Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Disturbance: It's a Feature, not a Bug

Arne Hansen, Stefan Wolf

Published Feb 6, 2019• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Results of measurements give legitimacy to a physical theory: What if acquiring these results in the first place necessitates what the same theory considers to be an interaction? In this note, we assume that theories account for interactions so that they are empirically traceable, and that observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. We investigate consequences of this assumption: The unfolding language game, inspired by logic, leads to a class of contextual and probabilistic theories. Disturbance becomes a means to render interactions, thus, also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement problem arises in all such theories, not only quantum mechanics: It is a consequence of the need for empirical evidence of interactions.

Related papers

Contextuality: It's a Feature, not a Bug

Arne Hansen, Wolf, Stefan

Results of measurements give legitimacy to a physical theory. What if acquiring these results in the first place necessitates what the same theory considers to be an interaction? In this note, we assume that theories account for interactions so that they are empirically traceable, and that observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. We investigate consequences of this assumption: The unfolding language game, inspired by "quantum logic," leads to a class of contextual and probabilistic theories. Contextuality becomes a means to render interactions, thus also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement "problem" arises in all such theories, not only quantum mechanics: It is a consequence of the need for empirical evidence of interactions. And a consequence of the converse need for an interaction when obtaining that empirical evidence.

arXiv:1902.02088•Feb 6, 2019•2 citations

Measuring Measuring

Arne Hansen, Stefan Wolf

Measurements play a crucial role in doing physics: Their results provide the basis on which we adopt or reject physical theories. In this note, we examine the effect of subjecting measurements themselves to our experience. We require that our contact with the world is empirically warranted. Therefore, we study theories that satisfy the following assumption: Interactions are accounted for so that they are empirically traceable, and observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. Examining, with regard to these assumptions, an abstract representation of measurements with tools from quantum logic leads us to contextual theories. Contextuality becomes a means to render interactions, thus also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement becomes problematic---also beyond quantum mechanics---if one tries to commensurate the assumption of tangible interactions with the notion of a spectator theory, i.e., with the idea that measurement results are read off without effect. The problem, thus, presents itself as the collision of different epistemological stances with repercussions beyond quantum mechanics.

arXiv:1910.06123•Oct 14, 2019•1 citation

The Quantum Measurement Problem

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Abstract We use the Wigner’s friend story to characterize the quantum measurement problem. On the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whether a physical system is measured determines which of the theory's two dynamical laws obtains. For this reason, the logical consistency of the theory depends on one specifying strictly disjoint conditions for when when each law obtains, which means that one needs to say precisely what constitutes a measurement. But since the term measurement occurs in the standard theory as an undefined primitive term, the theory is at best incomplete. We see precisely how this conceptual incompleteness threatens the logical inconsistency of the theory and why, on even the most charitable reading, it entails that the theory is empirical incomplete. We end by considering why its empirically incompleteness is extremely difficult to test.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Dec 26, 2019•2 citations

The Epistemology of Measurement

Emily Adlam

Abstract This chapter discusses the measurement problem in the context of modern epistemology of science, setting out an epistemological framework which will be used throughout the book. I suggest that the literature on the measurement problem typically assumes that quantum mechanics is confirmed by the empirical evidence regardless of interpretation, and I argue that this ultimately founders for reasons similar to logical positivism. I then invoke recent work in the epistemology of measurement by van Fraassen, Chang and Tal to argue that we cannot make sense of scientific epistemology without a satisfactory understanding of what is going on during the process of measurement. Finally, I propose an approach to the epistemology of science inspired by Chang’s progressive coherentism, and argue that this is the right way of thinking about epistemic situations in which our understanding of the operation of our measuring devices depends crucially on the very physics we are trying to find out about.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Jun 12, 2025•0 citations

Measurement Without Collapse: Outcomes as Physical Records

Jorge Roig

Abstract The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is commonly framed as a conflict between unitary dynamics and the appearance of definite outcomes. This paper argues that the conflict arises from a misplaced assumption about what outcomes must be. In experimental practice, outcomes are not arbitrarily precise microscopic states or instantaneous events, but stable physical records produced in measurement interactions. Treating outcomes as such records allows them to be formalized as coarse-grained equivalence classes of physical states that persist in time and support consistent interaction across systems. On this basis, decoherence explains the stability of outcomes without selecting a unique global result or modifying quantum dynamics. Objectivity is recovered through the robustness of records rather than through absolute, observer-independent outcome facts. The measurement problem is thereby dissolved without invoking collapse mechanisms, branching universes, or observer-dependent postulates, while preserving all standard empirical predictions of quantum mechanics.

•Jun 2, 2026•0 citations

The measurement problem, quantisation and collapse

Lars‐Göran Johansson

The present paper contains a new attack on the measurement problem. The point of departure is a realist view according to which i) state functions in quantum theory describe physical states of affairs and not information states attributed to observers, and ii) in theses states, some observables are indeterminate and not merely unknown, i.e., value determinism is rejected. Furthermore, quantisation of interaction is accepted as an empirically established fact, independently of any interpretations of quantum theory. From these assumptions it follows that Hermitian operators replacing classical variables may be viewed as representing actions from the environment done on physical systems represented by the state functions upon which the operators operate. Sometimes this influence is followed by a discontinuous, indeterministic and irreversible state change; in other words, the system undergoes a collapse, which is represented by a projection operator. Thus, assuming a realistic view on quantum states and their changes, we have an explanation for the collapse of the wave function. Since the collapse is a discontinuous, random and irreversible state change, the classical form of physical explanation in terms of a mechanism which describes how a system continuously changes its state is impossible. Hence, if we accept quantisation of interaction, we must give up our demand for a ordinary mechanical explanation for the collapse. Neither can we state, in advance, sufficient conditions for the collapse, since it is an indeterministic theory.

•Jan 1, 2014•0 citations
Results of measurements give legitimacy to a physical theory: What if acquiring these results in the first place necessitates what the same theory considers to be an interaction? In this note, we assume that theories account for interactions so that they are empirically traceable, and that observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. We investigate consequences of this assumption: The unfolding language game, inspired by logic, leads to a class of contextual and probabilistic theories. Disturbance becomes a means to render interactions, thus, also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement problem arises in all such theories, not only quantum mechanics: It is a consequence of the need for empirical evidence of interactions.
Results of measurements give legitimacy to a physical theory. What if acquiring these results in the first place necessitates what the same theory considers to be an interaction? In this note, we assume that theories account for interactions so that they are empirically traceable, and that observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. We investigate consequences of this assumption: The unfolding language game, inspired by "quantum logic," leads to a class of contextual and probabilistic theories. Contextuality becomes a means to render interactions, thus also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement "problem" arises in all such theories, not only quantum mechanics: It is a consequence of the need for empirical evidence of interactions. And a consequence of the converse need for an interaction when obtaining that empirical evidence.
Measurements play a crucial role in doing physics: Their results provide the basis on which we adopt or reject physical theories. In this note, we examine the effect of subjecting measurements themselves to our experience. We require that our contact with the world is empirically warranted. Therefore, we study theories that satisfy the following assumption: Interactions are accounted for so that they are empirically traceable, and observations necessarily go with such an interaction with the observed system. Examining, with regard to these assumptions, an abstract representation of measurements with tools from quantum logic leads us to contextual theories. Contextuality becomes a means to render interactions, thus also measurements, empirically tangible. The measurement becomes problematic---also beyond quantum mechanics---if one tries to commensurate the assumption of tangible interactions with the notion of a spectator theory, i.e., with the idea that measurement results are read off without effect. The problem, thus, presents itself as the collision of different epistemological stances with repercussions beyond quantum mechanics.
Abstract We use the Wigner’s friend story to characterize the quantum measurement problem. On the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whether a physical system is measured determines which of the theory's two dynamical laws obtains. For this reason, the logical consistency of the theory depends on one specifying strictly disjoint conditions for when when each law obtains, which means that one needs to say precisely what constitutes a measurement. But since the term measurement occurs in the standard theory as an undefined primitive term, the theory is at best incomplete. We see precisely how this conceptual incompleteness threatens the logical inconsistency of the theory and why, on even the most charitable reading, it entails that the theory is empirical incomplete. We end by considering why its empirically incompleteness is extremely difficult to test.
Abstract This chapter discusses the measurement problem in the context of modern epistemology of science, setting out an epistemological framework which will be used throughout the book. I suggest that the literature on the measurement problem typically assumes that quantum mechanics is confirmed by the empirical evidence regardless of interpretation, and I argue that this ultimately founders for reasons similar to logical positivism. I then invoke recent work in the epistemology of measurement by van Fraassen, Chang and Tal to argue that we cannot make sense of scientific epistemology without a satisfactory understanding of what is going on during the process of measurement. Finally, I propose an approach to the epistemology of science inspired by Chang’s progressive coherentism, and argue that this is the right way of thinking about epistemic situations in which our understanding of the operation of our measuring devices depends crucially on the very physics we are trying to find out about.
Abstract The measurement problem in quantum mechanics is commonly framed as a conflict between unitary dynamics and the appearance of definite outcomes. This paper argues that the conflict arises from a misplaced assumption about what outcomes must be. In experimental practice, outcomes are not arbitrarily precise microscopic states or instantaneous events, but stable physical records produced in measurement interactions. Treating outcomes as such records allows them to be formalized as coarse-grained equivalence classes of physical states that persist in time and support consistent interaction across systems. On this basis, decoherence explains the stability of outcomes without selecting a unique global result or modifying quantum dynamics. Objectivity is recovered through the robustness of records rather than through absolute, observer-independent outcome facts. The measurement problem is thereby dissolved without invoking collapse mechanisms, branching universes, or observer-dependent postulates, while preserving all standard empirical predictions of quantum mechanics.
The present paper contains a new attack on the measurement problem. The point of departure is a realist view according to which i) state functions in quantum theory describe physical states of affairs and not information states attributed to observers, and ii) in theses states, some observables are indeterminate and not merely unknown, i.e., value determinism is rejected. Furthermore, quantisation of interaction is accepted as an empirically established fact, independently of any interpretations of quantum theory. From these assumptions it follows that Hermitian operators replacing classical variables may be viewed as representing actions from the environment done on physical systems represented by the state functions upon which the operators operate. Sometimes this influence is followed by a discontinuous, indeterministic and irreversible state change; in other words, the system undergoes a collapse, which is represented by a projection operator. Thus, assuming a realistic view on quantum states and their changes, we have an explanation for the collapse of the wave function. Since the collapse is a discontinuous, random and irreversible state change, the classical form of physical explanation in terms of a mechanism which describes how a system continuously changes its state is impossible. Hence, if we accept quantisation of interaction, we must give up our demand for a ordinary mechanical explanation for the collapse. Neither can we state, in advance, sufficient conditions for the collapse, since it is an indeterministic theory.