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Does Quantum Mechanics Establish the Final Failure of Causality

MacGregor Malloy

Published May 3, 2017• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

In the wake of relativistic field theories in physics, all of our most fundamental physical theories shared three properties regarding the way that they described the world. First, properties of objects were always determined. Second, systems always evolved deterministically. Thirdly, no causal relationship between two separate regions in space was immediate or had superluminal effect. These properties of theories are called determinacy, determinism and local causality, respectively. These properties all correspond to classical metaphysical principles about the structure of the world. It will be shown that the theory of quantum mechanics has none of these properties and so therefore introduces a tension between the classical metaphysical description of the world and the descriptions given by our most fundamental physical theories. John Stewart Bell showed that no entirely correct theory of quantum mechanics has the property of local causality. I argue that this implies that local causality is metaphysically untenable.

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Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.

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Abstract Quantum states in superposition cannot be observed, suggesting that they merely embody information on possible measurement results. Yet, we think of them as describing physical systems that evolve in time according to given mathematical equations. Furthermore, evolution takes place in physical space-time, and local causality is imposed on space-time by Special Relativity (a sequence of cause and effect that constitutes a fundamental principle by which we think about and do scientific work). It is therefore strange that there is non–locality and violation of causality embedded in Quantum Mechanics. We try to give here a first step to see whether a deterministic and local interpretation is possible. We will show that Bell’s inequality is not conclusive about the non–local nature of Quantum Mechanics, in that there exists an interpretation of reality (which we put forward) which is local and in which Bell’s inequality cannot be derived. Assuming determinism and locality a new Bell-like inequality is derived, which is always satisfied by Quantum Mechanics and which allows for local hidden variables [1].

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Bell's theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known as "local causality" is not compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell's theorem. However, another assumption of Bell's theorem is the use of classical logic. One part of this assumption is the principle of "ontic definiteness", that is, that it must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell's inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed.

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It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.

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A strict epistemic approach to physics

Per Östborn

The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state $S$ with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state $S$ is a subset of a state space $\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}$, such that $S$ always contains many elements $Z$. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of $S$ cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements $Z$, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of $S$ is described in terms of sequential time $n\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}$, which is updated according to $n\rightarrow n+1$ each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time $n$ can be separated from relational time $t$, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each $n$, in which $t$ represents the knowledge at sequential time $n$ about the temporal relations between present and past events.

arXiv:1601.00680•Jan 4, 2016•7 citations
In the wake of relativistic field theories in physics, all of our most fundamental physical theories shared three properties regarding the way that they described the world. First, properties of objects were always determined. Second, systems always evolved deterministically. Thirdly, no causal relationship between two separate regions in space was immediate or had superluminal effect. These properties of theories are called determinacy, determinism and local causality, respectively. These properties all correspond to classical metaphysical principles about the structure of the world. It will be shown that the theory of quantum mechanics has none of these properties and so therefore introduces a tension between the classical metaphysical description of the world and the descriptions given by our most fundamental physical theories. John Stewart Bell showed that no entirely correct theory of quantum mechanics has the property of local causality. I argue that this implies that local causality is metaphysically untenable.
Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.
Abstract Quantum states in superposition cannot be observed, suggesting that they merely embody information on possible measurement results. Yet, we think of them as describing physical systems that evolve in time according to given mathematical equations. Furthermore, evolution takes place in physical space-time, and local causality is imposed on space-time by Special Relativity (a sequence of cause and effect that constitutes a fundamental principle by which we think about and do scientific work). It is therefore strange that there is non–locality and violation of causality embedded in Quantum Mechanics. We try to give here a first step to see whether a deterministic and local interpretation is possible. We will show that Bell’s inequality is not conclusive about the non–local nature of Quantum Mechanics, in that there exists an interpretation of reality (which we put forward) which is local and in which Bell’s inequality cannot be derived. Assuming determinism and locality a new Bell-like inequality is derived, which is always satisfied by Quantum Mechanics and which allows for local hidden variables [1].
Bell's theorem shows that the reasonable relativistic causal principle known as "local causality" is not compatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics. It is not possible maintain a satisfying causal principle of this type while dropping any of the better-known assumptions of Bell's theorem. However, another assumption of Bell's theorem is the use of classical logic. One part of this assumption is the principle of "ontic definiteness", that is, that it must in principle be possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions treated in the theory. Once the logical setting is clarified somewhat, it can be seen that rejecting this principle does not in any way undermine the type of causal principle used by Bell. Without ontic definiteness, the deterministic causal condition known as Einstein Locality succeeds in banning superluminal influence (including signalling) whilst allowing correlations that violate Bell's inequalities. Objections to altering logic, and the consequences for operational and realistic viewpoints, are also addressed.
What defines an emergent quantum mechanics (EmQM)? Can new insight be advanced into the nature of quantum nonlocality by seeking new links between quantum and emergent phenomena as described by self-organization, complexity, or emergence theory? Could the development of a future EmQM lead to a unified, relational image of the cosmos? One key motivation for adopting the concept of emergence in relation to quantum theory concerns the persistent failure in standard physics to unify the two pillars in the foundations of physics: quantum theory and general relativity theory (GRT). The total contradiction in the foundational, metaphysical assumptions that define orthodox quantum theory versus GRT might render inter -theoretic unification impossible. On the one hand, indeterminism and non -causality define orthodox quantum mechanics, and, on the other hand, GRT is governed by causality and determinism . How could these two metaphysically-contradictory theories ever be reconciled? The present work argues that metaphysical contradiction necessarily implies physical contradiction. The contradictions are essentially responsible also for the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. A common foundation may be needed for overcoming the contradictions between the two foundational theories. The concept of emergence, and the development of an EmQM, might help advance a common foundation - physical and metaphysical - as required for successfull inter-theory unification .
It has been claimed that quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, i.e., that the predictions of quantum mechanics are at odds with a conception of the world where all the interactions are mediated by local mechanisms. The cited reason is the violation of the Bell inequality in cases where measurements are performed on quantum systems of particles that have interacted in the past. Quantum mechanics predicts that the state of the particles in such a system are correlated, a result obtained from considering a thought-experiment often known as EPR. In this thesis, I will argue that the violation of the Bell inequality in EPR forces us to either accept that causes sometimes act both backwards and forwards in time, or give up some widely-held assumptions about causal relations or the role of causal explanations. First, I will present three principles regarding causality that I take be widely accepted. I will then present the background for the claim the quantum mechanics is a non-local theory, and discuss the implications of non-local causal influences in light of the Special Theory of Relativity. One argument against a causal explanation of the EPR-correlations will be discussed, and different models for the causal structure of EPR will be assessed. I will argue that a retrocausal model – models that include instances of retrocausation, where the direction of causation is the opposite of the direction of time – is the only viable option if we want to uphold the three principles presented in chapter 1. I will discuss the plausibility of rejecting one of these principles, and argue that at least one of the can be restricted in a way that still accounts for our commitment to it. Finally, I will assess the non-local models against the retrocausal models, and argue that a retrocausal model offers interpretational advantages over the non-local alternatives.
The general view is that all fundamental physical laws should be formulated within the framework given by quantum mechanics (QM). In a sense, QM therefore has the character of a metaphysical theory. Consequently, if it is possible to derive QM from more basic principles, these principles should be of general, philosophical nature. Here, we derive the formalism of QM from well-motivated epistemic principles. A key assumption is that a physical theory that relies on entities or distinctions that are unknowable in principle gives rise to wrong predictions. First, an epistemic formalism is developed, using concepts like knowledge and potential knowledge, identifying a physical state SSS with the potential knowledge of the physical world. It is demonstrated that QM emerges from this formalism. However, Hilbert spaces, wave functions and probabilities are defined in certain well-defined observational contexts only. This means that the epistemic formalism is broader than QM. In the fundamental layer of description, the physical state SSS is a subset of a state space S={Z}\mathcal{S}=\{Z\}S={Z}, such that SSS always contains many elements ZZZ. These elements correspond to unattainable states of complete knowledge of the world. The evolution of SSS cannot be determined in terms of the individual evolution of the elements ZZZ, unlike the evolution of an ensemble in classical phase space. The evolution of SSS is described in terms of sequential time n∈Nn\in \mathbf{\mathbb{N}}n∈N, which is updated according to n→n+1n\rightarrow n+1n→n+1 each time an event occurs, each time potential knowledge changes. Sequential time nnn can be separated from relational time ttt, which describes distances between events in space-time. There is an entire space-time associated with each nnn, in which ttt represents the knowledge at sequential time nnn about the temporal relations between present and past events.