The aim of this paper is to implement Bell’s notion of local causality into a framework, called local physical theory. This framework, based on the axioms of algebraic field theory, is broad enough to integrate both probabilistic and spatiotemporal concepts and also classical and quantum theories. Bell’s original idea of local causality will arise as the classical case of our definition. Classifying local physical theories by whether they obey local primitive causality, a property rendering the dynamics of the theory causal, we then investigate what is needed for a local physical theory to be locally causal. Finally, comparing local causality with the common cause principles and relating both to the Bell inequalities we find a nice parallelism: Bell inequalities cannot be derived neither from local causality nor from a common cause unless the local physical theory is classical or the common cause is commuting, respectively.
Bell's Theorem requires any theory which obeys the technical definitions of Free Choice and Local Causality to satisfy the Bell inequality. Invariant set theory is a finite theory of quantum physics which violates the Bell inequality exactly as does quantum theory: in it neither Free Choice nor Local Causality hold, consistent with Bell's Theorem. However, within the proposed theory, the mathematical expressions of both Free Choice and Local Causality involve states which, for number-theoretic reasons, cannot be ontic (cannot lie on the theory's fractal-like invariant set
IU in state space). Weaker versions of Free Choice and Local Causality are proposed involving only the theory's ontic states. Conventional hidden-variable theories satisfying only these weaker definitions still obey the Bell inequality. However, invariant set theory, which violates the Bell inequality, satisfies these weaker definitions. It is argued that the weaker definitions are consistent with the physical meaning behind free choice and local causality as defined in space-time, and hence that Free Choice and Local Causality are physically too strong. It is concluded that the experimental violation of the Bell inequality may have less to do with free choice or local causality \emph{per se}, and more to do with the presence of a holistic but causal state-space geometry onto which quantum ontic states are constrained.
In the wake of relativistic field theories in physics, all of our most fundamental physical theories shared three properties regarding the way that they described the world. First, properties of objects were always determined. Second, systems always evolved deterministically. Thirdly, no causal relationship between two separate regions in space was immediate or had superluminal effect. These properties of theories are called determinacy, determinism and local causality, respectively. These properties all correspond to classical metaphysical principles about the structure of the world. It will be shown that the theory of quantum mechanics has none of these properties and so therefore introduces a tension between the classical metaphysical description of the world and the descriptions given by our most fundamental physical theories. John Stewart Bell showed that no entirely correct theory of quantum mechanics has the property of local causality. I argue that this implies that local causality is metaphysically untenable.