The thesis starts with a high-level introduction into cryptography and quantum mechanics. Chapter 2 gives a theoretical foundation by introducing probability theory, information theory, functional analysis, quantum mechanics and quantum information theory. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are editions of work published earlier.\n\nIn Chapter 3, we present a quantum-information-theoretic tool to analyze random sampling in a quantum setting. In particular, we present two new rigorous security proofs that make use of our new sampling tool: one for BB84 quantum key distribution, and one for a quantum reduction from oblivious transfer (OT) to bit commitment.\n\nChapter 4 studies the problem of message authentication from a weak key (which is a key that is not uniformly random, e.g., a password) in a new scenario. In this scenario, the weak key is a one-time session key that is derived from a public source of randomness with the help of a long-term key (e.g., a password). We propose a new four-round protocol for message authentication from a weak (session) key. \n\nIn Chapter 5 we present a new entropic uncertainty relation and furthermore we consider the task of password-based identification. We devise a new quantum identification protocol that is secure in two security models simultaneously.
The thesis starts with a high-level introduction into cryptography and quantum mechanics. Chapter 2 gives a theoretical foundation by introducing probability theory, information theory, functional analysis, quantum mechanics and quantum information theory. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are editions of work published earlier.\n\nIn Chapter 3, we present a quantum-information-theoretic tool to analyze random sampling in a quantum setting. In particular, we present two new rigorous security proofs that make use of our new sampling tool: one for BB84 quantum key distribution, and one for a quantum reduction from oblivious transfer (OT) to bit commitment.\n\nChapter 4 studies the problem of message authentication from a weak key (which is a key that is not uniformly random, e.g., a password) in a new scenario. In this scenario, the weak key is a one-time session key that is derived from a public source of randomness with the help of a long-term key (e.g., a password). We propose a new four-round protocol for message authentication from a weak (session) key. \n\nIn Chapter 5 we present a new entropic uncertainty relation and furthermore we consider the task of password-based identification. We devise a new quantum identification protocol that is secure in two security models simultaneously.
It has been shown recently that the framework of quantum sampling, as introduced by Bouman and Fehr, can lead to new entropic uncertainty relations highly applicable to finite-key cryptographic analyses. Here we revisit these so-called sampling-based entropic uncertainty relations, deriving newer, more powerful, relations and applying them to source-independent quantum random number generators and high-dimensional quantum key distribution protocols. Along the way, we prove several interesting results in the asymptotic case for our entropic uncertainty relations. These sampling-based approaches to entropic uncertainty, and their application to quantum cryptography, hold great potential for deriving proofs of security for quantum cryptographic systems, and the approaches we use here may be applicable to an even wider range of scenarios.
Cryptography plays an integral role in secure communication and is usually the strongest link in the chain of security. Yet security problems abound in electronic communication: spyware, phishing, denial of service, and side-channel attacks are still major concerns. The main goal in this thesis is to consider how cryptographic techniques can be extended to offer greater defence against these non-traditional security threats. \n \nIn the first part of this thesis, we consider problems in classical cryptography. We introduce multi-factor password-authenticated key exchange which allows secure authentication and key agreement based on multiple short secrets, such as a long-term password and a one-time response; it can provide an enhanced level of assurance in higher security scenarios because a multi-factor protocol is designed to remain secure even if all but one of the factors has been compromised due to attacks such as phishing or spyware. Next, we consider the integration of denial of service countermeasures with key exchange protocols: by introducing a formal model for denial of service resilience that complements the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model for secure key agreement, we cover a wide range of existing denial of service attacks and prevent them by carefully using client puzzles. Additionally, we look at how side-channel attacks affect certain types of formulae used in elliptic curve cryptography, and demonstrate that information leaked during field operations such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication can be exploited by an attacker. \n \nIn the second part of this thesis, we examine cryptography in the quantum setting. We argue that quantum key distribution will have an important role to play in future information security infrastructures and will operate best when integrated with the powerful public key infrastructures that are used today. Finally, we present a new look at quantum money and describe a quantum coin scheme where the coins are not easily counterfeited, are locally verifiable, and can be transferred to another party.
Quantum information science has completely changed the way we think about and process information. From the simple realization that information is physical, we have been able to use the peculiar features of quantum mechanical phenomena to our advantage. Designing algorithms whose performance exceeds those running on classical computers, and performing secret communication whose security can actually be proven from sound assumptions are two main catalysts for the establishment of the field. This thesis discusses some progress in quantum key distribution and quantum randomness generation. Quantum key distribution, which is motivated by the increasing need to communicate securely, is on the verge of becoming an established technology. With the goal of extending the reach of quantum key distribution to more realistic scenarios, we present a study on reference-frame-independent protocols whose knowledge can help design more efficient protocols, and a framework to the security analysis of distributed-phase-reference protocols, which have been missing for many years. This allows these protocols to be used in practice against the most general adversary, although the key rate is rather pessimistic. In quantum randomness generation, the amount of extractable randomness from a quantum system depends on the level of trust or characterization of the devices; we present a study into such interaction. In the extreme situation of distrust, i.e. device-independent scenarios, we study the effect of the input randomness on the certifying power of such scenarios, and realize that one cannot amplify an arbitrary min-entropy source device-independently. Finally we discuss the amount of randomness in post-selected data, which has consequences on practical randomness generation protocols. The in depth study of randomness generation from quantum processes is well justified by the important role of randomness in modern computer science and other fields.
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics enable possibilities not allowed by classical physics. In particular, two parties can generate a random, secret key at a distance, even though an eavesdropper can do anything permitted by the laws of physics. Measuring the quantum properties of the signals generating the key, would ultimately change them, and thus reveal the eavesdropper’s presence. This exchange of a random, secret key is known as quantum cryptography.\n\nQuantum cryptography can be, and has been proven unconditionally secure using perfect devices. However, when quantum cryptography is implemented, one must use components available with current technology. These are usually imperfect. Although the security of quantum cryptography has been proven for components with certain imperfections, the question remains: can quantum cryptography be implemented in a provable, unconditionally secure way, using components available with current technology? This thesis contains both a theoretical, and an experimental contribution to the answer of this question. On the experimental side, components used in, and complete quantum cryptography systems have been carefully examined for security loopholes. In particular, it turned out that two commercial quantum cryptography systems contained loopholes, which would allow an eavesdropper to capture the full secret key, without exposing her presence. Furthermore, this detector control attack could be implemented with current technology. The attack is applicable against a variety of quantum cryptography implementations and protocols.\n\nThe theoretical contribution consists of security proofs for quantum cryptography in a very general setting. Precisely, the security is proven with arbitrary individual imperfections in the source and detectors. These proofs should make it possible to use a wide array of imperfect devices in implementations of quantum cryptography.\n\nFinally, a secure detection scheme is proposed, immune to the detector control attack and compatible with those security proofs. Therefore, if this scheme is implemented correctly, it offers provable security.