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CRC Press eBooks

Direct Study of Some Principles

Bernard d’Espagnat

Published Mar 5, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Knowledge of the classical and nonclassical theories of logical propositions is not required for an understanding of the analysis of the nonseparability of systems. Some very elementary notions about that matter may help to place the general problem in appropriate perspective. Classically, physical propositions bear upon physical systems. A proposition a bearing on a system S is a qualitative statement about S. The quantum calculus of propositions has been successfully used as an alternative and more general basis for the foundations of quantum mechanics. It is a truism that the advent of the modern physical theories—relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, S matrix theory, and so on—has induced us to abandon many familiar intuitive concepts. All the successful theories mentioned above are built on elaborate sets of axioms that are justified only a posteriori, that is, by agreement between some of their consequences and observed facts.

DOI
10.1201/9780429501449-15

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This talk is about quantum logic, and before we engage in the subject proper let me say how much I appreciate the invitation to deliver it that was extended to me by the Japanese Society for the Philosophy of Science.In particular because I feel that such a meeting is really the place that is most adequate for the discussion of these matters.Let us introduce the subject by mentioning a few general points.First of all, logics deals with propositions.Hence we shall be concerned with propositions.But in fact our interest will be exclusively focused on what is-or what should be the simplest type of propositions: the propositions by means of which a physicist expresses what he knows about a physical system.A priori, our subject should then be very simple.Indeed the elementary books about logic tell us that the rules concerning these propositions can be formalized.That, for example, the propositions can be combined by means of two rules, corresponding to and and to or, and that the resulting structure is just that of a Boolean Algebra.We would expect this to hold for any system.However, as you know, a major difficulty already creeps in at this point when we want to deal with atomic systems.This is because a very simple word such as "and" may well have no obvious meaning in that case.And when we try to force a meaning to it was sometimes encounter quite unpleasant surprises, exemplified by the Heisenberg relations.Among the founders of quantum physics the reactions to such a fact were quite varied as is well known.Some of them sort of hoped that the difficulty just came from our using the wrong concepts.For example, it is quite obvious that if we try to describe as a particle something which is really a wave, we are heading for trouble and we are bound to formulate some meaningless propositions.However, this remark did not lead to a satisfactory solution in the end.Other physicists notably the Copenhagen group took a very different standpoint.Substantially, what they said boiled to this: since we cannot "see" the elementary particles, let us refrain from formulating directly propositions bearing on them.Ultimately, there fore, all their propositions bear on the instruments; or should be interpreted in terms of such propositions.This is -it turned out a very good recipe.Of course, propositions bearing on instruments are propositions of classical, macroscopic physcis.As such, they fall -57-

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Knowledge of the classical and nonclassical theories of logical propositions is not required for an understanding of the analysis of the nonseparability of systems. Some very elementary notions about that matter may help to place the general problem in appropriate perspective. Classically, physical propositions bear upon physical systems. A proposition a bearing on a system S is a qualitative statement about S. The quantum calculus of propositions has been successfully used as an alternative and more general basis for the foundations of quantum mechanics. It is a truism that the advent of the modern physical theories—relativity, quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics, S matrix theory, and so on—has induced us to abandon many familiar intuitive concepts. All the successful theories mentioned above are built on elaborate sets of axioms that are justified only a posteriori, that is, by agreement between some of their consequences and observed facts.
This talk is about quantum logic, and before we engage in the subject proper let me say how much I appreciate the invitation to deliver it that was extended to me by the Japanese Society for the Philosophy of Science.In particular because I feel that such a meeting is really the place that is most adequate for the discussion of these matters.Let us introduce the subject by mentioning a few general points.First of all, logics deals with propositions.Hence we shall be concerned with propositions.But in fact our interest will be exclusively focused on what is-or what should be the simplest type of propositions: the propositions by means of which a physicist expresses what he knows about a physical system.A priori, our subject should then be very simple.Indeed the elementary books about logic tell us that the rules concerning these propositions can be formalized.That, for example, the propositions can be combined by means of two rules, corresponding to and and to or, and that the resulting structure is just that of a Boolean Algebra.We would expect this to hold for any system.However, as you know, a major difficulty already creeps in at this point when we want to deal with atomic systems.This is because a very simple word such as "and" may well have no obvious meaning in that case.And when we try to force a meaning to it was sometimes encounter quite unpleasant surprises, exemplified by the Heisenberg relations.Among the founders of quantum physics the reactions to such a fact were quite varied as is well known.Some of them sort of hoped that the difficulty just came from our using the wrong concepts.For example, it is quite obvious that if we try to describe as a particle something which is really a wave, we are heading for trouble and we are bound to formulate some meaningless propositions.However, this remark did not lead to a satisfactory solution in the end.Other physicists notably the Copenhagen group took a very different standpoint.Substantially, what they said boiled to this: since we cannot "see" the elementary particles, let us refrain from formulating directly propositions bearing on them.Ultimately, there fore, all their propositions bear on the instruments; or should be interpreted in terms of such propositions.This is -it turned out a very good recipe.Of course, propositions bearing on instruments are propositions of classical, macroscopic physcis.As such, they fall -57-
The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating properties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with every sentence of L(x). The set PfP^{f}Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered and contains a subset PTfP^{f}_{T}PTf​ of testable physical propositions whose order structure depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particular, PTfP^{f}_{T}PTf​ turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language LTQ(x)L_{TQ}(x)LTQ​(x), and the structure of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.
One of the aspects of quantum theory which has attracted the most general attention, is the novelty of the logical notions which it presupposes. It asserts that even a complete mathematical description of a physical system S does not in general enable one to predict with certainty the result of an experiment on S, and that in particular one can never predict with certainty both the position and the momentum of S, (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle). It further asserts that most pairs of observations are incompatible, and cannot be made on S, simultaneously (Principle of Non-commutativity of Observations).
The success of Newton's mechanic, Maxwell's electrodynamic, Einstein's theories of relativity, and quantum mechanics is a strong argument for the space-time continuum. Nevertheless, doubts have been expressed about the use of a continuum in a science squarely based on observation and measurement. An exact science requires that qualitative arguments must be reduced to quantitative statements. The observability of a continuum can be reduced from qualitative arguments to quantitative statements by means of information theory. Information theory was developed during the last decades within electrical communications, but it is almost unknown in physics. The closest approach to information theory in physics is the calculus of propositions, which has been used in books on the frontier of quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity. Principles of information theory are discussed in this book. The ability to think readily in terms of a finite number of discrete samples is developed over many years of using information theory and digital computers, just as the ability to think readily in terms of a continuum is developed by long use of differential calculus
We address the old question whether a logical understanding of Quantum Mechanics requires abandoning some of the principles of classical logic. Against Putnam and others (Among whom we may count or not E. W. Beth, depending on how we interpret some of his statements), our answer is a clear “no”. Philosophically, our argument is based on combining a formal semantic approach, in the spirit of E. W. Beth’s proposal of applying Tarski’s semantical methods to the analysis of physical theories, with an empirical–experimental approach to Logic, as advocated by both Beth and Putnam, but understood by us in the view of the operational- realistic tradition of Jauch and Piron, i.e. as an investigation of “the logic of yes–no experiments” (or “questions”). Technically, we use the recently-developed setting of Quantum Dynamic Logic (Baltag and Smets 2005, 2008) to make explicit the operational meaning of quantum-mechanical concepts in our formal semantics. Based on our recent results (Baltag and Smets 2005), we show that the correct interpretation of quantum-logical connectives is dynamical, rather than purely propositional. We conclude that there is no contradiction between classical logic and (our dynamic reinterpretation of) quantum logic. Moreover, we argue that the Dynamic-Logical perspective leads to a better and deeper understanding of the “non-classicality” of quantum behavior than any perspective based on static Propositional Logic.
The first five sections of this chapter are intended to provide some intuitive physical content to the notions of state and proposition of a quantum system. We deliberately avoid any deductive attitude, and we also avoid formalizations: the ingredients we shall start with (yes-no experiments and preparations) are so primitive and unstructured that the construction of quantum mechanics out of them is certainly not at hand. What we are going to see is simply that there is natural physical motivation for the occurrence at the very basis of every statistical theory—quantum mechanics in particular—of an ordered structure of propositions, of a convex structure of states, and of a relationship between these structures that makes the states behave as probability measures on propositions. From Section 13.6 on, we shall sketch a more formalized model, based on Mackey's approach.