In this study Arun Bala examines the implications that Niels Bohr’s principle of complementarity holds for fields beyond physics. Bohr, one of the founding figures of modern quantum physics, argued that the principle of complementarity he proposed for understanding atomic processes has parallels in psychology, biology, and social science, as well as in Buddhist and Taoist thought. But Bohr failed to offer any explanation for why complementarity might extend beyond physics, and his claims have been widely rejected by scientists as empty speculation. Scientific scepticism has only been reinforced by the naïve enthusiasm of postmodern relativists and New Age intuitionists, who seize upon Bohr’s ideas to justify anti-realist and mystical positions. Arun Bala offers a detailed defence of Bohr’s claim that complementarity has far-reaching implications for the biological and social sciences, as well as for comparative philosophies of science, by explaining Bohr’s parallels as responses to the omnipresence of grown properties in nature.
In this study Arun Bala examines the implications that Niels Bohr’s principle of complementarity holds for fields beyond physics. Bohr, one of the founding figures of modern quantum physics, argued that the principle of complementarity he proposed for understanding atomic processes has parallels in psychology, biology, and social science, as well as in Buddhist and Taoist thought. But Bohr failed to offer any explanation for why complementarity might extend beyond physics, and his claims have been widely rejected by scientists as empty speculation. Scientific scepticism has only been reinforced by the naïve enthusiasm of postmodern relativists and New Age intuitionists, who seize upon Bohr’s ideas to justify anti-realist and mystical positions. Arun Bala offers a detailed defence of Bohr’s claim that complementarity has far-reaching implications for the biological and social sciences, as well as for comparative philosophies of science, by explaining Bohr’s parallels as responses to the omnipresence of grown properties in nature.
The views of Niels Bohr on complementarity are examined, both in physics and in other fields. N. Bohr's opinions on the relationship between physics and biology are discussed in detail. It is shown that, over a number of years, Bohr viewed as complementary the study of organisms as atomic-molecular and as integral systems. Subsequently, owing to the development of molecular biology, Bohr rejected the idea of the complementarity in principle of the stated two types of studies. The current status of the physical theory of biological phenomena is examined, and the role of synergetics in this field is noted. The so-called antireductionism is criticized. It is shown that the views of contemporary eminent theoretical biologists reveal them to be unfamiliar with physics. The very important role of physics in the further development of biology and its practical applications is emphasized.
The so-called “orthodox” interpretation of quantum physics attributed to Niels Bohr is commonly regarded as abandoning realism. I have already opposed this view elsewhere (Folse 1985) but partially in response to criticism of my position (Shimony 1985), here I propose to relate Bohr’s realism to recent contributions to the realism debate given by Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), and Ellis (1985). Specifically, I argue that Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint requires a causal entity realism. Furthermore, labeling Bohr an anti-realist with respect to theories is misleading because it assumes the correspondence theory of truth that Bohr holds quantum theory forces us to reject. Although there are many realist views, I take the root of realism to be the quest for knowledge about the reality producing the phenomena we experience. It is realism in this sense that Bohr defended and that makes science significant to metaphysics.
Niels Bohr developed the framework of complementarity in response to the binding of measuring device and quantum system into an irreducible whole or "individual" at the instant of measurement. On the grounds that an organism and its environment are also bound irreducibly upon interaction, Bohr extended complementarity to biology and psychology, treating mechanistic reduction of the organism and neural objectification of consciousness as mere perspectives opposed by equally valid perspectives. In contrast to Bohr's aversion to metaphysical speculation, Heisenberg suggested that the quantum-mechanical wave function represents a real entity which determines probable outcomes of measurements given the forces acting on the system. In light of Bohr's parallel between quantum and biological systems, the probability wave of the atom ought to be mirrored in the equally intangible consciousness of the organism. I propose further that life is indeed an irreducible property of the organism and that mechanistic biology mischaracterizes life. Key to my analysis is the dual nature of time.
Introduction In order to develop the insight that is worked out by Brock (Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics, Logos, 2003), that the philosophy of quantum mechanics should parallel Kant's philosophy of natural science, some preliminary analyses of key concepts need to be done. Initiated by Niels Bohr (Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge, John Wiley and Sons, 1958), the concept of ‘complementarity’ has played a major role in the interpretation of quantum theory. However, the exact place it occupies in respect of the logical form of the relation of complementarity between descriptive predicates has not been spelled out in detail to my knowledge. Complementary predicates exclude one another as simultaneous attributions to the same subject. Exactly what form does this exclusion take? How is it related to the basic exclusion-of-predicates principle, the logical law of non-contradiction?
Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...
SUMMARY. — This paper emphasizes the evolution of complementarity, in Niels Bohr's successive formulations of this idea, from 1927 to 1939, despite little, if any change in the definition of the concept with time. In the Como lecture, in 1927, Bohr introduced the idea of « complementary descriptions » in a problematic, polemical way. Against Schrödinger' s interpretation, he stressed the « irrationality » inherent in the quantum postulate. In 1935, Bohr again used complementarity polemically, in his reply to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen. But far from intending it to convey irrationality this time, he meant to use it instead to prove that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. Finally, I will take up Bohr's attempts to apply complementarity to fundamental problems in biology, psychology, sociology, and so forth. I will argue that the introduction of complementarity outside physics was not motivated by an imperialist ambition of the Copenhagen School, but rather inspired by Bohr's own personal philosophy.