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CRC Press eBooks

Bohr and Heisenberg

Bernard d’Espagnat

Published Mar 5, 2018• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

One of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics occupies a privileged position in the opinion of the majority of physicists. This is the Copenhagen view, which owes its fame and popularity not only to historical reasons but also to its simplicity and practical efficiency. As is well known, the Copenhagen outlook was elaborated collectively. Nevertheless, Niels Bohr's and W. Heisenberg's contributions should be singled out as particularly outstanding. This chapter describes two principles, which are in fact the two pillars on which Bohr's doctrine is built. These are: The working of measuring instruments must be accounted for in purely classical terms . Another one is quantum systems that should not even be thought of as possessing individual properties independently of the experimental arrangement. In the particular case of the pair of observables "position" and "momentum," the Heisenberg uncertainty relations can be considered as a generalization of the complementarity principle.

DOI
10.1201/9780429501449-26

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One of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics occupies a privileged position in the opinion of the majority of physicists. This is the Copenhagen view, which owes its fame and popularity not only to historical reasons but also to its simplicity and practical efficiency. As is well known, the Copenhagen outlook was elaborated collectively. Nevertheless, Niels Bohr's and W. Heisenberg's contributions should be singled out as particularly outstanding. This chapter describes two principles, which are in fact the two pillars on which Bohr's doctrine is built. These are: The working of measuring instruments must be accounted for in purely classical terms . Another one is quantum systems that should not even be thought of as possessing individual properties independently of the experimental arrangement. In the particular case of the pair of observables "position" and "momentum," the Heisenberg uncertainty relations can be considered as a generalization of the complementarity principle.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
Abstract One of the foundational principles of quantum mechanics is Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation. According to this relation, no one can measure both the position of a particle and how fast it is moving simultaneously no matter how precise the measuring instruments. Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation and the associated Bohr’s principle of complementarity are explained using simple examples. The idea that measurement disturbs the system is a source of the uncertainty. The philosophical question whether the uncertainty represents only our inability to measure the properties precisely or it has much deeper consequences related to the question of reality is also discussed.
From the outset, Heisenberg had resolved to eliminate classical space-time pictures involving particles and waves from the quantum mechanics of the atom. He had wanted to focus instead on the properties actually observed and recorded in laboratory experiments, such as the positions and intensities of spectral lines. Alone in Copenhagen in February 1927, he now pondered on the significance and meaning of such experimental observables. Feeling the need to introduce at least some form of ‘visualizability’, he asked himself some fundamental questions, such as: What do we actually mean when we talk about the position of an electron? He went on to discover the uncertainty principle: the product of the ‘uncertainties’ in certain pairs of variables—called complementary variables—such as position and momentum cannot be smaller than Planck’s constant h (now h / 4π‎).
The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics has become the standard way of explaining the physical philosophical meaning of the mathematics of microscopic behavior. It developed from the thought of people who attended the Institute for Theoretical Physics of the University of Copenhagen during the 40 years that Niels Bohr directed it, from 1920 to 1962. Bohr took a large part in developing the Copenhagen Interpretation, he didn't escape all controversy over it (although the quote above is a bit of an exaggeration). Bohr did die before the experimental theoretical developments that have transposed the debate over the appropriateness adequacy of the Copenhagen Interpretation into a new key, he may well have been lucky to have escaped when he did. There is no authoritative codification of CI [the Copenhagen Interpretation], write T Gornitz C. E von Weizsacker of the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany in' their formal presentation to the recent Loyola Conference on Mathematical Interpretational Problems in Relativistic Quantum Theory, and under the conditions of its origin there probably could not be one.... All prominent authors of the time who wrote on these questions, like Bohr, [Werner] Heisenberg, [Wolfgang] Pauli, J[ohn] v[on] Neumann on one side, [Albert] Einstein [Erwin] Schrodinger on the other, fell, so we feel, into some stammering when they tried to express their own positions. Nevertheless there is what might be called a Copenhagen attitude. It concentrates on observable phenomena, makes statistics probability central to its understanding, considers quantum mechanics primarily a theory of knowledge or information becomes a kind of physica negativa (analogous to a theologia negativa) in trying not to say too much about things that can't be seen or felt. For example, it doesn't much care whether the orbits of electrons in atoms are real or not and, in fact, tends to regard them as unreal. It appears in most textbooks as the standard way of looking at things.
One of the most striking deviations of quantum mechanics from classical mechanics is that any measurement of a microscopic system involves the interaction with the measuring instruments. The interaction cannot be neglected and in fact leads to uncontrollable disturbance on the system. In 1927, Werner Karl Heisenberg in his celebrated paper established the quantitative expression for unavoidable momentum disturbance caused by any position measurement. The crucial word here is simultaneously. The uncertainty relation gives the lower bound on the product of the uncertainties of two pairs of variables. But it says nothing about the accuracy with which individual observables can be measured. The physical meaning of energy-time uncertainty is different from that of x-px uncertainty. Position and momentum are observables to which Hermitian operators are assigned and which are measured at a particular time. An important implication of the uncertainty principle is that quantum systems do follow classical trajectories which conflict with our everyday experience.
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.