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IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Secrecy Capacity Region of Fading Binary Z Interference Channel With Statistical CSIT

Sanjay Karmakar, Anirban Ghosh

Published Aug 21, 2018• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We characterize the secrecy capacity region of a fast Fading Binary 2-user Z-Interference Channel (FBZIC), assuming that only the Statistical Channel State Information is available at the Transmitters (S-CSIT). The converse is proved by constructing a new channel which is stochastically stronger than both the direct and cross-links emerging from the interfering transmitter. We also show that a capacity optimal code for a point-to-point binary erasure channel can be used at the non-interfering transmitter, a secrecy capacity optimal code for a binary erasure wiretap channel can be used at the interfering transmitter, and received signals can be decoded treating interference as erasure, to achieve all the secrecy rate pairs within the secrecy capacity region of the FBZIC. It turns out that the secrecy capacity region is a trapezoid and we explicitly characterize its corner points in terms of erasure probabilities of the various links of the channel. Comparing it with the capacity region of a fast fading no-secrecy binary 2-user ZIC, we quantify the loss due to the additional secrecy constraint. Our results reveal that, when the non-interfering user operates at its maximum rate, the interfering user cannot operate at a non-zero secrecy rate.

DOI
10.1109/tifs.2018.2866327

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Jun 16, 2017•1 citation
We characterize the secrecy capacity region of a fast Fading Binary 2-user Z-Interference Channel (FBZIC), assuming that only the Statistical Channel State Information is available at the Transmitters (S-CSIT). The converse is proved by constructing a new channel which is stochastically stronger than both the direct and cross-links emerging from the interfering transmitter. We also show that a capacity optimal code for a point-to-point binary erasure channel can be used at the non-interfering transmitter, a secrecy capacity optimal code for a binary erasure wiretap channel can be used at the interfering transmitter, and received signals can be decoded treating interference as erasure, to achieve all the secrecy rate pairs within the secrecy capacity region of the FBZIC. It turns out that the secrecy capacity region is a trapezoid and we explicitly characterize its corner points in terms of erasure probabilities of the various links of the channel. Comparing it with the capacity region of a fast fading no-secrecy binary 2-user ZIC, we quantify the loss due to the additional secrecy constraint. Our results reveal that, when the non-interfering user operates at its maximum rate, the interfering user cannot operate at a non-zero secrecy rate.
We characterize the secrecy capacity region of a Layered Erasure 2-user Z interference channel (LEZIC) with arbitrary distribution for the numbers of layers that gets erased on any particular link. It is assumed that the instantaneous channel state information (CSI), i.e., the number of surviving layers on any particular link is available only at the receivers. We prove the capacity result in two steps; In the first step, we show that a polygon with one vertex at origin and two sides coinciding with the rate axes contains the secrecy capacity region of the LEZIC. Characterization of this polygon involves defining an intermediate enhanced channel. In the second step, we prove that all the non-zero vertexes of the aforementioned polygon can be achieved by point-to-point coding by the non-interfering transmitter and decoding its message at the interfered receiver by treating interference as erasure. The interfering transmitter on the other hand, sends Bernoulli i.i.d. bits only at layers that have a better chance of reaching the desired receiver than the interfered receiver.
We consider an Ergodic Fading Broadcast Channel with one Legitimate receiver and one Eavesdropper (BCoLoE) having arbitrary fading statistics, where the instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI) are known only at the receivers (CSIR). The secrecy capacity of this channel is characterized within 11 bits irrespective of fading statistics and Signal-to-Noise Ratios (SNRs). This is achieved by deriving a new upper bound to the secrecy capacity of the channel and two new lower bounds. The upper bound is derived by approximating Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs) of the two links by corresponding staircase functions. The smaller lower bound, although looser, has a form which can be analytically compared with the upper bound and facilitates the approximate secrecy capacity characterization. It is proved that, the so called Binary Expansion Signaling with Reverse Stripping (BES-RS) scheme can achieve a secrecy rate larger than both these lower bounds with the help of numerical computation for several BCoLoEs with practical fading statistics. We further characterize the secrecy capacity of a class of 2-user binary fading interference channel (BFIC) and 2-user layered fading interference channel (LFIC), under the same assumptions as for the wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity region for a very weak BFIC turns out to be quadrangular while for LFIC it is polygonal. We explicitly characterize the corner points in both the cases. The converse in either case is proved by dividing the set of upper bounds into two carefully chosen regions depending on the values of ω - the weighting factor of the weighted sum bounds. In case of LFIC each of the regions are also shown to be piece-wise linear. The achievability on the other hand is proved by using capacity optimal code for a layered erasure wiretap channel at both the transmitters and treating interference as erasure while decoding the signals at the receivers. In addition, the achievability of the layered case also involves proper assignment of the layers to the two transmitters based on some constraints. We also prove the secrecy capacity of strong BFIC and LFIC as zero.
In this work, we examine the secrecy capacity region of the block-fading broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) when the transmitter has limited knowledge of the channel. In particular, we consider a two-user communication system where the transmitter has one common message to be transmitted to both users and one confidential message intended to only one of them. The confidential message has to be kept secret from the other user to whom the information is not intended. The transmitter is not aware of the channel state information (CSI) of neither channel and is only provided by limited CSI feedback sent at the beginning of each fading block. Assuming an error-free feedback link, we characterize the secrecy capacity region of this channel and show that even with a 1-bit CSI feedback, a positive secrecy rate can still be achieved. Then, we look at the case where the feedback link is not error- free and is rather a binary erasure channel (BEC). In the latter case, we provide an achievable secrecy rate region and show that as long as the erasure event is not a probability 1 event, the transmitter can still transmit the confidential information with a positive secrecy rate.
We consider the fast-fading Gaussian wiretap channel with single antenna nodes and without channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT), where the fading processes of the two links are arbitrary and independent of each other. We derive an upper bound to the secrecy capacity for this channel and an achievable rate as well. Subsequently, we identify a class of channel statistics for which the outer bound and the achievable rates are identical thereby characterizes the exact secrecy capacity of the channel. The class of channels with such channel statistics are called stochastically degraded in this paper. Many practical wireless settings including the Rayleigh fading environment fall under this stochastically degraded class. We illustrate our results by computing explicit expression for the secrecy capacity for Rayleigh distributed wiretap channels.
We consider the secure transmission in ergodic fast Rayleigh fading multiple-input single-output single-antenna-eavesdropper (MISOSE) wiretap channels. We assume that the statistics of both the legitimate and eavesdropper channels are the only available channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT). By introducing a new secrecy capacity upper bound, we prove that the secrecy capacity is achieved by the Gaussian input without prefixing. To attain this result, we form another MISOSE channel for upper-bounding by relaxing the equivocation constraint, and tighten the bound by carefully selecting correlations between the legitimate and eavesdropper channel gains. The resulting upper bound is tighter than the others in the literature which are based on modifying the correlation between the noises at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. Next, we fully characterize the secrecy capacity by showing that the optimal channel input covariance matrix is a scaled identity matrix. The key to solve such a stochastic optimization problem is by exploiting the completely monotone property of the secrecy capacity. Finally, we prove that with only statistical CSIT of both channels, the capacity will neither scale with signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) nor the number of antenna. Our numerical results also match these observations and further confirm that having the legitimate CSIT (realizations) is very beneficial to increase the secrecy capacity.
We investigate the relation between different stochastic orders and the degradedness of a fast fading wiretap channel with statistical channel state information at the transmitter (CSIT). In particular, we derive sufficient conditions to identify the ergodic secrecy capacities for both single and multiple antenna cases even though there is only statistical CSIT. Introduction To design a wiretap code with higher secrecy rate, channel state information at the transmitter of the legitimate and eavesdropper's channels1 should be known to a certain degree. When there is perfect CSIT of both channels, the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel can be achieved by a Gaussian input. However, due to several practical issues such as (1) being a malicious user, Eve is by no means intending to feed back the correct CSI to Alice; (2) limited feedback bandwidth; (3) the delay caused by channel estimation; (4) the speed of channel variation, etc., it is more reasonable to consider cases where perfect CSIT is unavailable. In this chapter we consider the cases when only statistical CSIT of both channels from Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, respectively, are available. One possible way to get such information from Eve virtually is as follows. For some bounded space like indoor parking lots or malls, it is possible to collect the channel statistics offline of most of the positions within that space, where the channel variation may be due to the movement of people or cars, etc. When Alice wants to transmit, she can use the known statistics measured offline of the channel between her and the unknown user closest to her as Eve's channel information to design her wiretap code for the worst-case scenario. Although the secrecy capacity formula for discrete memoryless non-degraded wiretap channels was proved in [1], the optimal selection of the auxiliary random variable and channel prefixing are still unknown for additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels with partial CSIT in general. Only a few capacity results under the considered scenario are known, and are summarized as follows.