Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES.

Peter Marleau, E. Brubaker, Nathan R. Hilton, Michael McDaniel, Richard Schroeppel, K.D. Seager, Sharon M. Deland

Published Jun 1, 2015• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Glaser, Barak, and Goldston recently described an approach for nuclear warhead verification based on the cryptographic concept of a zero-knowledge protocol (ZKP).The verification approach included both procedural elements and a physical implementation.A group of Sandia National Laboratories researchers, whose expertise include radiation instrumentation design and development, cryptography, and arms control verification implementation, jointly reviewed the paper and identified specific challenges to implementing the approach as well as some opportunities.This paper compares the ZKP concept as presented by Glaser et al., to other warhead verification concepts and approaches described in the literature.The paper also summarizes challenges and opportunities for elements of this (new) approach.We note that ZKP as used in cryptography is a useful model for the arms control verification problem, but find that the direct analogy to arms control breaks down quickly.For example, fault tolerance in cryptographic ZKP is achieved by brute force repetition of the challenge/response procedure; in arms control, repeated measurements can be expensive.The ZKP methodology fits within the general class of template-based verification techniques, where template in this case refers to a reference measurement that is used for comparison.Template methods in general confirm that a given object is like another object that has already been accepted as a warhead by some other means.This can be a powerful verification approach, but requires independent means to trust the authenticity of the reference warhead -a standard that may be difficult to achieve.Note that this use of template differs from that of Glaser et al., who use the term to describe the accepted reference warhead.In the ZKP approach as described, the reference warhead must be presentwith inspector confidence in its provenance-at each subsequent confirmation measurement.This imposes significant additional constraints on maintaining continuity of knowledge of the reference between inspections.Despite some technical challenges, the concept of last-minute selection of the pre-loads and equipment could be a valuable component of a verification regime.In addition, the neutron transmission image using a bubble detector array is an interesting idea that can be considered for template measurements independently of ZKP..

Related papers

A Physical Zero-Knowledge Proof and Unclonable Sensors for Nuclear Warhead Verification

Sébastien Philippe

Future nuclear arms-control agreements may call for reductions of the total number of nuclear weapons and warheads in the world arsenals. Such agreements would require new trusted verification mechanisms to confirm that items presented to inspectors are nuclear warheads and not spoofs. Proliferation and national security concerns require, however, that inspectors gain no warhead design information through this process. To address this paradox, considerable efforts have been directed towards the development of "information barriers." These barriers consist of automated measurement systems that process sensitive information but only display the results of internal analysis in a binary valid/invalid manner. These systems are, by their nature, at risk of electronic tampering and snooping – and their trusted implementation has so far proved extremely difficult to realize. This thesis takes radically different directions to address this challenge. It demonstrates new approaches to information protection and trusted instruments for nuclear warhead verification that are based on the cryptographic concepts of zero-knowledge proofs and physically unclonable functions. To the author's knowledge, this thesis provides the first demonstration of a zero-knowledge physical measurement technique. Using fast neutron differential radiography and superheated emulsion detectors, such a technique can show two objects have identical geometry and opacity to 14-MeV neutrons without revealing what these properties are. This zero-knowledge feature no longer holds when the objects compared are significantly different. Such a technique could form the basis of a template-matching verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. The thesis then introduces and demonstrates key elements of an optical physical unclonable function sensitive to neutrons and based on superheated emulsions. Such sensors are unique objects that cannot be cloned or simulated. The data they produce are a function of both their internal disordered structure and the physical quantity they measure. Due to their sensitivity against any structural variation, including through neutron irradiation, it is possible to show that they – or the data they have recorded -- have not been tampered with. Such sensors could be used by adversarial parties in sensitive facilities without the risk of being compromised.

•Jan 1, 2018•1 citation

A framework for comparing nuclear warhead authentication protocols

R. Loch Macdonald

Even with the end of the Cold War, nuclear arms control continues to be a cornerstone of strategic stability and international non-proliferation efforts.New treaties are necessary to build upon, or at least maintain, the status-quo, and will rely upon verification technologies and protocols to ensure all sides are dismantling their warheads as promised.The nuclear weapon states refuse to participate in any process which might reveal the design of their warheads to an adversary or would-be proliferator.This makes warhead authentication, the critical verification step where the object to be dismantled is confirmed to be an authentic warhead, especially challenging.Despite several decades of research, there is no agreed means of describing or assessing warhead authentication protocols.This has hindered protocol development, and made it more difficult for the policy and technical communities to communicate what is important and feasible.This thesis presents a framework for describing warhead authentication protocols and quantifying their performance.The framework draws on methods used to assess digital authentication protocols, as well as information theoretic analysis of privacy.A model is developed for describing authentication protocols; showing how authentication questions, physical properties, and measurable data relate to one another.This allows the objectives and assumptions of a protocol to be made explicit, helping to ensure that protocols are compared fairly.It was found that the protocols in the literature have made use of very different assumptions, and that has influenced their choices of measurement technology and concepts of operation.Having established how to describe protocols, the thesis investigates how best to quantify the completeness (type I error rate), soundness (type II error rate), and information privacy of a protocol.While the absolute soundness cannot be calculated without knowledge of all possible hoaxes, a conditional soundness can be estimated using a minimax approach.A new measure of information privacy is presented, based on a change in the KL divergence between an inspector's beliefs and the actual warhead design, when the inspector starts from an incorrect prior.Médard always made time for my questions and was an amazing source of ideas for how to apply information theory to the project.Professor Areg Danagoulian helped me remain focused on the practical matters underlying my project, which I greatly appreciated.All of my committee have been excellent role models as researchers and mentors, which I hope to emulate in the future.I would like to thank all the staff in the department who have helped me in various ways.The list is very long, but I would especially like to say thank you to Heather for looking after us and keeping us on the straight and narrow in those first few years.Thank you as well to everyone who has made the past few years so enjoyable and memorable.This includes everyone in the LNSP group, Ian, my friends in NSE and the MIT rugby club, and especially the Simmons students and House team.Being a GRT was an experience I will always cherish.Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank my parents, Jamie, Lisa, and Alba for their love and support.Your encouragement and help has been of immeasurable value, and gives me confidence as we move on to the next challenges together.lognormal-distributed property with low variance, and a uniformlydistributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 17 Calculating the completeness of a Poisson observable of an underlying lognormal-distributed property with high variance, and a uniformlydistributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74 18 Poisson observable of an invariant property and a a uniformly-distributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 19 Example of linearized neutronics model for assessing soundness . . . .78 20 1D example of soundness calculation, for a Poisson observable of a lognormal property, as defined in Equation 3.22 . . . . . . . . . . . .84 21 1D example of soundness calculation, for a Poisson observable of a Gaussian property, as defined in Equation 3.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . .84 22 Illustration of the authentic object used in the 2D soundness example 86 23 Distribution of risk function results for successful hoaxes in the 2D soundness example, for 𝒞 = 0.8, 𝒮 = 0.7.The most extreme results are taken as the risk function for that completeness, soundness pair. . . .89 24 Completeness -soundness -risk map for the 2D soundness example .90 25 Completeness -soundness -risk map for the 2D soundness example using a one-sided hypothesis test to more easily detect [A] heavy hoaxes, and [B] light hoaxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90 26 Shannon entropy is a measure of the uniformity, or peakedness, of a distribution, regardless of the ordering of the entries.This makes it an accurate measure of uncertainty but less appropriate as a measure of estimator error . . . . . . . . . . . . .

•Jan 1, 2019•0 citations

Nuclear disarmament verification via resonant phenomena

Jake J. Hecla, Areg Danagoulian

Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner's obligation. Here we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

arXiv:1709.09736•Nature Communications•Mar 28, 2018•26 citations

Post‐Quantum Confidential Transaction Protocols

R. Manjula Devi, P. Keerthika, Pragnya Suresh +4 more

In recent years, much extraordinary progress has been achieved in the advance- ment of Quantum computers due to tremendous speed up in processing. However, the threat of large-scale impact on society has led to widespread initia- tives to develop new cryptographic algorithms, standards, and migration paths, which are collectively referred to as “post-quantum cryptography”. The concept of a Zero-Knowledge Protocol (ZKP) along with its noninteractive variants has been surveyed and well explained. Providing the deep insight of the protocols adapted for confidential transaction in post-quantum cryptography by applying zero-knowledge proof is the major purpose of this chapter.

Wiley eBooks•Jul 15, 2022•2 citations

Post-Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Applications

Ron Steinfeld

Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates for designing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that resist emerging quantum computing attacks. The recent NIST PQC standardization process is nearing its completion, with practical lattice-based algorithms for basic cryptographic functionalities (namely digital signature and public-key encryption) selected for standardization in the near future. However, practical lattice-based solutions for more advanced privacy-preserving protocols, in particular, Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), have only emerged recently and are an active area of research. We discuss some recent developments in design and analysis of practical lattice-based post-quantum ZKPs and their applications. In particular, we review some challenges that arise in designing ZKPs in the lattice setting and some recent progress on efficient lattice-based Schnorr-like proofs for important relations, such as binary/range proofs, one-out-of-many proofs and rounding proofs [1, 2, 4]. We discuss applications and optimization of such proof systems as building blocks for practical advanced cryptographic protocols such as ring signatures and balance proofs for privacy-preserving cryptocurrency payment protocols [2, 3]. We also discuss our recent work on succinct designated-verifier ZKPs (DV-ZKSNARKS) for verifying correctness of general delegated computations [5].

ACM ASIA Public-Key Cryptography Workshop (APKC)•Jun 20, 2023•5 citations

Homomorphic inference of deep neural networks for zero-knowledge verification of nuclear warheads

Gabriel V. Turturica, Violeta Iancu

Disarmament treaties have been the driving force towards reducing the large nuclear stockpile assembled during the Cold War. Further efforts are built around verification protocols capable of authenticating nuclear warheads while preventing the disclosure of confidential information. This type of problem falls under the scope of zero-knowledge protocols, which aim at multiple parties agreeing on a statement without conveying any information beyond the statement itself. A protocol capable of achieving all the authentication and security requirements is still not completely formulated. Here we propose a protocol that leverages the isotopic capabilities of NRF measurements and the classification abilities of neural networks. Two key elements guarantee the security of the protocol, the implementation of the template-based approach in the network's architecture and the use of homomorphic inference. Our results demonstrate the potential of developing zero-knowledge protocols for the verification of nuclear warheads using Siamese networks on encrypted spectral data.

Scientific Reports•May 8, 2023•2 citations
Glaser, Barak, and Goldston recently described an approach for nuclear warhead verification based on the cryptographic concept of a zero-knowledge protocol (ZKP).The verification approach included both procedural elements and a physical implementation.A group of Sandia National Laboratories researchers, whose expertise include radiation instrumentation design and development, cryptography, and arms control verification implementation, jointly reviewed the paper and identified specific challenges to implementing the approach as well as some opportunities.This paper compares the ZKP concept as presented by Glaser et al., to other warhead verification concepts and approaches described in the literature.The paper also summarizes challenges and opportunities for elements of this (new) approach.We note that ZKP as used in cryptography is a useful model for the arms control verification problem, but find that the direct analogy to arms control breaks down quickly.For example, fault tolerance in cryptographic ZKP is achieved by brute force repetition of the challenge/response procedure; in arms control, repeated measurements can be expensive.The ZKP methodology fits within the general class of template-based verification techniques, where template in this case refers to a reference measurement that is used for comparison.Template methods in general confirm that a given object is like another object that has already been accepted as a warhead by some other means.This can be a powerful verification approach, but requires independent means to trust the authenticity of the reference warhead -a standard that may be difficult to achieve.Note that this use of template differs from that of Glaser et al., who use the term to describe the accepted reference warhead.In the ZKP approach as described, the reference warhead must be presentwith inspector confidence in its provenance-at each subsequent confirmation measurement.This imposes significant additional constraints on maintaining continuity of knowledge of the reference between inspections.Despite some technical challenges, the concept of last-minute selection of the pre-loads and equipment could be a valuable component of a verification regime.In addition, the neutron transmission image using a bubble detector array is an interesting idea that can be considered for template measurements independently of ZKP..
Future nuclear arms-control agreements may call for reductions of the total number of nuclear weapons and warheads in the world arsenals. Such agreements would require new trusted verification mechanisms to confirm that items presented to inspectors are nuclear warheads and not spoofs. Proliferation and national security concerns require, however, that inspectors gain no warhead design information through this process. To address this paradox, considerable efforts have been directed towards the development of "information barriers." These barriers consist of automated measurement systems that process sensitive information but only display the results of internal analysis in a binary valid/invalid manner. These systems are, by their nature, at risk of electronic tampering and snooping – and their trusted implementation has so far proved extremely difficult to realize. This thesis takes radically different directions to address this challenge. It demonstrates new approaches to information protection and trusted instruments for nuclear warhead verification that are based on the cryptographic concepts of zero-knowledge proofs and physically unclonable functions. To the author's knowledge, this thesis provides the first demonstration of a zero-knowledge physical measurement technique. Using fast neutron differential radiography and superheated emulsion detectors, such a technique can show two objects have identical geometry and opacity to 14-MeV neutrons without revealing what these properties are. This zero-knowledge feature no longer holds when the objects compared are significantly different. Such a technique could form the basis of a template-matching verification system that could confirm the authenticity of nuclear weapons without sharing any secret design information. The thesis then introduces and demonstrates key elements of an optical physical unclonable function sensitive to neutrons and based on superheated emulsions. Such sensors are unique objects that cannot be cloned or simulated. The data they produce are a function of both their internal disordered structure and the physical quantity they measure. Due to their sensitivity against any structural variation, including through neutron irradiation, it is possible to show that they – or the data they have recorded -- have not been tampered with. Such sensors could be used by adversarial parties in sensitive facilities without the risk of being compromised.
Even with the end of the Cold War, nuclear arms control continues to be a cornerstone of strategic stability and international non-proliferation efforts.New treaties are necessary to build upon, or at least maintain, the status-quo, and will rely upon verification technologies and protocols to ensure all sides are dismantling their warheads as promised.The nuclear weapon states refuse to participate in any process which might reveal the design of their warheads to an adversary or would-be proliferator.This makes warhead authentication, the critical verification step where the object to be dismantled is confirmed to be an authentic warhead, especially challenging.Despite several decades of research, there is no agreed means of describing or assessing warhead authentication protocols.This has hindered protocol development, and made it more difficult for the policy and technical communities to communicate what is important and feasible.This thesis presents a framework for describing warhead authentication protocols and quantifying their performance.The framework draws on methods used to assess digital authentication protocols, as well as information theoretic analysis of privacy.A model is developed for describing authentication protocols; showing how authentication questions, physical properties, and measurable data relate to one another.This allows the objectives and assumptions of a protocol to be made explicit, helping to ensure that protocols are compared fairly.It was found that the protocols in the literature have made use of very different assumptions, and that has influenced their choices of measurement technology and concepts of operation.Having established how to describe protocols, the thesis investigates how best to quantify the completeness (type I error rate), soundness (type II error rate), and information privacy of a protocol.While the absolute soundness cannot be calculated without knowledge of all possible hoaxes, a conditional soundness can be estimated using a minimax approach.A new measure of information privacy is presented, based on a change in the KL divergence between an inspector's beliefs and the actual warhead design, when the inspector starts from an incorrect prior.Médard always made time for my questions and was an amazing source of ideas for how to apply information theory to the project.Professor Areg Danagoulian helped me remain focused on the practical matters underlying my project, which I greatly appreciated.All of my committee have been excellent role models as researchers and mentors, which I hope to emulate in the future.I would like to thank all the staff in the department who have helped me in various ways.The list is very long, but I would especially like to say thank you to Heather for looking after us and keeping us on the straight and narrow in those first few years.Thank you as well to everyone who has made the past few years so enjoyable and memorable.This includes everyone in the LNSP group, Ian, my friends in NSE and the MIT rugby club, and especially the Simmons students and House team.Being a GRT was an experience I will always cherish.Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank my parents, Jamie, Lisa, and Alba for their love and support.Your encouragement and help has been of immeasurable value, and gives me confidence as we move on to the next challenges together.lognormal-distributed property with low variance, and a uniformlydistributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73 17 Calculating the completeness of a Poisson observable of an underlying lognormal-distributed property with high variance, and a uniformlydistributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74 18 Poisson observable of an invariant property and a a uniformly-distributed nuisance parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 19 Example of linearized neutronics model for assessing soundness . . . .78 20 1D example of soundness calculation, for a Poisson observable of a lognormal property, as defined in Equation 3.22 . . . . . . . . . . . .84 21 1D example of soundness calculation, for a Poisson observable of a Gaussian property, as defined in Equation 3.8 . . . . . . . . . . . . .84 22 Illustration of the authentic object used in the 2D soundness example 86 23 Distribution of risk function results for successful hoaxes in the 2D soundness example, for 𝒞 = 0.8, 𝒮 = 0.7.The most extreme results are taken as the risk function for that completeness, soundness pair. . . .89 24 Completeness -soundness -risk map for the 2D soundness example .90 25 Completeness -soundness -risk map for the 2D soundness example using a one-sided hypothesis test to more easily detect [A] heavy hoaxes, and [B] light hoaxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90 26 Shannon entropy is a measure of the uniformity, or peakedness, of a distribution, regardless of the ordering of the entries.This makes it an accurate measure of uncertainty but less appropriate as a measure of estimator error . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner's obligation. Here we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.
In recent years, much extraordinary progress has been achieved in the advance- ment of Quantum computers due to tremendous speed up in processing. However, the threat of large-scale impact on society has led to widespread initia- tives to develop new cryptographic algorithms, standards, and migration paths, which are collectively referred to as “post-quantum cryptography”. The concept of a Zero-Knowledge Protocol (ZKP) along with its noninteractive variants has been surveyed and well explained. Providing the deep insight of the protocols adapted for confidential transaction in post-quantum cryptography by applying zero-knowledge proof is the major purpose of this chapter.
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates for designing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms that resist emerging quantum computing attacks. The recent NIST PQC standardization process is nearing its completion, with practical lattice-based algorithms for basic cryptographic functionalities (namely digital signature and public-key encryption) selected for standardization in the near future. However, practical lattice-based solutions for more advanced privacy-preserving protocols, in particular, Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs), have only emerged recently and are an active area of research. We discuss some recent developments in design and analysis of practical lattice-based post-quantum ZKPs and their applications. In particular, we review some challenges that arise in designing ZKPs in the lattice setting and some recent progress on efficient lattice-based Schnorr-like proofs for important relations, such as binary/range proofs, one-out-of-many proofs and rounding proofs [1, 2, 4]. We discuss applications and optimization of such proof systems as building blocks for practical advanced cryptographic protocols such as ring signatures and balance proofs for privacy-preserving cryptocurrency payment protocols [2, 3]. We also discuss our recent work on succinct designated-verifier ZKPs (DV-ZKSNARKS) for verifying correctness of general delegated computations [5].
Disarmament treaties have been the driving force towards reducing the large nuclear stockpile assembled during the Cold War. Further efforts are built around verification protocols capable of authenticating nuclear warheads while preventing the disclosure of confidential information. This type of problem falls under the scope of zero-knowledge protocols, which aim at multiple parties agreeing on a statement without conveying any information beyond the statement itself. A protocol capable of achieving all the authentication and security requirements is still not completely formulated. Here we propose a protocol that leverages the isotopic capabilities of NRF measurements and the classification abilities of neural networks. Two key elements guarantee the security of the protocol, the implementation of the template-based approach in the network's architecture and the use of homomorphic inference. Our results demonstrate the potential of developing zero-knowledge protocols for the verification of nuclear warheads using Siamese networks on encrypted spectral data.