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Practical security of quantum cryptography

Lars Lydersen

Published Jan 1, 2011• 4 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics enable possibilities not allowed by classical physics. In particular, two parties can generate a random, secret key at a distance, even though an eavesdropper can do anything permitted by the laws of physics. Measuring the quantum properties of the signals generating the key, would ultimately change them, and thus reveal the eavesdropper’s presence. This exchange of a random, secret key is known as quantum cryptography.\n\nQuantum cryptography can be, and has been proven unconditionally secure using perfect devices. However, when quantum cryptography is implemented, one must use components available with current technology. These are usually imperfect. Although the security of quantum cryptography has been proven for components with certain imperfections, the question remains: can quantum cryptography be implemented in a provable, unconditionally secure way, using components available with current technology? This thesis contains both a theoretical, and an experimental contribution to the answer of this question. On the experimental side, components used in, and complete quantum cryptography systems have been carefully examined for security loopholes. In particular, it turned out that two commercial quantum cryptography systems contained loopholes, which would allow an eavesdropper to capture the full secret key, without exposing her presence. Furthermore, this detector control attack could be implemented with current technology. The attack is applicable against a variety of quantum cryptography implementations and protocols.\n\nThe theoretical contribution consists of security proofs for quantum cryptography in a very general setting. Precisely, the security is proven with arbitrary individual imperfections in the source and detectors. These proofs should make it possible to use a wide array of imperfect devices in implementations of quantum cryptography.\n\nFinally, a secure detection scheme is proposed, immune to the detector control attack and compatible with those security proofs. Therefore, if this scheme is implemented correctly, it offers provable security.

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Quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution (QKD), provides a means of unconditionally secure communication. The security is in principle based on the fundamental laws of physics. Security proofs show that if quantum cryptography is appropriately implemented, even the most\npowerful eavesdropper cannot decrypt the message from a cipher.\n The implementations of quantum crypto-systems in real life may not fully comply with the assumptions made in the security proofs. Such discrepancy between the experiment and the theory can be fatal to the\nsecurity of a QKD system. In this thesis we address a number of these discrepancies.\n A perfect single-photon source is often assumed in many security proofs. However, a weak coherent source is widely used in a real-life QKD implementation. Decoy state protocols have been proposed as a novel\napproach to dramatically improve the performance of a weak coherent source based QKD implementation without jeopardizing its security. Here, we present the first experimental demonstrations of decoy state\nprotocols. Our experimental scheme was later adopted by most decoy state QKD implementations.\n In the security proof of decoy state protocols as well as many other QKD protocols, it is widely assumed that a sender generates a phase-randomized coherent state. This assumption has been enforced in few implementations. We close this gap in two steps: First, we implement and verify the phase randomization experimentally;\nsecond, we prove the security of a QKD implementation without the coherent state assumption.\n In many security proofs of QKD, it is assumed that all the detectors on the receiver's side have identical detection efficiencies. We show experimentally that this assumption may be violated in a\ncommercial QKD implementation due to an eavesdropper's malicious manipulation. Moreover, we show that the eavesdropper can learn part of the final key shared by the legitimate users as a consequence of this violation of the assumptions.

•Jan 1, 2009•2 citations

How secure is quantum cryptography

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In 1991 scientists have for the first time demonstrated practical quantum cryptography (QC) and given a proof of its unconditional security against two most obvious attacking strategies. In the next decade several groups of scientists have made more stringent security proofs and it was soon widely accepted that quantum cryptographic protocol BB84 and its variants are the only known protocols that allow unconditionally secure key growth. Moreover, QC was able to offer unique possibility that any eavesdropping activity could be detected by legitimate parties. In 2004 Swiss spin-off IdQuantique has shown the world's first commercial quantum key distribution system Clavis, followed soon by the QPN system of American start-up Magiq. For almost 7 years nobody suspected that there might be something terribly wrong with these systems. Then, at the end of 2010, a group of Norwegian scientists experimenting with attacks on photon detectors constructed tailored attacks to both commercial systems which were so successful that the plaintext was recovered in full (100%) and moreover the legitimate parties could not detect any suspicious activity ! This raised the question: where does it leave us with quantum cryptography, is it secure or not? What about the security proofs, were they wrong? Our conclusion is that security proofs were correct except that they proved security of something else - not the machines that were cracked. At present state of the art it is not clear how or is it even possible to build a provable QC machine.

International Convention on Information and Communication Technology, Electronics and Microelectronics•Jan 1, 2012•0 citations

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Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD) applies fundamental laws of quantum physics to guarantee secure communication. The security of quantum cryptography was proven in the last decade. Many security analyses are based on the assumption that QKD system components are idealized. In practice, inevitable device imperfections may compromise security unless these imperfections are well investigated.\n\nA highly attenuated laser pulse which gives a weak coherent state is widely used in QKD experiments. A weak coherent state has multi-photon components, which opens up a security loophole to the sophisticated eavesdropper. With a small adjustment of the hardware, we will prove that the decoy state method can close this loophole and substantially improve the QKD performance. We also propose a few practical decoy state protocols, study statistical fluctuations and perform experimental demonstrations. Moreover, we will apply the methods from entanglement distillation protocols based on two-way classical communication to improve the decoy state QKD performance. Furthermore, we study the decoy state methods for other single photon sources, such as triggering parametric down-conversion (PDC) source. Note that our work, decoy state protocol, has attracted a lot of scientific and media interest. The decoy state QKD becomes a standard technique for prepare-and-measure QKD schemes.\n\nAside from single-photon-based QKD schemes, there is another type of scheme based on entangled photon sources. A PDC source is commonly used as an entangled photon source. We propose a model and post-processing scheme for the entanglement-based QKD with a PDC source. Although the model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source. By simulating a real PDC experiment, we show that the entanglement-based QKD can achieve longer maximal secure distance than the single-photon-based QKD schemes.\n\nWe propose a time-shift attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors in a QKD system. This eavesdropping strategy can be realized by current technology. We will also discuss counter measures against the attack and study the security of a QKD system with efficiency mismatch detectors.

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Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure, assumptions are made about the protocol and its devices. If these assumptions are not justified in an implementation then an eavesdropper may break the security of the protocol. Therefore, security is crucially dependent on which assumptions are made and how justified the assumptions are in an implementation of the protocol. This thesis is primarily a review that analyzes and clarifies the connection between the security proofs of quantum-cryptography protocols and their experimental implementations. In particular, we focus on quantum key distribution: the task of distributing a secret random key between two parties. We provide a comprehensive introduction to several concepts: quantum mechanics using the density operator formalism, quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution. We define security for quantum key distribution and outline several mathematical techniques that can either be used to prove security or simplify security proofs. In addition, we analyze the assumptions made in quantum cryptography and how they may or may not be justified in implementations. Along with the review, we propose a framework that decomposes quantum-key-distribution protocols and their assumptions into several classes. Protocol classes can be used to clarify which proof techniques apply to which kinds of protocols. Assumption classes can be used to specify which assumptions are justified in implementations and which could be exploited by an eavesdropper. Two contributions of the author are discussed: the security proofs of two two-way quantum-key-distribution protocols and an intuitive proof of the data-processing inequality.

arXiv:1505.02792•Jan 1, 2014•14 citations

Implementation Security of Quantum Cryptography - Introduction, challenges, solutions | ETSI White Paper No. 27

Marco Lucamarini, Andrew Shields, Romain Alléaume +18 more

Quantum cryptography provides an ensemble of protocols, such as quantum key distribution [1-3], quantum random number generation [4], closed group digital signatures [5], long-term secure data storage [6] and multi-party secure computation [7], which are robust against future algorithmic and computational advances, including the emergence of quantum computers. This is because its security is information-theoretic, i.e., it can be proven based only on models of the local devices operated by legitimate users and does not require any assumptions on the resources available to an adversary [8-12]. Information-theoretic security will be important for data confidentiality in the future when we expect more powerful computers and new algorithms to be at the fingertips of our digital foes. Of particular concern is the advent of quantum computers that can be used to launch efficient attacks on conventional techniques, such as the widely-used forms of public key cryptography. Well before more powerful conventional and quantum computers become available, quantum cryptography will be important to protect against a generic vulnerability inherent to current cryptographic techniques based on computational complexity: encrypted data can be stored today and decrypted in the future, when suitable technology becomes available. This leads to the possibility of retrospectively breaking encryption keys established with computational techniques, such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. This becomes a serious threat if data confidentiality must be maintained for several years, especially as it is now feasible to store large volumes of information.Although the quantum cryptographic protocolsare information-theoretic secure, real systemsmay still possess side channels, i.e. security vulnerabilities, if their implementation deviates significantly from the idealised models used in the security analysis [12-15]. This is a common threat to any cryptosystem, irrespective of whether it is based on quantum theory [16-23] or computational complexity [24-28]. For example, timing attacks can threaten implementations of both quantum [16] and non-quantum [24] systems. Therefore, the security analysis of a cryptosystem’s implementation, for simplicity called “implementation security”, is anatural and important development in the evolution of all cryptographic technologies, including quantum cryptography.Since the security of quantum cryptography depends only on the legitimate users’ local equipment, the fundamental task in quantum cryptography implementation security is to estimate how much information such equipment leaks to a potential adversary. When this information leakage can be bounded below a certain value, security can be restored [29, 30] using a technique called privacy amplification[31, 32, 33]. This compresses a partially secret bit sequence into a highly secure key, with the amount of compression depending upon the estimated information leakage. Thus, by adequately characterising a real system, it is possible to restore the security promise of the theoretical protocol against technology available at the time that secret key is being created. It is a specific feature of quantum cryptography that this security statement does not change with future technological advances.Privacyamplification is not the only resource available to enforce the implementation security of quantum cryptography. Modifications to hardware and protocols can dramatically reduce the information leakage and the potential occurrence of side-channels and active attacks [34-38]. Moreover, quantum correlations can be used to test the hardware of a real system [39-40]. Such tests can be quite demanding to implement but have the advantage of immunity against a large class of implementation issues. The importance of analysing the implementation security of quantum cryptography is widely recognised and is a very active area of research. National metrology institutes, government organisations, universities and private companies fully acknowledge the importance of thissubject and are supporting its effective development. ETSI has established an Industry Specification Group (ISG) to coordinate these efforts and to set forward-looking standards in quantum cryptography implementation security [41]. These will guide security evaluation by qualified third parties, as part of a security certification of quantum cryptographic products.

•Jan 1, 2018•6 citations

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Anqi Huang, Stefanie Barz, Erika Andersson +1 more

Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.

arXiv:1805.06668•New Journal of Physics•Aug 31, 2018•76 citations
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics enable possibilities not allowed by classical physics. In particular, two parties can generate a random, secret key at a distance, even though an eavesdropper can do anything permitted by the laws of physics. Measuring the quantum properties of the signals generating the key, would ultimately change them, and thus reveal the eavesdropper’s presence. This exchange of a random, secret key is known as quantum cryptography.\n\nQuantum cryptography can be, and has been proven unconditionally secure using perfect devices. However, when quantum cryptography is implemented, one must use components available with current technology. These are usually imperfect. Although the security of quantum cryptography has been proven for components with certain imperfections, the question remains: can quantum cryptography be implemented in a provable, unconditionally secure way, using components available with current technology? This thesis contains both a theoretical, and an experimental contribution to the answer of this question. On the experimental side, components used in, and complete quantum cryptography systems have been carefully examined for security loopholes. In particular, it turned out that two commercial quantum cryptography systems contained loopholes, which would allow an eavesdropper to capture the full secret key, without exposing her presence. Furthermore, this detector control attack could be implemented with current technology. The attack is applicable against a variety of quantum cryptography implementations and protocols.\n\nThe theoretical contribution consists of security proofs for quantum cryptography in a very general setting. Precisely, the security is proven with arbitrary individual imperfections in the source and detectors. These proofs should make it possible to use a wide array of imperfect devices in implementations of quantum cryptography.\n\nFinally, a secure detection scheme is proposed, immune to the detector control attack and compatible with those security proofs. Therefore, if this scheme is implemented correctly, it offers provable security.
Quantum cryptography, or quantum key distribution (QKD), provides a means of unconditionally secure communication. The security is in principle based on the fundamental laws of physics. Security proofs show that if quantum cryptography is appropriately implemented, even the most\npowerful eavesdropper cannot decrypt the message from a cipher.\n The implementations of quantum crypto-systems in real life may not fully comply with the assumptions made in the security proofs. Such discrepancy between the experiment and the theory can be fatal to the\nsecurity of a QKD system. In this thesis we address a number of these discrepancies.\n A perfect single-photon source is often assumed in many security proofs. However, a weak coherent source is widely used in a real-life QKD implementation. Decoy state protocols have been proposed as a novel\napproach to dramatically improve the performance of a weak coherent source based QKD implementation without jeopardizing its security. Here, we present the first experimental demonstrations of decoy state\nprotocols. Our experimental scheme was later adopted by most decoy state QKD implementations.\n In the security proof of decoy state protocols as well as many other QKD protocols, it is widely assumed that a sender generates a phase-randomized coherent state. This assumption has been enforced in few implementations. We close this gap in two steps: First, we implement and verify the phase randomization experimentally;\nsecond, we prove the security of a QKD implementation without the coherent state assumption.\n In many security proofs of QKD, it is assumed that all the detectors on the receiver's side have identical detection efficiencies. We show experimentally that this assumption may be violated in a\ncommercial QKD implementation due to an eavesdropper's malicious manipulation. Moreover, we show that the eavesdropper can learn part of the final key shared by the legitimate users as a consequence of this violation of the assumptions.
In 1991 scientists have for the first time demonstrated practical quantum cryptography (QC) and given a proof of its unconditional security against two most obvious attacking strategies. In the next decade several groups of scientists have made more stringent security proofs and it was soon widely accepted that quantum cryptographic protocol BB84 and its variants are the only known protocols that allow unconditionally secure key growth. Moreover, QC was able to offer unique possibility that any eavesdropping activity could be detected by legitimate parties. In 2004 Swiss spin-off IdQuantique has shown the world's first commercial quantum key distribution system Clavis, followed soon by the QPN system of American start-up Magiq. For almost 7 years nobody suspected that there might be something terribly wrong with these systems. Then, at the end of 2010, a group of Norwegian scientists experimenting with attacks on photon detectors constructed tailored attacks to both commercial systems which were so successful that the plaintext was recovered in full (100%) and moreover the legitimate parties could not detect any suspicious activity ! This raised the question: where does it leave us with quantum cryptography, is it secure or not? What about the security proofs, were they wrong? Our conclusion is that security proofs were correct except that they proved security of something else - not the machines that were cracked. At present state of the art it is not clear how or is it even possible to build a provable QC machine.
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution (QKD) applies fundamental laws of quantum physics to guarantee secure communication. The security of quantum cryptography was proven in the last decade. Many security analyses are based on the assumption that QKD system components are idealized. In practice, inevitable device imperfections may compromise security unless these imperfections are well investigated.\n\nA highly attenuated laser pulse which gives a weak coherent state is widely used in QKD experiments. A weak coherent state has multi-photon components, which opens up a security loophole to the sophisticated eavesdropper. With a small adjustment of the hardware, we will prove that the decoy state method can close this loophole and substantially improve the QKD performance. We also propose a few practical decoy state protocols, study statistical fluctuations and perform experimental demonstrations. Moreover, we will apply the methods from entanglement distillation protocols based on two-way classical communication to improve the decoy state QKD performance. Furthermore, we study the decoy state methods for other single photon sources, such as triggering parametric down-conversion (PDC) source. Note that our work, decoy state protocol, has attracted a lot of scientific and media interest. The decoy state QKD becomes a standard technique for prepare-and-measure QKD schemes.\n\nAside from single-photon-based QKD schemes, there is another type of scheme based on entangled photon sources. A PDC source is commonly used as an entangled photon source. We propose a model and post-processing scheme for the entanglement-based QKD with a PDC source. Although the model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source. By simulating a real PDC experiment, we show that the entanglement-based QKD can achieve longer maximal secure distance than the single-photon-based QKD schemes.\n\nWe propose a time-shift attack that exploits the efficiency mismatch of two single photon detectors in a QKD system. This eavesdropping strategy can be realized by current technology. We will also discuss counter measures against the attack and study the security of a QKD system with efficiency mismatch detectors.
Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure, assumptions are made about the protocol and its devices. If these assumptions are not justified in an implementation then an eavesdropper may break the security of the protocol. Therefore, security is crucially dependent on which assumptions are made and how justified the assumptions are in an implementation of the protocol. This thesis is primarily a review that analyzes and clarifies the connection between the security proofs of quantum-cryptography protocols and their experimental implementations. In particular, we focus on quantum key distribution: the task of distributing a secret random key between two parties. We provide a comprehensive introduction to several concepts: quantum mechanics using the density operator formalism, quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution. We define security for quantum key distribution and outline several mathematical techniques that can either be used to prove security or simplify security proofs. In addition, we analyze the assumptions made in quantum cryptography and how they may or may not be justified in implementations. Along with the review, we propose a framework that decomposes quantum-key-distribution protocols and their assumptions into several classes. Protocol classes can be used to clarify which proof techniques apply to which kinds of protocols. Assumption classes can be used to specify which assumptions are justified in implementations and which could be exploited by an eavesdropper. Two contributions of the author are discussed: the security proofs of two two-way quantum-key-distribution protocols and an intuitive proof of the data-processing inequality.
Quantum cryptography provides an ensemble of protocols, such as quantum key distribution [1-3], quantum random number generation [4], closed group digital signatures [5], long-term secure data storage [6] and multi-party secure computation [7], which are robust against future algorithmic and computational advances, including the emergence of quantum computers. This is because its security is information-theoretic, i.e., it can be proven based only on models of the local devices operated by legitimate users and does not require any assumptions on the resources available to an adversary [8-12]. Information-theoretic security will be important for data confidentiality in the future when we expect more powerful computers and new algorithms to be at the fingertips of our digital foes. Of particular concern is the advent of quantum computers that can be used to launch efficient attacks on conventional techniques, such as the widely-used forms of public key cryptography. Well before more powerful conventional and quantum computers become available, quantum cryptography will be important to protect against a generic vulnerability inherent to current cryptographic techniques based on computational complexity: encrypted data can be stored today and decrypted in the future, when suitable technology becomes available. This leads to the possibility of retrospectively breaking encryption keys established with computational techniques, such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. This becomes a serious threat if data confidentiality must be maintained for several years, especially as it is now feasible to store large volumes of information.Although the quantum cryptographic protocolsare information-theoretic secure, real systemsmay still possess side channels, i.e. security vulnerabilities, if their implementation deviates significantly from the idealised models used in the security analysis [12-15]. This is a common threat to any cryptosystem, irrespective of whether it is based on quantum theory [16-23] or computational complexity [24-28]. For example, timing attacks can threaten implementations of both quantum [16] and non-quantum [24] systems. Therefore, the security analysis of a cryptosystem’s implementation, for simplicity called “implementation security”, is anatural and important development in the evolution of all cryptographic technologies, including quantum cryptography.Since the security of quantum cryptography depends only on the legitimate users’ local equipment, the fundamental task in quantum cryptography implementation security is to estimate how much information such equipment leaks to a potential adversary. When this information leakage can be bounded below a certain value, security can be restored [29, 30] using a technique called privacy amplification[31, 32, 33]. This compresses a partially secret bit sequence into a highly secure key, with the amount of compression depending upon the estimated information leakage. Thus, by adequately characterising a real system, it is possible to restore the security promise of the theoretical protocol against technology available at the time that secret key is being created. It is a specific feature of quantum cryptography that this security statement does not change with future technological advances.Privacyamplification is not the only resource available to enforce the implementation security of quantum cryptography. Modifications to hardware and protocols can dramatically reduce the information leakage and the potential occurrence of side-channels and active attacks [34-38]. Moreover, quantum correlations can be used to test the hardware of a real system [39-40]. Such tests can be quite demanding to implement but have the advantage of immunity against a large class of implementation issues. The importance of analysing the implementation security of quantum cryptography is widely recognised and is a very active area of research. National metrology institutes, government organisations, universities and private companies fully acknowledge the importance of thissubject and are supporting its effective development. ETSI has established an Industry Specification Group (ISG) to coordinate these efforts and to set forward-looking standards in quantum cryptography implementation security [41]. These will guide security evaluation by qualified third parties, as part of a security certification of quantum cryptographic products.
Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.