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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

Ontic structural realism and quantum field theory: Are there intrinsic properties at the most fundamental level of reality?

Philipp Berghofer

Published Sep 14, 2017• 21 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsb.2017.09.003

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Abstract Ontic structural realism (OSR) has been suggested as a metaphysics for quantum field theory (QFT). A common objection to OSR highlights the presence of fundamental intrinsic properties in physical theories (such as QFT) as undermining OSR. As there are purported examples of fundamental intrinsic properties possessed by fields in QFT, OSR is purportedly refuted in QFT (Berghofer, 2018). This article defends OSR from this argument. There are two possible strategies for responding to this argument: (1) denying that Berghofer’s counterexamples to OSR are intrinsic properties, and (2) finding a means of accommodating intrinsic properties in OSR. I consider the first strategy and discuss several possible arguments why the purported cases of fundamental intrinsic properties in QFT are non-intrinsic. Additionally, as there are a number of means available for OSR to accommodate intrinsic properties, the second strategy also succeeds.

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Structural realism attempts to make a compromise between scientific realism and empiricism, by restricting our realist commitment to the relational structure of scientific theories. There are two main versions of the position: ontic, or epistemic. According to ontic structural realism, the nomological relations expressed by theories are the primitive entities of reality. This ontic version is motivated in particular by arguments to the effect that epistemic versions are not really distinct from mere empiricism. However according to some authors, it’s not clear that ontic structural realism can differentiate between physical and mathematical relations, and account for the relations between scientific theories and their experimental basis. These difficulties can be related to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, which also concerns the link between theoretical models and experiments. It appears that epistemic structural realism is in a better position to respond to these difficulties. A compromise between both versions of structural realism could allow us to keep the advantages of both.

Lato Sensu Revue de la Société de philosophie des sciences•Dec 22, 2016•2 citations
Abstract Ontic structural realism (OSR) has been suggested as a metaphysics for quantum field theory (QFT). A common objection to OSR highlights the presence of fundamental intrinsic properties in physical theories (such as QFT) as undermining OSR. As there are purported examples of fundamental intrinsic properties possessed by fields in QFT, OSR is purportedly refuted in QFT (Berghofer, 2018). This article defends OSR from this argument. There are two possible strategies for responding to this argument: (1) denying that Berghofer’s counterexamples to OSR are intrinsic properties, and (2) finding a means of accommodating intrinsic properties in OSR. I consider the first strategy and discuss several possible arguments why the purported cases of fundamental intrinsic properties in QFT are non-intrinsic. Additionally, as there are a number of means available for OSR to accommodate intrinsic properties, the second strategy also succeeds.
This note provides the formal ontological basis for Ontological Resolution Theory (ORT). ORT posits a strict separation between the fundamental substrate (Backend) and the observer interface (Frontend). In this framework, standard physical concepts such as "field", "spin", "electromagnetism", "particle", and "spacetime" are not fundamental entities, but decoder tags generated by a limited-bandwidth A0-interface. The underlying reality operates exclusively on a discrete FCC graph defined by the tuple (G, R, U). This approach represents a radical form of ontic structural realism, where relations are primary, and objects/properties are strictly emergent interface artifacts. This document provides the translation dictionary between standard quantum-theoretical tags and their structural graph counterparts
Structural realism attempts to make a compromise between scientific realism and empiricism, by restricting our realist commitment to the relational structure of scientific theories. There are two main versions of the position: ontic, or epistemic. According to ontic structural realism, the nomological relations expressed by theories are the primitive entities of reality. This ontic version is motivated in particular by arguments to the effect that epistemic versions are not really distinct from mere empiricism. However according to some authors, it’s not clear that ontic structural realism can differentiate between physical and mathematical relations, and account for the relations between scientific theories and their experimental basis. These difficulties can be related to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics, which also concerns the link between theoretical models and experiments. It appears that epistemic structural realism is in a better position to respond to these difficulties. A compromise between both versions of structural realism could allow us to keep the advantages of both.