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Logic Journal of IGPL

Descriptions in quantum mechanics

Décio Krause

Published Apr 28, 2017• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Russell’s theory of descriptions depends essentially on the concept of identity, in particular to eliminate definite descriptions by contextual definitions. But quantum objects, according to a possible metaphysical interpretation I shall assume without discussion here, seem not to satisfy the standard theory of identity, and do not have individuality in a sense. Even so, physicists refer informally to both ‘a quantum so-and-so’ and, worst, to ‘the quantum so-and-so’, as if these expressions were something like descriptions. In this article, we sketch a possible theory of ‘quantum (definite) descriptions’ using a weaker concept of indiscernibility (or indistinguishability), and advance some consequences such a theory may have for the discussions on the logical foundations of quantum theory.

DOI
10.1093/jigpal/jzx013

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Russell’s theory of descriptions depends essentially on the concept of identity, in particular to eliminate definite descriptions by contextual definitions. But quantum objects, according to a possible metaphysical interpretation I shall assume without discussion here, seem not to satisfy the standard theory of identity, and do not have individuality in a sense. Even so, physicists refer informally to both ‘a quantum so-and-so’ and, worst, to ‘the quantum so-and-so’, as if these expressions were something like descriptions. In this article, we sketch a possible theory of ‘quantum (definite) descriptions’ using a weaker concept of indiscernibility (or indistinguishability), and advance some consequences such a theory may have for the discussions on the logical foundations of quantum theory.
The standard ways classical logic and mathematics deal with the concept of indiscernibility (indistinguishability), with special emphasis to the concept of indiscernibility in a structure are considered. The aim is to emphasize that in asserting that ‘two’ objects of a certain domain (generally, a non empty set) are the same object, one becomes committed to the axioms of set theory, since the structures where these concepts are expressed are generally taken as set theoretical constructs. Some of the consequences of these points to the philosophical discussion on identity and indiscernibility in quantum theory are then investigated.
The topics of identity, individuality and indiscernibility had already entered the domain of the philosophy of physics, mainly in what respects the philosophy of quantum theories. In this paper, I present the main ideas of an underlying metaphysics that considers the basic entities of quantum physics as non-individuals, that is, as entities to which the standard theory of identity of classical logic and standard mathematics (set theory) does not apply. Two things must be emphasized: the first is that we pursue Erwin Schrödinger’s ideas that the notion of identity (or sameness ) does not apply to quantum things; the second is to follow Heinz Post’s claim that the non-individuality of quantum entities ‘must be introduced right at the start’ and not by taking individuals and making them pretend to be non-individuals ‘by hand’, say by confining them to non-rigid structures. Thus, this paper should be regarded as an attempt to justify the metaphysics of non-individuals and the logical systems that cope with them, although these systems are here only referred to. We also answer some criticisms that have been directed to such a view. The paper is directed to an audience of both physicists interested in foundations and philosophers of physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.
The notion of an individual and the related issues on individuation are topics that appear in the philosophical discussion ever since the antiquity. The idea of an individual thing is intuitively clear: an individual is something of a specific kind that is a unity, having its own identity, and being so that it is possible at least in principle to discern it from any other individual, even of similar species. But when we try to leave the intuitive realm and push this idea to a logical analysis, we find a cluster of problems that are difficult to overcome within standard logico-mathematical contexts. In this work, we shall be concerned with some aspects of this intuitive concept of an individual and on some related facts about individuation taken from recent discussions that arose ever since the inception of quantum theory, pushing the discussion to a “logical” view, which in our opinion is still lacking in the usual debates on such issues. In the final part of the paper, we propose a metaphysics where the notion of identity is substituted, for some objects, by a weaker notion of indiscernibility, and we try to justify such a move. In most of the uses of the expression “quantum theory”, we shall not make explicit the distinction between the non-relativistic and the relativistic approaches, although they of course are quite different, for we think that the problems as we shall present them appear in both versions. But, as the text goes, the context will distinguish between them and these questions will become clear to the reader.
In the non-reflexive formulation of quantum physics, attention is given to a metaphysical view of quantum objects (q-objects) as non-individuals, characterised as entities to which the standard notion of identity lacks sense. The reference to the nature of q-objects is usually omitted in other interpretations and the most we can find is some vague reference to “to each [quantum] system we associate a Hilbert space”, and nothing more is said about them; we need to infer from the theory their characteristics, and it gives us several alternatives. One of them, to be justified here in broad aspects, is the non-individual view. It is important to enlighten that we are not trying to just find a way to deal with quantum entities but to defend a possible ontology of non-individuals, which can be applied also to ‘particles’ arising from quantum fields. Our account is based on two assumptions: (i) the ‘classical theory of identity’ does not apply to q-objects, and (ii) their non-individuality must be attributed from the start, that is, as a primitive notion and not ‘made a posteriori’ say by assuming symmetry principles. The underlying logic is called non-reflexive because the reflexive law of identity ∀x(x=x)\forall{x{({x = x})}}∀x(x=x) is supposed not to hold for q-objects. Since all the details demand a lot of space, here we only sketch and justify our view. The references provide a more detailed account.
In this work, we discuss a formal way of dealing with the properties of contextual systems. Our approach is to assume that properties describing the same physical quantity, but belonging to different measurement contexts, are indistinguishable in a strong sense. To construct the formal theoretical structure, we develop a description using quasi-set theory, which is a set-theoretical framework built to describe collections of elements that violate Leibnitz's principle of identity of indiscernibles. This framework allows us to consider a new ontology in order to study the properties of quantum systems. This article is part of the theme issue 'Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond'.
It is widely believed that particles in quantum mechanics are metaphysically strange; they are not individuals (the view of Cassirer 1956), in some sense of the term, and perhaps they are not even objects at all, a suspicion raised by Quine(1976a, 1990). In parallel it is thought that this di¤erence, and especially the status of quantum particles as indistinguishable, accounts for the di¤erence between classical and quantum statistics- a view with long historical credentials. 1 ‘Indistinguishable’here mean permutable; that states of a¤airs di¤ering only in permutations of particles are the same- which, satisfyingly, are described by quantum entanglements, so clearly in a way that is conceptually new. And, indeed, distinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, for which permutations yield distinct states, do obey classical statistics, so there is something to this connection. But it cannot be the whole story if, as I will argue, at least in one notable tradition, classical particle descriptions may also be permutable (so classical