Abstract This work sets out to answer a single question: what is the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics? However, we adopt a different approach to that normally used. Rather than surveying physicists, or poring over the precise details of the thoughts of Bohr and Heisenberg, we review a collection of 42 textbooks on quantum mechanics, encompassing the most popular and prominent works of this nature. We then gauge their response to 13 propositions to build up a picture of exactly what is believed by an orthodox quantum mechanic. We demonstrate that this orthodoxy has many aspects of Copenhagen-like viewpoints, but also shows some interesting emerging deviations. Moreover, it is more nuanced than some reductive characterisations that condense the orthodoxy down to the ontological primacy of the quantum state. The revealed orthodoxy has three consistent pillars: measurement inherently disturbs quantum states, these states refer to individual instances, not ensembles, and quantum systems do not have definite properties prior to measurement. More fully, it entails that individual particles exist in wave-like super-positions and present particle behaviours only when forced to by outside influences. The act of measuring such a system inherently induces random changes in its state, manifesting as a form of measurement error that corresponds to the uncertainty principle. This implies that measurement does not reveal underlying values of quantum properties.
Abstract This work sets out to answer a single question: what is the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics? However, we adopt a different approach to that normally used. Rather than surveying physicists, or poring over the precise details of the thoughts of Bohr and Heisenberg, we review a collection of 42 textbooks on quantum mechanics, encompassing the most popular and prominent works of this nature. We then gauge their response to 13 propositions to build up a picture of exactly what is believed by an orthodox quantum mechanic. We demonstrate that this orthodoxy has many aspects of Copenhagen-like viewpoints, but also shows some interesting emerging deviations. Moreover, it is more nuanced than some reductive characterisations that condense the orthodoxy down to the ontological primacy of the quantum state. The revealed orthodoxy has three consistent pillars: measurement inherently disturbs quantum states, these states refer to individual instances, not ensembles, and quantum systems do not have definite properties prior to measurement. More fully, it entails that individual particles exist in wave-like super-positions and present particle behaviours only when forced to by outside influences. The act of measuring such a system inherently induces random changes in its state, manifesting as a form of measurement error that corresponds to the uncertainty principle. This implies that measurement does not reveal underlying values of quantum properties.
In classical mechanics, as we know, all observables commute with each other and therefore belong to the same “commuting set.” This means that – in principle – we can measure all observables simultaneously. Then, the state manifests itself as a collection of properties (of values of observables) (see Sec. 1.1), and as such it is observable. On the other hand, quantum-mechanical observables may not commute (see Subsec. 2.1.5). As a consequence, the state is not just a collection of observable values (see also Sec. 2.3) so that we may ask ourselves whether it is observable or not, and therefore raise the following question: What is the nature of the wave function? Is it simply a mathematical tool, i.e. does it only represent the sum of all that we can know about a system? Or does it have an ontological status? Since the early days of quantum mechanics, this question has been very popular. As a first attempt, de Broglie tried to interpret the wave function as describing, in classical terms, a wave field that envelopes a classical particle (see also Subsec. 16.3.2). This theory should predict the existence of empty waves, but several experiments have shown negative results (see also the end of Sec. 9.6). More recently, many physicists have tried to propose some methods in order to measure the wave function. Here we shortly report on some of these proposals and discuss to what extent the quantum state can be measured.
The Orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics, which followed the Copenhagen Interpretation but was enhanced by primarily Werner Heisenberg and John von Neumann into a fully developed theory, brought in, among others, the role of measurement, available choices and response of the quantum system.It is, more consistent and clear than other interpretations of quantum mechanics as it provides account of the interactions of observers with the external world.As such, the Orthodox interpretation does a lot more than just account for physical interactions in the atomic world, which was the original goal of quantum mechanics in the early part of the twentieth century.In this article we present several issues that may have been answered or need further development, such as measurement and observation, what is Nature and who the observer is.Extending Orthodox quantum mechanics, leading to universal non-dual Awareness may provide a consistent and integrated view of reality and is consistent with advances in mathematical theory.An issue of paramount importance is what are the philosophical underpinnings or ontological view of the quantum nature of the universe and the role of human minds, observations and choices.
The measurement problem in quantum mechanics first cropped up during the 1930s during a famous series of debates between Einstein and Bohr concerning the physical adequacy – or ‘completeness’ – of the orthodox (Copenhagen) theory.1 As we have seen, it is a topic central to Hanson’s thinking not only with regard to quantum mechanics but also for its wider bearing on the scope and limits of scientific knowledge, the theory-laden character of observations, and the underdetermination of theory by evidence.2 Thus it is frequently adduced in support of his proto-Kuhnian claim that scientists working within different paradigms must be thought of as observing different things or inhabiting ‘different worlds’.3 What I propose to do now is look in more detail at the arguments surrounding this topic and, especially, at various proposals – from Einstein down – for a realist construal of the quantum data (i.e., the empirical measurement-results) that would offer an alternative to Hanson’s idea of the uncertainty principle as placing an absolute limit on our knowledge of objects and events in the microphysical domain. Having set out his arguments already in chapters 4 and 5, I shall not make any further detailed reference to Hanson’s work but assume that the reader who has come this far will have them clearly in mind. Thus my purpose in the remainder of this book is to raise the question: what becomes of the paradigm-relativist approach to issues in the history and philosophy of science if it derives so much of its suasive force from an interpretation of quantum mechanics that has proved increasingly open to challenge?
In classical mechanics, the state of a physical object is determined by quantities such as mass, momentum, and angular momentum. According to Newton’s laws, for a given initial state, the evolution of the system is deterministic—that is, the state of the object (i.e., its parameters) can be precisely predicted at any future time. In quantum mechanics, however, based on the theory of matter waves, the state of a system is described by a probability wave function. Given an initial state, the time evolution of the system is governed by the Schrödinger equation, which determines the probability distribution of the particle’s position (or other observables) in space over time. The probabilistic nature of the quantum state implies that prior to measurement, the system may exist in a superposition of possible states, each associated with a certain probability amplitude. In physics, measurement refers to the experimental determination of mechanical quantities such as position, momentum, energy, and angular momentum. In classical mechanics, the act of measurement does not influence the physical state of the object; the system remains unaffected by the observation. In contrast, quantum measurement fundamentally alters the state: once a definite value of an observable is measured, the wave function collapses to the corresponding eigenstate. This signifies that the probabilistic description of the system with respect to that observable becomes a definite state—the system’s wave function is projected accordingly. Thus, the state of a quantum system is inherently measurement-dependent, and by measuring a mechanical quantity, one effectively determines the corresponding probability distribution, or wave function, associated with that observable. Therefore, the relationship between observables (mechanical quantities) and state wave functions, as well as the mathematical structure connecting them, constitutes one of the central concerns of quantum theory. As previously discussed, the Schrödinger equation involves expressions for energy and momentum that act on wave functions in the form of operators. Accordingly, we now proceed to explore the formalism of quantum mechanics based on the concept of operators.
One of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics occupies a privileged position in the opinion of the majority of physicists. This is the Copenhagen view, which owes its fame and popularity not only to historical reasons but also to its simplicity and practical efficiency. As is well known, the Copenhagen outlook was elaborated collectively. Nevertheless, Niels Bohr's and W. Heisenberg's contributions should be singled out as particularly outstanding. This chapter describes two principles, which are in fact the two pillars on which Bohr's doctrine is built. These are: The working of measuring instruments must be accounted for in purely classical terms . Another one is quantum systems that should not even be thought of as possessing individual properties independently of the experimental arrangement. In the particular case of the pair of observables "position" and "momentum," the Heisenberg uncertainty relations can be considered as a generalization of the complementarity principle.
Abstract The book starts with a description of classical mechanics then discusses the quantum phenomena that require us to give up our commonsense classical intuitions. We consider the physical and conceptual arguments that led to the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of quantum mechanics and how the standard theory explains quantum phenomena. This includes a discussion of how the theory’s two dynamical laws work with the standard interpretation of states to explain determinate measurement records, quantum statistics, interference effects, entanglement, decoherence, and quantum nonlocality. A careful understanding of how the standard theory works ultimately leads to the quantum measurement problem. We consider how the measurement problem threatens the logical consistency of the standard theory then turn to a discussion of the main proposals for resolving it. This includes collapse formulations of quantum mechanics like Wigner’s extension of the standard theory and the GRW approach and no-collapse formulations like pure wave mechanics, the various many-worlds theories, and Bohmian mechanics. In discussing alternative formulations of quantum mechanics we pay particular attention to the explanatory role played by each theory’s empirical ontology and associated metaphysical commitments and the conceptual trade-offs between theoretical options.