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Open Physics

Bohr against Bell: complementarity versus nonlocality

Andrei Yu. Khrennikov

Published Jan 1, 2017• 33 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In this note we compare the views of Bohr (known as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics) with the views of Bell: complementarity versus nonlocality.
DOI
10.1515/phys-2017-0086

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This paper examines the transformation of Bohr's interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, known as complementarity, from the version presented in his famous Como lecture (1927), which introduced complementarity, to a new version that was developed by Bohr shortly thereafter, in part under the impact of his intervening exchanges with Einstein. While the existence of more than one version of Bohr's complementarity (and of still different versions of the Copenhagen interpretation by others) has been noted, Bohr's rethinking itself of complementarity has rarely been adequately addressed. Apart from refining and indeed correcting the Como argument, the transformation in question was, I argue, defined by a shift from a more philosophical to a more experimental argument. My aim is to explore both this shift and the complexity of the relationships between physics and philosophy in Bohr's thinking in order to understand better the beginnings and the ends, also in the sense of aims, of Bohr's complementarity.
We start with discussion on Bohr’s response to the EPR argument andexplain how Bohr was able to sail between Scylla (incompleteness) andCharybdis (nonlocality) towards the consistent interpretation of quantumtheory. We call the latter the Bohr interpretation and distinguish it fromthe commonly used orthodox Copenhagen interpretation. We point to connectionbetween the complementarity principle and the information interpretationof QM and briefly discuss its versions, starting withSchrödinger and continuing to the information quantization interpretation(Zeilinger, Brukner), QBism (Fuchs et al.), reality without realism (RWR,Plotnitsky), the Växjö interpretation (Khrennikov), and derivations of thequantum formalism from the information axioms (e.g., D’Ariano et al.). Oneof the main distinguishing features of the information interpretation is the possibility of structuring thequantum foundations without nonlocality and spooky actionat a distance.
The Copenhagen interpretation, which informs the textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, depends fundamentally on the notion of ontological wave-particle duality and a viewpoint called “complementarity.” In this paper, Bohr's own interpretation is traced in detail and is shown to be fundamentally different from and even opposed to the Copenhagen interpretation in virtually all its particulars. In particular, Bohr's interpretation avoids the ad hoc postulate of wave function ‘collapse’ that is central to the Copenhagen interpretation. The strengths and weakness of both interpretations are summarized.
One of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics occupies a privileged position in the opinion of the majority of physicists. This is the Copenhagen view, which owes its fame and popularity not only to historical reasons but also to its simplicity and practical efficiency. As is well known, the Copenhagen outlook was elaborated collectively. Nevertheless, Niels Bohr's and W. Heisenberg's contributions should be singled out as particularly outstanding. This chapter describes two principles, which are in fact the two pillars on which Bohr's doctrine is built. These are: The working of measuring instruments must be accounted for in purely classical terms . Another one is quantum systems that should not even be thought of as possessing individual properties independently of the experimental arrangement. In the particular case of the pair of observables "position" and "momentum," the Heisenberg uncertainty relations can be considered as a generalization of the complementarity principle.