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IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference

The secrecy capacity region of fading erasure Z interference channel with no CSIT

Sanjay Karmakar, Anirban Ghosh

Published Apr 1, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We characterize the secrecy capacity region of a Layered Erasure 2-user Z interference channel (LEZIC) with arbitrary distribution for the numbers of layers that gets erased on any particular link. It is assumed that the instantaneous channel state information (CSI), i.e., the number of surviving layers on any particular link is available only at the receivers. We prove the capacity result in two steps; In the first step, we show that a polygon with one vertex at origin and two sides coinciding with the rate axes contains the secrecy capacity region of the LEZIC. Characterization of this polygon involves defining an intermediate enhanced channel. In the second step, we prove that all the non-zero vertexes of the aforementioned polygon can be achieved by point-to-point coding by the non-interfering transmitter and decoding its message at the interfered receiver by treating interference as erasure. The interfering transmitter on the other hand, sends Bernoulli i.i.d. bits only at layers that have a better chance of reaching the desired receiver than the interfered receiver.

DOI
10.1109/wcnc.2018.8377423

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We characterize the secrecy capacity region of a Layered Erasure 2-user Z interference channel (LEZIC) with arbitrary distribution for the numbers of layers that gets erased on any particular link. It is assumed that the instantaneous channel state information (CSI), i.e., the number of surviving layers on any particular link is available only at the receivers. We prove the capacity result in two steps; In the first step, we show that a polygon with one vertex at origin and two sides coinciding with the rate axes contains the secrecy capacity region of the LEZIC. Characterization of this polygon involves defining an intermediate enhanced channel. In the second step, we prove that all the non-zero vertexes of the aforementioned polygon can be achieved by point-to-point coding by the non-interfering transmitter and decoding its message at the interfered receiver by treating interference as erasure. The interfering transmitter on the other hand, sends Bernoulli i.i.d. bits only at layers that have a better chance of reaching the desired receiver than the interfered receiver.
We characterize the secrecy capacity region of a fast Fading Binary 2-user Z-Interference Channel (FBZIC), assuming that only the Statistical Channel State Information is available at the Transmitters (S-CSIT). The converse is proved by constructing a new channel which is stochastically stronger than both the direct and cross-links emerging from the interfering transmitter. We also show that a capacity optimal code for a point-to-point binary erasure channel can be used at the non-interfering transmitter, a secrecy capacity optimal code for a binary erasure wiretap channel can be used at the interfering transmitter, and received signals can be decoded treating interference as erasure, to achieve all the secrecy rate pairs within the secrecy capacity region of the FBZIC. It turns out that the secrecy capacity region is a trapezoid and we explicitly characterize its corner points in terms of erasure probabilities of the various links of the channel. Comparing it with the capacity region of a fast fading no-secrecy binary 2-user ZIC, we quantify the loss due to the additional secrecy constraint. Our results reveal that, when the non-interfering user operates at its maximum rate, the interfering user cannot operate at a non-zero secrecy rate.
We consider an Ergodic Fading Broadcast Channel with one Legitimate receiver and one Eavesdropper (BCoLoE) having arbitrary fading statistics, where the instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI) are known only at the receivers (CSIR). The secrecy capacity of this channel is characterized within 11 bits irrespective of fading statistics and Signal-to-Noise Ratios (SNRs). This is achieved by deriving a new upper bound to the secrecy capacity of the channel and two new lower bounds. The upper bound is derived by approximating Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs) of the two links by corresponding staircase functions. The smaller lower bound, although looser, has a form which can be analytically compared with the upper bound and facilitates the approximate secrecy capacity characterization. It is proved that, the so called Binary Expansion Signaling with Reverse Stripping (BES-RS) scheme can achieve a secrecy rate larger than both these lower bounds with the help of numerical computation for several BCoLoEs with practical fading statistics. We further characterize the secrecy capacity of a class of 2-user binary fading interference channel (BFIC) and 2-user layered fading interference channel (LFIC), under the same assumptions as for the wiretap channel. The secrecy capacity region for a very weak BFIC turns out to be quadrangular while for LFIC it is polygonal. We explicitly characterize the corner points in both the cases. The converse in either case is proved by dividing the set of upper bounds into two carefully chosen regions depending on the values of ω - the weighting factor of the weighted sum bounds. In case of LFIC each of the regions are also shown to be piece-wise linear. The achievability on the other hand is proved by using capacity optimal code for a layered erasure wiretap channel at both the transmitters and treating interference as erasure while decoding the signals at the receivers. In addition, the achievability of the layered case also involves proper assignment of the layers to the two transmitters based on some constraints. We also prove the secrecy capacity of strong BFIC and LFIC as zero.
We consider the layered erasure wiretap channel which can also be viewed as the time varying version of the deterministic model of the wiretap channel and characterize its secrecy capacity. We assume an arbitrary fading statistics for the erasure probabilities of the layers and assume that only the fading statistics is known at the transmitter while the instantaneous erasure information, i.e., which layers are erased in a particular channel use, is known at both the receivers. The converse is based on an enhancement technique where we first construct an enhanced wiretap channel and then derive upper bound to the secrecy capacity of the enhanced channel. On the achievability side we show that a coding scheme, in which information is transmitted only via a subset of the layers chosen carefully depending on the channel statistics and independent coding is done across different layers in this subset, can achieve the upper bound.
In this work, we examine the secrecy capacity region of the block-fading broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) when the transmitter has limited knowledge of the channel. In particular, we consider a two-user communication system where the transmitter has one common message to be transmitted to both users and one confidential message intended to only one of them. The confidential message has to be kept secret from the other user to whom the information is not intended. The transmitter is not aware of the channel state information (CSI) of neither channel and is only provided by limited CSI feedback sent at the beginning of each fading block. Assuming an error-free feedback link, we characterize the secrecy capacity region of this channel and show that even with a 1-bit CSI feedback, a positive secrecy rate can still be achieved. Then, we look at the case where the feedback link is not error- free and is rather a binary erasure channel (BEC). In the latter case, we provide an achievable secrecy rate region and show that as long as the erasure event is not a probability 1 event, the transmitter can still transmit the confidential information with a positive secrecy rate.
We consider a fast fading 2-receiver Broadcast channel (BC), where one of the receivers is legitimate and the other is malicious/unintended. The instantaneous Channel State Information (CSI) is assumed to be known only at the receivers (CSIR). The secrecy capacity of this channel is characterized within 11 bits irrespective of fading statistics and Signal-to- Noise Ratios (SNRs). This is achieved by deriving a new upper bound to the secrecy capacity of the channel and two new lower bounds. The upper bound is derived by approximating Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs) of the two links by corresponding staircase functions and has the desirable property of easy computability for arbitrary fading statistics. The smaller lower bound, although looser, has a form which can be analytically compared with the upper bound and facilitates the approximate secrecy capacity characterization. It is proved that, the so called Binary Expansion Signaling with Reverse Stripping (BES-RS) scheme can achieve a secrecy rate larger than both these lower bounds. This result establishes BES-RS scheme as a practically implementable coding scheme that can achieve the secrecy capacity of the FWC within a constant number of bits, where the constant is universal across all fading statistics and SNR. Explicit numerical computation of these bounds shows that the difference between the secrecy rate achievable by the BES-RS scheme and the upper bound is much smaller than the aforementioned universal constant. This in turn suggests that, much of the gap of 11 bits originates from the looseness introduced to bring the two bounds in a compatible form.
In this chapter, we will discuss how the quality and availability of channel state information (CSI) affects secrecy in wireless networks. In particular, we study how the delay in the availability of CSI affects secrecy in the context of the two-user broadcast channel with confidential messages. We adopt a secure degrees of freedom perspective and investigate various CSI scenarios, including cases when the availability of CSI at the transmitter varies across users and with time. We discuss how to leverage such variabilities in CSI for secrecy and highlight the differences between the optimal degrees of freedom with or without secrecy constraints. Introduction The availability of channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) plays a crucial role in securing wireless communication at the physical layer. Various well-known physical-layer security techniques such as coding for the fading wiretap channel [1–4], coding for the multiple-antenna wiretap channel [5–8], artificial noise injection [9], cooperative jamming [10, 11], cooperation for secrecy [12–18], secure signal alignment [19–22], and other related techniques rely upon the assumption of timely availability of precise CSIT; see also a recent review article in [23]. In most practical scenarios, the channel gains are measured by the receivers and then fed back to the transmitters. The measurement and feedback process necessarily introduces imprecision and delay into the CSI. Motivated by this fact, in this chapter we explore the fundamental limits of physical layer security when the CSIT is imperfect. For concreteness, we will focus on a particular wireless network model: the multiple-input single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCCM). This effectively models practical systems such as a cellular downlink network where each user wants not only reliability but also confidentiality of the information intended for it. The focus of this chapter is on the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region of the fading two-user MISO BCCM, in which the transmitter with two antennas has two confidential messages, one for each of the single antenna users (see Fig. 8.1). The secrecy capacity region of the MISO broadcast channel (BC) for the case of perfect and instantaneous CSI at all terminals (transmitter and the receivers) has been characterized in [24, 25]. Using these results, it follows that for the two-user MISO BCCM, the sum s.d.o.f. is 2 with perfect and instantaneous CSIT.