak, and Goldston recently described an approach for nuclear warhead verification based on the cryptographic concept of a zero-knowledge protocol (ZKP).The verification approach included both procedural elements and a physical implementation.A group of Sandia National Laboratories researchers, whose expertise include radiation instrumentation design and development, cryptography, and arms control verification implementation, jointly reviewed the paper and identified specific challenges to implementing the approach as well as some opportunities.This paper compares the ZKP concept as presented by Glaser et al., to other warhead verification concepts and approaches described in the literature.The paper also summarizes challenges and opportunities for elements of this (new) approach.We note that ZKP as used in cryptography is a useful model for the arms control verification problem, but find that the direct analogy to arms control breaks down quickly.For example, fault tolerance in cryptographic ZKP is achieved by brute force repetition of the challenge/response procedure; in arms control, repeated measurements can be expensive.The ZKP methodology fits within the general class of template-based verification techniques, where template in this case refers to a reference measurement that is used for comparison.Template methods in general confirm that a given object is like another object that has already been accepted as a warhead by some other means.This can be a powerful verification approach, but requires independent means to trust the authenticity of the reference warhead -a standard that may be difficult to achieve.Note that this use of template differs from that of Glaser et al., who use the term to describe the accepted reference warhead.In the ZKP approach as described, the reference warhead must be presentwith inspector confidence in its provenance-at each subsequent confirmation measurement.This imposes significant additional constraints on maintaining continuity of knowledge of the reference between inspections.Despite some technical challenges, the concept of last-minute selection of the pre-loads and equipment could be a valuable component of a verification regime.In addition, the neutron transmission image using a bubble detector array is an interesting idea that can be considered for template measurements independently of ZKP..
Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner's obligation. Here we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.
Even with the end of the Cold War, nuclear arms control continues to be a cornerstone of strategic stability and international non-proliferation efforts.New treaties are necessary to build upon, or at least maintain, the status-quo, and will rely upon verification technologies and protocols to ensure all sides are dismantling their warheads as promised.The nuclear weapon states refuse to participate in any process which might reveal the design of their warheads to an adversary or would-be proliferator.This makes warhead authentication, the critical verification step where the object to be dismantled is confirmed to be an authentic warhead, especially challenging.Despite several decades of research, there is no agreed means of describing or assessing warhead authentication protocols.This has hindered protocol development, and made it more difficult for the policy and technical communities to communicate what is important and feasible.This thesis presents a framework for describing warhead authentication protocols and quantifying their performance.The framework draws on methods used to assess digital authentication protocols, as well as information theoretic analysis of privacy.A model is developed for describing authentication protocols; showing how authentication questions, physical properties, and measurable data relate to one another.This allows the objectives and assumptions of a protocol to be made explicit, helping to ensure that protocols are compared fairly.It was found that the protocols in the literature have made use of very different assumptions, and that has influenced their choices of measurement technology and concepts of operation.Having established how to describe protocols, the thesis investigates how best to quantify the completeness (type I error rate), soundness (type II error rate), and information privacy of a protocol.While the absolute soundness cannot be calculated without knowledge of all possible hoaxes, a conditional soundness can be estimated using a minimax approach.A new measure of information privacy is presented, based on a change in the KL divergence between an inspector's beliefs and the actual warhead design, when the inspector starts from an incorrect prior.Médard always made time for my questions and was an amazing source of ideas for how to apply information theory to the project.Professor Areg Danagoulian helped me remain focused on the practical matters underlying my project, which I greatly appreciated.All of my committee have been excellent role models as researchers and mentors, which I hope to emulate in the future.I would like to thank all the staff in the department who have helped me in various ways.The list is very long, but I would especially like to say thank you to Heather for looking after us and keeping us on the straight and narrow in those first few years.Thank you as well to everyone who has made the past few years so enjoyable and memorable.This includes everyone in the LNSP group, Ian, my friends in NSE and the MIT rugby club, and especially the Simmons students and House team.Being a GRT was an experience I will always cherish.Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank my parents, Jamie, Lisa, and Alba for their love and support.Your encouragement and help has been of immeasurable value, and gives me confidence as we move on to the next challenges together.lognormal-distributed property with low variance, and a uniformlydistributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 17 Calculating the completeness of a Poisson observable of an underlying lognormal-distributed property with high variance, and a uniformlydistributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74 18 Poisson observable of an invariant property and a a uniformly-distributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 19 Example of linearized neutronics model for assessing soundness . . . .78 20 1D example of soundness calculation, for a Poisson observable of a lognormal property, as defined in Equation 3.22 . . . . . . . . . . . .84 21 1D example of soundness calculation, for a Poisson observable of a Gaussian property, as defined in Equation 3.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . .84 22 Illustration of the authentic object used in the 2D soundness example 86 23 Distribution of risk function results for successful hoaxes in the 2D soundness example, for 𝒞 = 0.8, 𝒮 = 0.7.The most extreme results are taken as the risk function for that completeness, soundness pair. . . .89 24 Completeness -soundness -risk map for the 2D soundness example .90 25 Completeness -soundness -risk map for the 2D soundness example using a one-sided hypothesis test to more easily detect [A] heavy hoaxes, and [B] light hoaxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90 26 Shannon entropy is a measure of the uniformity, or peakedness, of a distribution, regardless of the ordering of the entries.This makes it an accurate measure of uncertainty but less appropriate as a measure of estimator error . . . . . . . . . . . . .
We discuss the question of how physical statements can be proven over digital communication channels between two parties (a "prover" and a "verifier") residing in two separate local systems. Examples include: (i) "a certain object in the prover's system has temperature X°C", (ii) "two certain objects in the prover's system are positioned at distance X", or (iii) "a certain object in the prover's system has been irreversibly altered or destroyed". As illustrated by these examples, our treatment goes beyond classical security sensors in considering more general physical statements. Another distinctive aspect is the underlying security model: We neither assume secret keys in the prover's system, nor do we suppose classical sensor hardware in his system which is tamper-resistant and trusted by the verifier. Without an established name, we call this new type of security protocol a "virtual proof of reality" or simply a "virtual proof" (VP). In order to illustrate our novel concept, we give example VPs based on temperature sensitive integrated circuits, disordered optical scattering media, and quantum systems. The corresponding protocols prove the temperature, relative position, or destruction/modification of certain physical objects in the prover's system to the verifier. These objects (so-called "witness objects") are prepared by the verifier and handed over to the prover prior to the VP. Furthermore, we verify the practical validity of our method for all our optical and circuit-based VPs in detailed proof-of-concept experiments. Our work touches upon, and partly extends, several established concepts in cryptography and security, including physical unclonable functions, quantum cryptography, interactive proof systems, and, most recently, physical zero-knowledge proofs. We also discuss potential advancements of our method, for example "public virtual proofs" that function without exchanging witness objects between the verifier and the prover.