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Journal of Modern Physics

Success and Incoherence of Orthodox Quantum Mechanics

María Esther Burgos

Published Jan 1, 2016• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Orthodox quantum mechanics is a highly successful theory despite its serious conceptual flaws. It renounces realism, implies a kind of action-at-a-distance and is incompatible with determinism. Orthodox quantum mechanics states that Schrödinger’s equation (a deterministic law) governs spontaneous processes while measurement processes are ruled by probability laws. It is well established that time dependent perturbation theory must be used for solving problems involving time. In order to account for spontaneous processes, this last theory makes use of laws valid only when measurements are performed. This incoherence seems absent from the literature.

DOI
10.4236/jmp.2016.712132

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Orthodox quantum mechanics is a highly successful theory despite its serious conceptual flaws. It renounces realism, implies a kind of action-at-a-distance and is incompatible with determinism. Orthodox quantum mechanics states that Schrödinger’s equation (a deterministic law) governs spontaneous processes while measurement processes are ruled by probability laws. It is well established that time dependent perturbation theory must be used for solving problems involving time. In order to account for spontaneous processes, this last theory makes use of laws valid only when measurements are performed. This incoherence seems absent from the literature.
In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.
According to orthodox quantum mechanics, state vectors change in two incompatible ways: “deterministically” in accordance with Schr0̈dinger's time-dependent equation, and probabilistically if and only if a measurement is made. It is argued here that the problem of measurement arises because the precise, mutually exclusive conditions for these two types of transitions to occur are not specified within orthodox quantum mechanics. Fundamentally, this is due to an inevitable ambiguity in the notion of “measurement” itself. Hence, if the problem of measurement is to be resolved, a new, fully objective version of quantum mechanics needs to be developed which does not incorporate the notion of measurement in its basic postulates at all.
The concept of 'super-indeterminism' captures the notion that the free choice assumption of orthodox quantum mechanics necessitates only the following requirement: an agent's free-choice performance in the selection of measurement settings must not represent an exception to the rule of irreducible quantum indeterminism in the physical universe (i.e, "universal indeterminism"). Any additional metaphysical speculation, such as to whether quantum indeterminism, i.e., intrinsic randomness, implicates the reality of experimenter "freedom", "free will", or "free choice", is redundant in relation to the predictive success of orthodox quantum mechanics. Accordingly, super-indeterminism views as redundant also, from a technical standpoint, whether an affirmative or a negative answer is claimed in reference to universal indeterminism as a necessary precondition for experimenter freedom. Super-indeterminism accounts, for example, for the circular reasoning which is implicit in the free will theorem by Conway and Kochen [1,2]. The concept of super-indeterminism is of great assistance in clarifying the often misunderstood meaning of the concept of "free variables" as used by John Bell [3]. The present work argues that Bell sought an operational, effective free will theorem , one based upon the notion of "determinism without predetermination", i.e., one wherein "free variables" represent universally uncomputable variables. In conclusion, the standard interpretation of quantum theory does not answer, and does not need to answer in order to ensure the predictive success of orthodox theory, the question of whether either incompatibilism or compatibilism is valid in relation to free-will metaphysics and to the free-will phenomenology of experimenter agents in quantum mechanics.
Left on its own, a quantum state evolves deterministically under the Schrödinger equation, forming superpositions. Upon measurement, however, a stochastic process governed by the Born rule collapses it to a single outcome. This dual evolution of quantum states – the core of the Measurement Problem – has puzzled physicists and philosophers for nearly a century. Yet, amid the cacophony of competing interpretations, the problem today is not as impenetrable as it once seemed. This paper reviews the current status of the Measurement Problem, distinguishing between what is well understood and what remains unresolved. We examine key theoretical approaches, including decoherence, many-worlds interpretation, objective collapse theories, hidden-variable theories, dualistic approaches, deterministic models, and epistemic interpretations. To make these discussions accessible to a broader audience, we also reference curated online resources that provide high-quality introductions to central concepts.
Abstract This work sets out to answer a single question: what is the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics? However, we adopt a different approach to that normally used. Rather than surveying physicists, or poring over the precise details of the thoughts of Bohr and Heisenberg, we review a collection of 42 textbooks on quantum mechanics, encompassing the most popular and prominent works of this nature. We then gauge their response to 13 propositions to build up a picture of exactly what is believed by an orthodox quantum mechanic. We demonstrate that this orthodoxy has many aspects of Copenhagen-like viewpoints, but also shows some interesting emerging deviations. Moreover, it is more nuanced than some reductive characterisations that condense the orthodoxy down to the ontological primacy of the quantum state. The revealed orthodoxy has three consistent pillars: measurement inherently disturbs quantum states, these states refer to individual instances, not ensembles, and quantum systems do not have definite properties prior to measurement. More fully, it entails that individual particles exist in wave-like super-positions and present particle behaviours only when forced to by outside influences. The act of measuring such a system inherently induces random changes in its state, manifesting as a form of measurement error that corresponds to the uncertainty principle. This implies that measurement does not reveal underlying values of quantum properties.
Abstract Spontaneous collapse theories of quantum mechanics turn the usual Schrödinger equation into a stochastic dynamical law. In particular, in this paper I will focus on the GRW theory. Two philosophical issues that can be raised about GRW concern (a) the ontology of the theory, in particular the nature of the wave function and its role within the theory, and (b) the interpretation of the objective probabilities involved in the dynamics of the theory. During the last years, it has been claimed that we can take advantage of dispositional properties in order to develop an ontology for GRW theory, and also in order to ground the objective probabilities which are postulated by it. However, in this paper I will argue that the dispositional interpretations which have been discussed in the literature so far are either flawed or—at best—incomplete. If we want to endorse a dispositional interpretation of GRW theory we thus need an extended account which specifies the precise nature of those properties and which makes also clear how they can correctly ground all the probabilities postulated by the theory. Thus, after having introduced several different kinds of probabilistic dispositions, I will try to fill the gap in the literature by proposing a novel and complete dispositional account of GRW, based on what I call spontaneous weighted multi-track propensities. I claim that such an account can satisfy both of our desiderata.