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Nature of / and the Apparatus

Conference, Transdisciplinary image, Henschke, Chris

Published Jan 1, 2018• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper I present aspects of my practice-based research, which focuses upon my cross-disciplinary collaborations undertaken with particle physicists working at the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN). This research led to the production and exhibition of a series of audiovisual artworks that engage with the philosophical, epistemological, and material aspects of particle physics. Issues arising between theory and experimentation – in terms of observation and measurement. My inquiry into the philosophy of particle physics has been framed largely through the epistemology of quantum physicist Niels Bohr. I discuss Bohr’s insights regarding nature and apparatuses, which I frame in the concepts of technological agency developed by contemporary scientific philosopher Andrew Pickering. Through my interactions with both physicists and apparatuses, I have produced artworks which express and question the limits of, and relationships between the subatomic and macroscopic universe, and the tensions and connections between art science.

DOI
10.6084/m9.figshare.6104678

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In this paper I present aspects of my practice-based research, which focuses upon my cross-disciplinary collaborations undertaken with particle physicists working at the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN). This research led to the production and exhibition of a series of audiovisual artworks that engage with the philosophical, epistemological, and material aspects of particle physics. Issues arising between theory and experimentation – in terms of observation and measurement. My inquiry into the philosophy of particle physics has been framed largely through the epistemology of quantum physicist Niels Bohr. I discuss Bohr’s insights regarding nature and apparatuses, which I frame in the concepts of technological agency developed by contemporary scientific philosopher Andrew Pickering. Through my interactions with both physicists and apparatuses, I have produced artworks which express and question the limits of, and relationships between the subatomic and macroscopic universe, and the tensions and connections between art science.
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In this chapter, I offer some personal reflections about the nature of reality, shaped by my work as a quantum physicist, my experimentation with psychedelic drugs during the 1960s, and my more recent studies of modern cognitive science. Traditionally, questions about the essential nature of reality are asked by philosophers. In the twentieth century, these questions were asked for the first time by scientists as well. During the first three decades of the century, the exploration of the atomic and subatomic world brought physicists in contact with a strange and unexpected reality that shattered the foundations of their worldview and forced them to think in entirely new ways. Quantum physics showed scientists “a new reality,” and from that time on, the nature of reality became a popular subject of discussion not only in philosophy but also in science. In recent decades, cognitive scientists took another radical step in the scientific conception of the nature of reality. They asserted that the features of our ordinary, everyday reality are not features of an independently existing world, but are created in the very process of perception. In a way this generalizes the influence of the act of perception on the perceived object, which was famously analyzed in quantum physics by Werner Heisenberg, to everyday perception. In other words, even our everyday reality is just one of many alternate realities.
The present dissertation aims to incorporate inter-disciplinarily features of philosophical inquiry, scientific exploration, and subjective reflection on the epistemology of knowledge. The work begins with an extensive literature review on the topics of MODERN PHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY, in particular exploring in depth the PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE of Sir Arthur Eddington and synthesizes it with works of CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHERS, namely Aristotle, Plato, and to a smaller extent Heraclitus. It borrows heavily from the early movers of QUANTUM MECHANICS – Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrodinger – and demonstrates their own familiarity with the aforementioned Classical Thinkers, finally emphasizing their still necessary and continued relevance in MODERN PHILOSOPHY OF PHYSICS. The work focusses on the nature of knowledge – EPISTEMOLOGY – under two particular facets; that of subjectivity and the role of experimenter/observer in creating knowledge, and that of structuralism as defined by Eddington as the metaphysical “structure” created by the objects of inquiry, the methods used to observe them, and the observer themselves. The introductory chapters conclude with a Treatise on the Nature of Interdisciplinary research, emphasizing INTERDISCIPLINARITY as a naturally-occurring process of the human mind, and thereby illustrating its omnipresence throughout the entirety of Homo sapiens – from pre-history to CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY to the modern official conceptualization of the term in ACADEMIA. The work proceeds with three experimental chapters designed to explore and illustrate these above features. The first demonstrates the communication of bacteria using photons of particular periodicities, emphasizing the notion of structure. The second explores the most destructive of human activities, war, through the resolution of potentially sub-conscious patterns and periodicities within this aggressive behaviour, demonstrating its governance by Lunar cycles. The third and final experiment investigates a fundamental behaviour of our species, language, by comparing the quantitative shifts in frequencies and formants resultant from holding facial expressions that encapsulate neutral, happy, and sad affective states; the phenomenon arises from the subjective expression and reception of vocalizations altered in periodic ways. The dissertation closes with a brief exploration of dogmatic approaches to knowledge production. There are a number of objectives for the present dissertation. First, it has an overarching aim of continuing the traditional field of what was NATURAL PHILOSOPHY – the highly integratory science in which the barriers between disciplines had not yet been firmly entrenched. In doing so, it is a work of interdisciplinary science, cobbling together diverse fields as biology, biophysics, experimental psychology, linguistics, with a particular emphasis on philosophy. It is arguably a work of EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY, only instead of focusing on moralist issues it explores the PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE through experimentation. Second, it enquires to what extent a particular tool is applicable in multiple scenarios from epistemological and ontological perspectives; it questions to what extent emergent phenomena are capable of describing the states of the biological systems. Whether recording biophotons from bacteria, observing patterns of human warfare, or measuring the vocalizations of psychology students, the dissertation hopes to demonstrate signals of those systems are equivalent epistemologically; in that breaking the signal down into its components is sufficient and justifiable for discerning knowledge of the system that produced it. In so doing, it is possible to argue they are ontologically related as signal phenomenon – although their precise natures of being differ, as signals they represent a particular class of being; a messenger. Finally, the document hopes to illustrate in a general sense the continued importance of including to some extent philosophical considerations and perspectives within science. It desires to be a demonstration of the “BIG PICTURE” approach to devising methodologies and comparing results for seemingly varied fields of study, promoting the act of interdisciplinarity without ascribing to any the nuances of particular interdisciplinary theory. In short, it emphasizes that “science can be destroyed by having the disciplines too thin, because there is no integration.” 1
Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...
The article deals with the approach to understanding science and technology as well as natural and cultural practices developed by the American philosopher Karen Barad in the concept of agential realism. The peculiarity of her approach consists in referring as a starting point to quantum mechanics in its interpretation, which was proposed by Niels Bohr. Barad proposes a reinterpretation of Bohr's propositions through revealing their ontological content. In this regard, the article addresses the epistemological and ontological problems that quantum physics has faced, such as the conditions for the possibility of an objective description of the world, the nature of measurement, and the relationship between language and the material world. Discussed is the shift that Barad argues is asserted in Bohr's philosophy-physics, which consists of quantum mechanics moving from the linguistic concepts in which the world of classical science was represented to what Barad calls material-discursive practices through which the world is articulated and explained. The possibilities of a different interpretation of Niels Bohr's philosophy-physics are considered.