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Revue d histoire des sciences

L'évolution de la complémentarité dans les textes de Bohr (1927-1939)

Bernadette Bensaude‐Vincent

Published Jan 1, 1985• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

SUMMARY. — This paper emphasizes the evolution of complementarity, in Niels Bohr's successive formulations of this idea, from 1927 to 1939, despite little, if any change in the definition of the concept with time. In the Como lecture, in 1927, Bohr introduced the idea of « complementary descriptions » in a problematic, polemical way. Against Schrödinger' s interpretation, he stressed the « irrationality » inherent in the quantum postulate. In 1935, Bohr again used complementarity polemically, in his reply to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen. But far from intending it to convey irrationality this time, he meant to use it instead to prove that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. Finally, I will take up Bohr's attempts to apply complementarity to fundamental problems in biology, psychology, sociology, and so forth. I will argue that the introduction of complementarity outside physics was not motivated by an imperialist ambition of the Copenhagen School, but rather inspired by Bohr's own personal philosophy.

DOI
10.3406/rhs.1985.4006

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Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...

Configurations•Sep 1, 2004•0 citations
SUMMARY. — This paper emphasizes the evolution of complementarity, in Niels Bohr's successive formulations of this idea, from 1927 to 1939, despite little, if any change in the definition of the concept with time. In the Como lecture, in 1927, Bohr introduced the idea of « complementary descriptions » in a problematic, polemical way. Against Schrödinger' s interpretation, he stressed the « irrationality » inherent in the quantum postulate. In 1935, Bohr again used complementarity polemically, in his reply to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen. But far from intending it to convey irrationality this time, he meant to use it instead to prove that quantum mechanics is a complete theory. Finally, I will take up Bohr's attempts to apply complementarity to fundamental problems in biology, psychology, sociology, and so forth. I will argue that the introduction of complementarity outside physics was not motivated by an imperialist ambition of the Copenhagen School, but rather inspired by Bohr's own personal philosophy.
Niels Bohr introduced the concept of complementarity in order to give a general account of quantum mechanics, however he stressed that the idea of complementarity is related to the general difficulty in the formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction between subject and object. The complementary descriptions approach is a framework for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, more specifically, it focuses in the development of the idea of complementarity and the concept of potentiality in the orthodox quantum formulation. In PART I of this article, we analyze the ideas of Bohr and present the principle of complementary description which takes into account Einstein's ontological position. We argue, in PART II, that this development allows a better understanding of some of the paradigmatic interpretational problems in quantum mechanics, such as the measurement problem and the quantum to classical limit. We conclude that one should further develop complementarity in order to elaborate a consistent worldview.
Niels Bohr introduced the concept of complementarity in order to give a general account of quantum mechanics, however he stressed that the idea of complementarity is related to the general difficulty in the formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction between subject and object. The complementary descriptions approach is a framework for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, more specifically, it focuses in the development of the idea of complementarity and the concept of potentiality in the orthodox quantum formulation. In PART I of this article, we analyze the ideas of Bohr and present the principle of complementary description which takes into account Einstein's ontological position. We argue, in PART II, that this development allows a better understanding of some of the paradigmatic interpretational problems in quantum mechanics, such as the measurement problem and the quantum to classical limit. We conclude that one should further develop complementarity in order to elaborate a consistent worldview.
SUMMARY. — In this article, I examine Einstein's objections to quantum mechanics, with the formalism's interpretation in terms of complementarity as the historical setting. From 1924 to 1927, the period of development of a formalised quantum theory, Einstein raised certain questions that kept him from joining the throng of ardent supporters. Against the theory and its interpretation of 1927, he at first advanced arguments with the idea of eventually finding a flaw in quantum mechanics, and casting doubts upon its pretensions of completeness. Finally acknowledging, in 1931, the theory's coherence and accuracy at describing phenomena, he then tried to put forth objections to the theory's interpretation, which aimed at demonstrating the theory's incompleteness. These arguments culminated in the « Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen » article of 1935, and Einstein repeated them continually until his death. The analysis here calls, of course, for assessments of both the import of Einstein's arguments in relation to physics today, as well as to Einstein's own conceptions where theoretical physics is concerned, but these go beyond the aims of the present article.
This paper examines the transformation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, known as complementarity, from the version presented in his famous Como lecture (1927), which introduced complementarity, to a new version that was developed by Bohr shortly thereafter, in part under the impact of his intervening exchanges with Einstein. While the existence of more than one version of Bohr's complementarity (and of still different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation by others) has been noted, Bohr's rethinking itself of complementarity has rarely been adequately addressed. Apart from refining and indeed correcting the Como argument, the transformation in question was, I argue, defined by a shift from a more philosophical to a more experimental argument. My aim is to explore both this shift and the complexity of the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's thinking in order to understand better the beginnings and the ends, also in the sense of aims, of Bohr's complementarity.
Niels Bohr introduced the concept of complementarity in order to give a general account of quantum mechanics, however he stressed that the idea of complementarity is related to the general dificulty in the formation of human ideas, inherent in the distinction between subject and object. Earlier, we have introduced a development of the concept of complementarity which constitutes a new approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that this development allows a better understanding of some of the paradigmatic interpretational problems of quantum theory. Within the scheme proposed by modal interpretations we analyze the relation between holism and reductionism as well as the problems proposed by Arntzenius and Clifton. We discuss the problem of presupposing the concept of entity within the quantum formalism and bring into stage the concept of faculty as a way to recover the objective character of quantum mechanics.
Complementarity and Deconstruction: Plotnitsky's Analysis and Beyond Makoto Katsumori Akita University The philosophical thought of the modern physicist Niels Bohr (1885–1962), which revolves around the concept of complementarity, has long been a major subject of historical and philosophical inquiry. Many prior studies of Bohr's complementarity, however, seem to be limited by the fact that they largely proceed within the conceptual frames of the "mainstream" philosophy of science. This being the case, his radical questioning of traditional scientific and philosophical notions—such as the unambiguity of concepts and words—has not been adequately addressed, insofar as these notions are uncritically presupposed by the commentators themselves. In other words, Bohr's thought has often been interpreted under certain tacit premises of scientific rationality that are precisely of the kind targeted by his epistemological critique. In recent years, however, there have emerged new approaches to Bohr's idea of complementarity that place it in different, less conventional, philosophical contexts. Among the most notable of these is Arkady Plotnitsky's endeavor to connect Bohr's complementarity with Jacques Derrida's project of deconstruction. In the present article, based on my recent doctoral dissertation,1 I take up this contribution by Plotnitsky as a suitable point of reference from which to [End Page 435] explore anew Bohr's thought with its radical philosophical implications. After outlining Bohr's complementarity argument and Plotnitsky's reading thereof (in the first and second sections, respectively), I will examine a series of problems that seem to face, or to be left unsolved by, Plotnitsky's account (in the third section). This critical appraisal will finally lead me to sketch a new interpretive approach of my own (in the fourth section), which both extends and delimits the intersections between complementarity and deconstruction. As regards the historical development of Bohr's complementarity, I will largely restrict myself to the period between 1927 and 1950, in which the most crucial of his innovative ideas seem to have been presented. I. Bohr's Idea of Complementarity In his 1927 lecture delivered in Como, Italy, entitled "The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory," Niels Bohr introduced the concept and framework of complementarity as a pivotal idea in his interpretation of quantum theory. From then on, he continually developed the idea of complementarity with regard not only to quantum theory but to other fields of knowledge as well. In what follows, I will first outline his complementarity argument in its "early" period, stretching from 1927 to the mid-thirties,—or, more precisely, until just before his 1935 debate with EPR.2 Bohr starts by noting that "our usual description of physical phenomena is based entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be observed without disturbing them appreciably."3 This notion of physical phenomena as undisturbed by observation underlies all of classical physics and is still maintained in the theory of relativity. However, Bohr continues, a new situation has arisen with the development of quantum theory, specifically with "the so-called quantum postulate, which attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories"; this "individuality" implies that "any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the [End Page 436] agency of observation not to be neglected" (PWNB, 1: 53–54.). In more specific terms, any observation aimed at space-time coordination brings about an exchange of momentum and energy with the measuring rods and clocks. It is crucial here that this interaction between the object and the instrument of observation is not simply unavoidable, but "uncontrollable," which represents a "feature of irrationality" brought into the description of nature (PWNB, 1: 68, 91). For insofar as the measuring instruments are to fulfill their purpose, the interaction itself cannot be taken into account, and thus the magnitude of the disturbance always remains unknown. It follows, in Bohr's view, that "an independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation...