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Analysis

Are quantum particles objects?

Simon W. Saunders

Published Jan 1, 2006• 230 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It is widely believed that particles in quantum mechanics are metaphysically strange; they are not individuals (the view of Cassirer 1956), in some sense of the term, and perhaps they are not even objects at all, a suspicion raised by Quine(1976a, 1990). In parallel it is thought that this di¤erence, and especially the status of quantum particles as indistinguishable, accounts for the di¤erence between classical and quantum statistics- a view with long historical credentials. 1 ‘Indistinguishable’here mean permutable; that states of a¤airs di¤ering only in permutations of particles are the same- which, satisfyingly, are described by quantum entanglements, so clearly in a way that is conceptually new. And, indeed, distinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, for which permutations yield distinct states, do obey classical statistics, so there is something to this connection. But it cannot be the whole story if, as I will argue, at least in one notable tradition, classical particle descriptions may also be permutable (so classical

DOI
10.1093/analys/66.1.52

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It is widely believed that particles in quantum mechanics are metaphysically strange; they are not individuals (the view of Cassirer 1956), in some sense of the term, and perhaps they are not even objects at all, a suspicion raised by Quine(1976a, 1990). In parallel it is thought that this di¤erence, and especially the status of quantum particles as indistinguishable, accounts for the di¤erence between classical and quantum statistics- a view with long historical credentials. 1 ‘Indistinguishable’here mean permutable; that states of a¤airs di¤ering only in permutations of particles are the same- which, satisfyingly, are described by quantum entanglements, so clearly in a way that is conceptually new. And, indeed, distinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, for which permutations yield distinct states, do obey classical statistics, so there is something to this connection. But it cannot be the whole story if, as I will argue, at least in one notable tradition, classical particle descriptions may also be permutable (so classical
This thesis analyses the ontological nature of quantum particles. In it I argue that quantum particles, despite their indistinguishability, are objects in much the same way as classical particles. This similarity provides an important point of continuity between classical and quantum physics. I consider two notions of indistinguishability, that of indiscernibility and permutation symmetry. I argue that neither sort of indistinguishability undermines the identity of quantum particles. I further argue that, when we understand in distinguishability in terms of permutation symmetry, classical particles are just as indistinguishable as quantum particles; for classical physics also possesses permutation symmetry.
According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. Classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by physical characteristics. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are in all circumstances indistinguishable from each other. This indistinguishability doctrine is motivated by the (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the assumption (``factorism'') that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space in the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particles system. Although the factorist assumption is standard in the literature, it is conceptually problematic. Particle indistinguishability is incompatible with the everyday meaning of ``particle'', and also with how this term is used both in classical physics and in the experimental practice of physics. The standard view requires quantum particles of the same kind to remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, so that a transition to the classical picture of the world seems impossible. Earlier we have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and that avoids these and other problems. We further explain and develop this proposal here. In our view, particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but \emph{emergent}. However, in those situations where the particle concept is applicable, quantum particles---identical or not---are distinguishable in the same way as classical particles.
Permutation symmetries which arise in quantum mechanics pose an intriguing problem. It is not clear that particles which exhibit permutation symmetries (i.e. particles which are indiscernible, meaning that they can be swapped with each other without this yielding a new physical state) qualify as "objects" in any reasonable sense of the term. One solution to this puzzle, which I attribute to W.V. Quine, would have us eliminate such particles from our ontology altogether in order to circumvent the metaphysical vexations caused by permutation symmetries. In this essay I argue that Quine's solution is too rash, and in its place I suggest a novel solution based on altering some of the language of quantum mechanics. Before launching into the technical details of indiscernible particles, however, I begin this essay with some remarks on the methodology - instrumentalism - which motivates my arguments.
Particles in classical physics are distinguishable objects, which can be picked out individually on the basis of their unique physical properties. By contrast, in the philosophy of physics, the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are completely indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This standard view is problematic: Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable not only with the very meaning of "particle" in ordinary language and in classical physical theory, but also with how this term is actually used in the practice of present-day physics. Moreover, the indistinguishability doctrine prevents a smooth transition from quantum particles to what we normally understand by "particles" in the classical limit of quantum mechanics. Elaborating on earlier work, we here analyze the premises of the standard view and discuss an alternative that avoids these and similar problems. As it turns out, this alternative approach connects to recent discussions in quantum information theory.
Abstract According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink (1998; 2009) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011) have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity.
One recent debate in philosophy of physics has centered whether quantum particles are individuals or not. The received view is that particles are not individuals and the standard methodology is to approach the question via the structure of quantum theory. I challenge both the received view and the standard methodology. I contend not only that the structure of quantum theory is not the right place to look for conditions of individuality that quantum particles may or may not satisfy, but also that there is an important role for traditional metaphysics to play. Consequently, my work brings together the philosophy of physics and traditional metaphysics literatures to shed new light on the debate over the individuality of quantum particles. I defend a set of conditions of individuality and argue that quantum particles satisfy these conditions thereby defending the view that particles are individuals in opposition to the received view. I also challenge a second feature of the standard methodology insofar as I challenge the significance of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in terms of which much discussion in the philosophy of physics literature is framed. My work is significant in a number of additional ways as well. My work implies that the dominant explanation for quantum statistics in terms of non-individuality is incorrect and it also undermines the ontic-structural realists metaphysical underdetermination challenge to the scientific realist.