Scientists and philosophers have debated over the nature of light for thousands of years, and, for much of that time, the argument has been over whether light is made of particles or waves. However, as Einstein wrote, “We have two contradictory pictures of reality [particles and waves]; separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do.”
Scientists and philosophers have debated over the nature of light for thousands of years, and, for much of that time, the argument has been over whether light is made of particles or waves. However, as Einstein wrote, “We have two contradictory pictures of reality [particles and waves]; separately neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they do.”
Quantum mechanics was discovered in 1925 through groping efforts to compromise two apparently contradictory pictures on the fundamental entities in nature. One was the wave picture for light which was later extended to matter by de Broglie, another was the corpuscular picture of matter which was later extended to light by Einstein. Schrödinger's wave equation came as a natural development of the first stream, while Heisenberg's matrix mechanics was presented as a unique proposal from the second stream. In spite of completely different appearances, the two theories proved, within a couple of years after their discoveries, to be equivalent. This is a most beautiful example that the physical reality exists independent of the mathematical framework formulated for its description.
Have you ever tried to define light? If so, your definition is probably related to vision, the ability to see things. The Merriam-Webster English dictionary defines light as “something that makes vision possible”. However, the definition of the “nature of light” is a complex term already discussed by philosophers of Ancient Greece. In the 17th century, the debate on the matter focused on whether light was a particle or a wave, based on the different properties of light that had been gradually discovered over time. Isaac Newton (1642−1727) was a defender of the corpuscular theory of light, which considered light to be formed by particles, i.e., small pieces of matter, like dust or grains of sand. He was the author of Opticks (1706), the front cover of which appears in Fig. 1.1. Christian Huygens (1629–1695), on the other hand, supported the theory that light is a wave. These are two completely different definitions of the same physical concept. A range of experiments were developed to attempt to clarify this dilemma, but it was only until 1900 when Max Planck (1858-1947) introduced the basis of a theory that would go on to revolutionize scientific thinking, marking the beginning of modern physics: quantum theory. Developed during the 20th century thanks to advances made by scientists such as Niels Bohr, Born, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Pauli, Dirac, Einstein or de Broglie, quantum theory clarified that light is neither a particle nor a wave, but that it has a dual nature: it behaves like a wave as it spreads but like a particle in its interactions with matter. In this book, we will specify where necessary whether light behaves as a particle or as a wave, although in most cases we refer to rays of light, which always represent the direction of propagation of light.
THE conceptual problems raised by the discovery of quantum effects have not been fully resolved after half a century. Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly to be found in the mutual ignorance which prevails between physicists and philosophers. In his book Heisenberg brings together a philosophically inclined temperament with an unrivalled knowledge of physics. The result is a book of very great interest, however much one might disagree with his conclusions. The collection of essays of which the other book is made up is intended to bring crucial conceptual problems in physics especially to the notice of philosophers. The design and intention of the collection is admirable for this is the proper way to overcome the departmentalization of interest that has left the deep conceptual problems still unresolved. Men like Heisenberg who combine philosophical temperament with scientic knowledge of great distinction are rare, and yet the difficulties can only be cleared up by the application of philosophical techniques of analysis to problems which are an intimate and difficult part of physics. A great deal of the interest of Heisenberg's book lies in the very comprehensive account he gives of the origin and growth of the Copenhagen school, and the way the new phenomena forced a largely unwelcome picture of nature upon Bohr and his friends. The most important chapter from a philosophical point of view is that in which Heisenberg defends this interpretation against the attacks to which it has been subjected. The essence of his argument for the interpretation can be summed up in two propositions. (i) The Copenhagen interpretation of physical theory, which depends upon the acceptance of the so-called Principle of Complementarity, is an inevitable and final interpretation. The reason for this is that there are only two possible general models for understanding given physical phenomena; a particle model or a wave model. These are exhaustive and exclusive because the former depends upon discontinuous and the latter upon continuous (using substance here in the traditional philosophical sense). If we find, as we do, that the two fundamental constituents of the universe, matter and radiation, each exhibit two classes of phenomena, one explainable only on a particle model and one on a wave model, then we are compelled to adopt a complementarity hypothesis and give up the idea of finding a single and uniform model for the understanding of phenomena. There are only two kinds of models; they are mutually exclusive; both are required; hence we either despair before an insoluble problem or adopt the Copenhagen interpretation. (2) Any serious criticism of this interpretation must offer an alternative
As has become evident from historical studies, science does not proceed in the coherent and predictable way that basic science texts would have us believe. I will argue that an excellent counter-example is an episode from the historical development of quantum mechanics in which the incompatibility of the particle and the wave representations of the electron and light were destined to be encompassed by two mathematically equivalent, but conceptually quite different theories. I shall argue that the appearance of two such different, yet equivalent, quantum theories was not surprising at all and I claim even predictable. As Einstein himself wrote in 1909: ‘It is my opinion that the next phase in the development of theoretical physics will bring us a theory of light that can be interpreted as a kind of fusion of the wave and the [particle] theory.’ Certainly, the interpretative content of Werner Heisenberg's and Erwin Schrödinger's theories could not have been more different. By mid-1926, the theoretical foundations had been laid for a scientific and emotional battleground between the particle and the wave. I suggest that an important element in the debate was not the incompatibility itself but actually coming to terms with ambiguity in science. For, in the end, ambiguous and vague interpretations of the same phenomena became part of science, where science was supposed to give a clear and unambiguous description of nature.
Quantum mechanics has always presented a problem for scientific realists.For it does not seem to offer a coherent picture of the world.I think it does, and that there is a viable quantum mechanical model of reality.But it cannot be constructed, given the continuity constraints that we usually place on realistic models.To be a quantum mechanical realist, one has to be willing to accept that there are two fundamentally different kinds of processes occurring in nature: continuous, but quantum mechanically indeterminate, energy transfer processes and discontinuous, but spatially extended, changes of state.The unwillingness of philosophers to accept that there is such a distinction has caused many of them to doubt the reality of Schrodinger waves, and the processes of their generation and collapse.I am fully aware that I am treading on well-trodden territory, and that the technical difficulties that must be faced by anyone who is not a specialist in the field are immense.Nevertheless, I think there is a fairly clear metaphysical position on these issues derivable from the kind of essentialist realism outlined in the previous chapter, and I ask readers to bear with me.First, realism about Schrodinger waves requires the belief that particles are always transmitted as quantum mechanically indeterminate 1.
Scientific inquiry took millennia to ascertain the true nature of light, and it is not possible here to attempt to recapitulate all of the philosophizing, hypotheses, arguments, and experimentation involved in that great debate. The main point of controversy was whether light should be considered as a particle or as a wave. Empedocles of Acragas (492–432 b.c.e .) was of the opinion that light is a “streaming substance” emitted by luminous bodies, and that light travels at a finite speed ( Sambursky, 1958 ). In the seventeenth century, Isaac Newton postulated that light is composed of particles and that color is connected with the size of those particles; however, his contemporary Christiaan Huygens argued that light is a wave that transfers energy but not substance ( Einstein & Infeld, 1966 , p. 105ff). It turns out that light is indeed a wave propagating via electric and magnetic fields, but in addition to exhibiting properties of waves (such as interference) it also exhibits properties of particles (such as momentum and localization). When treating light as particles, the individual quanta are called photons .