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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Bell Nonlocality, Hardy's Paradox and Hyperplane Dependence

Gordon N. Fleming

Published Aug 31, 2016• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

I begin with some reminiscences of my delayed appreciation of the significance of John Bell'swork. Preparatory remarks on my general perspective concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics are presented. I argue against the conflation of hyperplane dependence with frame dependence, which occurs occasionally; and that the ‘elements of reality’ of Hardy's famous gedankenexperiment can retain their Lorentz invariance, i.e., their frame independence, if one recognizes the hyperplane dependence of their localization, which follows. Finally, I criticize a view of the nature of Lorentz transformations presented by Asher Peres and co-workers which conflicts with the view employed here. Initial Reactions to Bell's Work Like many others in the physics community, I was late to come to an appreciation of the significance of John Bell's papers on the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM). But unlike many of those, my indifference to Bell was not due to a dismissive attitude to foundational studies per se or to an intransigent commitment to some version of Copenhagenism. In 1971, for example, I was very much involved in the international conference on QM foundations at my home institution, where Bell presented the paper “On the hypothesis that the Schrödinger equation is exact,” published later as [1], but I paid minimal attention to his presentation. The cause of this poor judgment (as I eventually came to realize it was) was that I was already convinced that the Schrödinger equation was not exact in the sense Bell meant, but must be augmented with primordial state reductions. I was among those who, in the words of Bob Wald, as reported by Roger Penrose [2], were inclined to “take it seriously,” the QM state that is, and, consequently, could not “really believe in it,” i.e., really believe that purely unitary QM is a complete theory. I was delighted when the experimental tests of Bell's inequalities upheld the QM predictions. I was, furthermore, uninterested in hidden variable reconstructions of QM, such as Bohmian mechanics [3] and Many Worlds interpretations [4, 5], that were, in principle, not susceptible to empirical tests of their novel details.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781316219393.017

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John Bell's Varying Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics: Memories and Comments

H. D. Zeh

Various interpretations of quantum mechanics, favored (or neglected) by John Bell in the context of his nonlocality theorem, are compared and discussed. Varenna 1970 I met John Bell for the first time at the Varenna conference of 1970 [1]. I had been invited on the suggestion of Eugene P. Wigner, who had already helped me to publish my first paper on the concept that was later called decoherence – to appear in the first issue of Foundations of Physics a few months after the conference [2]. This concept arose from my conviction, based on many applications of quantum mechanics to composite systems under various conditions, that Schrödinger's wave function in configuration space, or more generally the superposition principle, is universally valid and applicable. In particular, stable narrow wavepackets can represent classical configurations, while their superpositions define novel individual properties – such as “momentum,” defined as a plane wave superposition of different positions. Superpositions of macroscopically different properties, on the other hand, are regularly irreversibly “dislocalized” (distributed over many degrees of freedom) by means of interactions described by the Schrödinger equation. The corresponding disappearance of certain local superpositions (“decoherence”) seems to explain the phenomenon of a classical world as well as the apparent occurrence of quantum jumps or stochastic “events” – see Sect. 20.4 or [3] for a historical overview of the conceptual development of quantum theory. So I had never felt any motivation to think of “hidden variables” or any other physics behind the successful wave function. Therefore, I was very surprised on my arrival in Varenna to hear everybody discuss Bell's inequality. It had been published a few years before the conference, but I had either not noticed it or not regarded it as particularly remarkable until then. As this inequality demonstrates that the predictions of quantum theory would require any conceivable reality possibly underlying the nonlocal wave function to be nonlocal itself, I simply found my conviction that the latter describes individual reality confirmed. For example, I had often discussed the conservation of total spin or angular momentum in an individual decay process, which requires nonlocal entanglement between the fragments at any distance in a form that was later called a “Bell state”.

arXiv:1402.5498•Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 31, 2016•4 citations

Some Personal Reflections on Quantum Nonlocality and the Contributions of John Bell

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Quantum nonlocality does not exist

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Quantum nonlocality is shown to be an artifact of the Copenhagen interpretation, in which each observed quantity has exactly one value at any instant. In reality, all physical systems obey quantum mechanics, which obeys no such rule. Locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI). Using the MWI, I show that the quantum side of Bell's inequality, generally believed nonlocal, is really due to a series of three measurements (not two as in the standard, oversimplified analysis), all three of which have only local effects. Thus, experiments confirming "nonlocality" are actually confirming the MWI. The mistaken interpretation of nonlocality experiments depends crucially on a question-begging version of the Born interpretation, which makes sense only in "collapse" versions of quantum theory, about the meaning of the modulus of the wave function, so I use the interpretation based on the MWI, namely that the wave function is a world density amplitude, not a probability amplitude. This view allows the Born interpretation to be derived directly from the Schrödinger equation, by applying the Schrödinger equation to both the observed and the observer.

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Harvey R. Brown, Christopher G. Timpson

Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely, that it violates ‘local causality’) became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about themathematical form of the local causality condition and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, in both its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz covariant version of quantum theory, free of action at a distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. Introduction John S. Bell's last word on his celebrated nonlocality theorem and its interpretation appeared in his 1990 paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, first published in the year of his untimely death. Bell was careful here to distinguish between the issue of ‘no superluminal signalling’ in quantum theory (both quantum field theory and quantum mechanics) and a principle he first introduced explicitly in 1976 and called ‘local causality’ [1]. In relation to the former, Bell expressed concerns that amplify doubts he had already expressed in 1976. These concerns touch on what is now widely known as the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics, and ultimately have to do with Bell's distaste for what he saw as an anthropocentric element in orthodox quantum thinking. In relation to local causality, Bell emphasised that his famous factorizability (no-correlations) condition is not to be seen ‘as the formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof’ and stressed how difficult he found it to articulate this consequence. He left the question of any strict inconsistency between violation of factorizability and special relativity theory unresolved, a not insignificant shift from his thinking up to the early 1980s.

arXiv:1501.03521•Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 31, 2016•33 citations

Readers offer their own magic moments with John Bell

Robert B. Griffiths

Reinhold Bertlmann’s article “Magic moments with John Bell” was a pleasure to read. I add a note concerning some later developments that are significant for understanding the implications of Bell’s quantum foundations work.The crucial point is that under the Bell locality hypothesis for a joint measurement as given in the article,E(a,b)=∫dλρ(λ)A(a,λ)·B(b,λ)the quantity λ that represents the hidden variable(s) is a classical, not a quantum, object, and ρ(λ) is a classical probability distribution. Such expressions only make sense in the context of quantum theory when the operators of interest commute with each other, but that is not the case when this expression is used to derive a Bell inequality.Many years ago Arthur Fine pointed out that hidden variables and Bell inequalities were “imposing requirements to make well defined precisely those probability distributions for noncommuting observables whose rejection is the very essence of quantum mechanics.”11. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291 Thus the real issue is not one of locality but, instead, the proper use of probabilities in quantum theory.Fine’s point has been confirmed by the later development of a fully consistent way of introducing probabilities in quantum mechanics.22. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. That approach has shown that when quantum mechanics is interpreted using subspaces of the Hilbert space rather than classical hidden variables to represent physical properties, it is local: There are no ghostly nonlocal influences.We cannot know how Bell would have responded to those new developments, which only came to full fruition after his untimely death. The reader willing to dig into my somewhat tedious discussion33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Bohm situation will find an explicit proof that a measurement by Alice has not the slightest effect on the spin on Bob’s side. More recent is a general argument that quantum mechanics satisfies a principle of Einstein locality: What is done to system A has no effect on system B as long as there is no interaction between the two.44. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5Those proofs of quantum locality begin by taking very seriously John von Neumann’s proposal that quantum properties correspond to Hilbert subspaces, whose projectors do not, in general, commute with one another.55. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Bell, though, assumed that such properties can be represented by classical hidden variables, which always commute. Thus Bell’s theorem teaches that if one uses classical hidden variables in place of quantum properties, the result will contradict quantum theory and disagree with experiment. Indeed, while Bell started off by pointing out deficiencies in von Neumann’s argument against hidden variables, the end result of his work is an even better and much more conclusive argument, backed by experiment, for rejecting classical hidden variables.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291, Google ScholarCrossref2. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. Google Scholar3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. Google Scholar4. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5, Google ScholarCrossref5. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Google Scholar© 2015 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 30, 2015•0 citations

An Introduction to the Foundations and Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Theodore McKeever, Ahsan Nazir

This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.

quant-pharXiv:2603.09818•Canadian Journal of Physics•Mar 11, 2026•1 citation
I begin with some reminiscences of my delayed appreciation of the significance of John Bell'swork. Preparatory remarks on my general perspective concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics are presented. I argue against the conflation of hyperplane dependence with frame dependence, which occurs occasionally; and that the ‘elements of reality’ of Hardy's famous gedankenexperiment can retain their Lorentz invariance, i.e., their frame independence, if one recognizes the hyperplane dependence of their localization, which follows. Finally, I criticize a view of the nature of Lorentz transformations presented by Asher Peres and co-workers which conflicts with the view employed here. Initial Reactions to Bell's Work Like many others in the physics community, I was late to come to an appreciation of the significance of John Bell's papers on the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM). But unlike many of those, my indifference to Bell was not due to a dismissive attitude to foundational studies per se or to an intransigent commitment to some version of Copenhagenism. In 1971, for example, I was very much involved in the international conference on QM foundations at my home institution, where Bell presented the paper “On the hypothesis that the Schrödinger equation is exact,” published later as [1], but I paid minimal attention to his presentation. The cause of this poor judgment (as I eventually came to realize it was) was that I was already convinced that the Schrödinger equation was not exact in the sense Bell meant, but must be augmented with primordial state reductions. I was among those who, in the words of Bob Wald, as reported by Roger Penrose [2], were inclined to “take it seriously,” the QM state that is, and, consequently, could not “really believe in it,” i.e., really believe that purely unitary QM is a complete theory. I was delighted when the experimental tests of Bell's inequalities upheld the QM predictions. I was, furthermore, uninterested in hidden variable reconstructions of QM, such as Bohmian mechanics [3] and Many Worlds interpretations [4, 5], that were, in principle, not susceptible to empirical tests of their novel details.
Various interpretations of quantum mechanics, favored (or neglected) by John Bell in the context of his nonlocality theorem, are compared and discussed. Varenna 1970 I met John Bell for the first time at the Varenna conference of 1970 [1]. I had been invited on the suggestion of Eugene P. Wigner, who had already helped me to publish my first paper on the concept that was later called decoherence – to appear in the first issue of Foundations of Physics a few months after the conference [2]. This concept arose from my conviction, based on many applications of quantum mechanics to composite systems under various conditions, that Schrödinger's wave function in configuration space, or more generally the superposition principle, is universally valid and applicable. In particular, stable narrow wavepackets can represent classical configurations, while their superpositions define novel individual properties – such as “momentum,” defined as a plane wave superposition of different positions. Superpositions of macroscopically different properties, on the other hand, are regularly irreversibly “dislocalized” (distributed over many degrees of freedom) by means of interactions described by the Schrödinger equation. The corresponding disappearance of certain local superpositions (“decoherence”) seems to explain the phenomenon of a classical world as well as the apparent occurrence of quantum jumps or stochastic “events” – see Sect. 20.4 or [3] for a historical overview of the conceptual development of quantum theory. So I had never felt any motivation to think of “hidden variables” or any other physics behind the successful wave function. Therefore, I was very surprised on my arrival in Varenna to hear everybody discuss Bell's inequality. It had been published a few years before the conference, but I had either not noticed it or not regarded it as particularly remarkable until then. As this inequality demonstrates that the predictions of quantum theory would require any conceivable reality possibly underlying the nonlocal wave function to be nonlocal itself, I simply found my conviction that the latter describes individual reality confirmed. For example, I had often discussed the conservation of total spin or angular momentum in an individual decay process, which requires nonlocal entanglement between the fragments at any distance in a form that was later called a “Bell state”.
I present the background of the Bohm approach that led John Bell to a study of quantum nonlocality, from which his famous inequalities emerged. I recall the early experiments done at Birkbeck with the aim of exploring the possibility of ‘spontaneous collapse’, a way suggested by Schrödinger to avoid the conclusion that quantum mechanics is grossly nonlocal. I also review some of the work that John did which directly impinged on my own investigations into the foundations of quantum mechanics and report some new investigations towards a more fundamental theory. Introduction My first encounter with quantum nonlocality was in discussions with David Bohm when I joined him as an assistant lecturer at Birkbeck in the sixties. Although my PhD thesis had been in condensed matter physics under the supervision of Cyril Domb, I had always been fascinated and puzzled by quantum phenomena, and when the opportunity to study the subject with Bohm came up, I took it. I would listen to the discussions between Bohm and Roger Penrose, who was at Birkbeck at the time, and it soon became clear that the prescribed interpretation of quantum mechanics that I was taught as an undergraduate left too many questions unanswered. At that time there was a very strange atmosphere in the physics community. I was often informed that there were no problems with the interpretation of the quantum formalism. If I did not follow the well-prescribed rules of the quantum algorithm, I would be ‘wasting my time’. There was no alternative, just do it! But Louis de Broglie and David Bohm had shown there was another way. However, their views were strongly opposed by many, and as far as I could judge their reasons did not seem to be based on mathematics or on logic, but on a preconceived notion that the formalism was, in principle, the best we could do. The experimental data were bizarre when looked upon from the standpoint of classical physics, but the uncertainty principle somehow prevented us from examining the actual process in detail. Reality was somehow veiled (see [1]).Were we condemned to use a mere algorithm or was there an underlying ontology?
Quantum nonlocality is shown to be an artifact of the Copenhagen interpretation, in which each observed quantity has exactly one value at any instant. In reality, all physical systems obey quantum mechanics, which obeys no such rule. Locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI). Using the MWI, I show that the quantum side of Bell's inequality, generally believed nonlocal, is really due to a series of three measurements (not two as in the standard, oversimplified analysis), all three of which have only local effects. Thus, experiments confirming "nonlocality" are actually confirming the MWI. The mistaken interpretation of nonlocality experiments depends crucially on a question-begging version of the Born interpretation, which makes sense only in "collapse" versions of quantum theory, about the meaning of the modulus of the wave function, so I use the interpretation based on the MWI, namely that the wave function is a world density amplitude, not a probability amplitude. This view allows the Born interpretation to be derived directly from the Schrödinger equation, by applying the Schrödinger equation to both the observed and the observer.
Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely, that it violates ‘local causality’) became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about themathematical form of the local causality condition and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, in both its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz covariant version of quantum theory, free of action at a distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. Introduction John S. Bell's last word on his celebrated nonlocality theorem and its interpretation appeared in his 1990 paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, first published in the year of his untimely death. Bell was careful here to distinguish between the issue of ‘no superluminal signalling’ in quantum theory (both quantum field theory and quantum mechanics) and a principle he first introduced explicitly in 1976 and called ‘local causality’ [1]. In relation to the former, Bell expressed concerns that amplify doubts he had already expressed in 1976. These concerns touch on what is now widely known as the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics, and ultimately have to do with Bell's distaste for what he saw as an anthropocentric element in orthodox quantum thinking. In relation to local causality, Bell emphasised that his famous factorizability (no-correlations) condition is not to be seen ‘as the formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof’ and stressed how difficult he found it to articulate this consequence. He left the question of any strict inconsistency between violation of factorizability and special relativity theory unresolved, a not insignificant shift from his thinking up to the early 1980s.
Reinhold Bertlmann’s article “Magic moments with John Bell” was a pleasure to read. I add a note concerning some later developments that are significant for understanding the implications of Bell’s quantum foundations work.The crucial point is that under the Bell locality hypothesis for a joint measurement as given in the article,E(a,b)=∫dλρ(λ)A(a,λ)·B(b,λ)the quantity λ that represents the hidden variable(s) is a classical, not a quantum, object, and ρ(λ) is a classical probability distribution. Such expressions only make sense in the context of quantum theory when the operators of interest commute with each other, but that is not the case when this expression is used to derive a Bell inequality.Many years ago Arthur Fine pointed out that hidden variables and Bell inequalities were “imposing requirements to make well defined precisely those probability distributions for noncommuting observables whose rejection is the very essence of quantum mechanics.”11. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291 Thus the real issue is not one of locality but, instead, the proper use of probabilities in quantum theory.Fine’s point has been confirmed by the later development of a fully consistent way of introducing probabilities in quantum mechanics.22. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. That approach has shown that when quantum mechanics is interpreted using subspaces of the Hilbert space rather than classical hidden variables to represent physical properties, it is local: There are no ghostly nonlocal influences.We cannot know how Bell would have responded to those new developments, which only came to full fruition after his untimely death. The reader willing to dig into my somewhat tedious discussion33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Bohm situation will find an explicit proof that a measurement by Alice has not the slightest effect on the spin on Bob’s side. More recent is a general argument that quantum mechanics satisfies a principle of Einstein locality: What is done to system A has no effect on system B as long as there is no interaction between the two.44. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5Those proofs of quantum locality begin by taking very seriously John von Neumann’s proposal that quantum properties correspond to Hilbert subspaces, whose projectors do not, in general, commute with one another.55. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Bell, though, assumed that such properties can be represented by classical hidden variables, which always commute. Thus Bell’s theorem teaches that if one uses classical hidden variables in place of quantum properties, the result will contradict quantum theory and disagree with experiment. Indeed, while Bell started off by pointing out deficiencies in von Neumann’s argument against hidden variables, the end result of his work is an even better and much more conclusive argument, backed by experiment, for rejecting classical hidden variables.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291, Google ScholarCrossref2. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. Google Scholar3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. Google Scholar4. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5, Google ScholarCrossref5. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Google Scholar© 2015 American Institute of Physics.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.