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Unconditionally Secure Qubit Commitment Scheme Using Quantum Maskers

Seok Hyung Lie, Hyukjoon Kwon, Myung-Gun Kim, Hyunseok Jeong

Published Mar 29, 2019• 10 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

A commitment scheme allows one to commit to hidden information while keeping its value recoverable when needed. Despite considerable efforts, an unconditionally and perfectly secure bit commitment has been proven impossible both classically and quantum-mechanically. The situation is similar when committing to qubits instead of classical bits as implied in the no-masking theorem [K. Modi et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 120}, 230501 (2018)]. In this Letter, we find that circumvention of the no-masking theorem is possible with the aid of classical randomness. Based on this, we construct an unconditionally secure quit-commitment scheme that utilises any kind of universal quantum maskers with optimal randomness consumption, which is distributed by a trusted initializer. This shows that randomness, which is normally considered only to obscure the information, can benefit a quantum secure communication scheme. This result can be generalised to an arbitrary dimensional system.

Related papers

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A new commitment scheme based on position-verification and non-local quantum correlations is presented here for the first time in literature. The only credential for unconditional security is the position of committer and non-local correlations generated; neither receiver has any pre-shared data with the committer nor does receiver require trusted and authenticated quantum/classical channels between him and the committer. In the proposed scheme, receiver trusts the commitment only if the scheme itself verifies position of the committer and validates her commitment through non-local quantum correlations in a single round. The position-based commitment scheme bounds committer to reveal valid commitment within allocated time and guarantees that the receiver will not be able to get information about commitment unless committer reveals. The scheme works for the commitment of both bits and qubits and is equally secure against committer/receiver as well as against any third party who may have interests in destroying the commitment. Our proposed scheme is unconditionally secure in general and evades Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks in particular.

arXiv:1406.6679•Scientific Reports•Oct 27, 2014•10 citations
A commitment scheme allows one to commit to hidden information while keeping its value recoverable when needed. Despite considerable efforts, an unconditionally and perfectly secure bit commitment has been proven impossible both classically and quantum-mechanically. The situation is similar when committing to qubits instead of classical bits as implied in the no-masking theorem [K. Modi et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. {\bf 120}, 230501 (2018)]. In this Letter, we find that circumvention of the no-masking theorem is possible with the aid of classical randomness. Based on this, we construct an unconditionally secure quit-commitment scheme that utilises any kind of universal quantum maskers with optimal randomness consumption, which is distributed by a trusted initializer. This shows that randomness, which is normally considered only to obscure the information, can benefit a quantum secure communication scheme. This result can be generalised to an arbitrary dimensional system.
We propose a new quantum bit commitment scheme which is unconditionally secure.The key observation we make is that, by random permutation of particles, two appropriately prepared quantum mixtures with distinguishable density matrices can be rendered indistinguishable to another observer.In the new scheme, the sender encodes the bit in a mixture with commitment dependent density matrix, and randomizes the order of the particles to conceal the information from the receiver.Our result contradicts the claims in the literature that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible.
Bit commitment involves the submission of evidence from one party to another so that the evidence can be used to confirm a later revealed bit value by the first party, while the second party cannot determine the bit value from the evidence alone. It is widely believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to quantum entanglement cheating, which is codified in a general impossibility theorem. In this paper, the scope of this general impossibility proof is analyzed, and gaps are found. Two variants of a bit commitment scheme utilizing anonymous quantum states and decoy states are presented. In the first variant, the exact verifying measurement is independent of the committed bit value, thus the second party can make it before the first party opens, making possible an unconditional security proof based on no-cloning. In the second variant, the impossibility proof fails because quantum entanglement purification of a mixed state does not render the protocol determinate. Whether impossibility holds in this or similar protocols is an open question, although preliminary results already show that the impossibility proof cannot work as it stands.
It is generally believed that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC) is proven impossible by a "no-go theorem". We point out that the theorem only establishes the existence of a cheating unitary transformation in any QBC scheme secure against the receiver, but this fact alone is not sufficient to rule out unconditionally secure QBC as a matter of principle, because there exists no proof that the cheating unitary transformation must be known to the cheater in all possible cases. In this work, we show how to circumvent the "no-go theorem" and prove that unconditionally secure QBC is in fact possible.
A new commitment scheme based on position-verification and non-local quantum correlations is presented here for the first time in literature. The only credential for unconditional security is the position of committer and non-local correlations generated; neither receiver has any pre-shared data with the committer nor does receiver require trusted and authenticated quantum/classical channels between him and the committer. In the proposed scheme, receiver trusts the commitment only if the scheme itself verifies position of the committer and validates her commitment through non-local quantum correlations in a single round. The position-based commitment scheme bounds committer to reveal valid commitment within allocated time and guarantees that the receiver will not be able to get information about commitment unless committer reveals. The scheme works for the commitment of both bits and qubits and is equally secure against committer/receiver as well as against any third party who may have interests in destroying the commitment. Our proposed scheme is unconditionally secure in general and evades Mayers and Lo-Chau attacks in particular.