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arXiv:1501.03521 · Cambridge University Press eBooks

Bell on Bell's Theorem: The Changing Face of Nonlocality

Harvey R. Brown, Christopher G. Timpson

Published Aug 31, 2016• 33 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely, that it violates ‘local causality’) became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about themathematical form of the local causality condition and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, in both its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz covariant version of quantum theory, free of action at a distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. Introduction John S. Bell's last word on his celebrated nonlocality theorem and its interpretation appeared in his 1990 paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, first published in the year of his untimely death. Bell was careful here to distinguish between the issue of ‘no superluminal signalling’ in quantum theory (both quantum field theory and quantum mechanics) and a principle he first introduced explicitly in 1976 and called ‘local causality’ [1]. In relation to the former, Bell expressed concerns that amplify doubts he had already expressed in 1976. These concerns touch on what is now widely known as the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics, and ultimately have to do with Bell's distaste for what he saw as an anthropocentric element in orthodox quantum thinking. In relation to local causality, Bell emphasised that his famous factorizability (no-correlations) condition is not to be seen ‘as the formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof’ and stressed how difficult he found it to articulate this consequence. He left the question of any strict inconsistency between violation of factorizability and special relativity theory unresolved, a not insignificant shift from his thinking up to the early 1980s.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781316219393.008

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Between 1964 and 1990, the notion of nonlocality in Bell's papers underwent a profound change as his nonlocality theorem gradually became detached from quantum mechanics, and referred to wider probabilistic theories involving correlations between separated beables. The proposition that standard quantum mechanics is itself nonlocal (more precisely, that it violates ‘local causality’) became divorced from the Bell theorem per se from 1976 on, although this important point is widely overlooked in the literature. In 1990, the year of his death, Bell would express serious misgivings about themathematical form of the local causality condition and leave ill-defined the issue of the consistency between special relativity and violation of the Bell-type inequality. In our view, the significance of the Bell theorem, in both its deterministic and stochastic forms, can only be fully understood by taking into account the fact that a fully Lorentz covariant version of quantum theory, free of action at a distance, can be articulated in the Everett interpretation. Introduction John S. Bell's last word on his celebrated nonlocality theorem and its interpretation appeared in his 1990 paper ‘La nouvelle cuisine’, first published in the year of his untimely death. Bell was careful here to distinguish between the issue of ‘no superluminal signalling’ in quantum theory (both quantum field theory and quantum mechanics) and a principle he first introduced explicitly in 1976 and called ‘local causality’ [1]. In relation to the former, Bell expressed concerns that amplify doubts he had already expressed in 1976. These concerns touch on what is now widely known as the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics, and ultimately have to do with Bell's distaste for what he saw as an anthropocentric element in orthodox quantum thinking. In relation to local causality, Bell emphasised that his famous factorizability (no-correlations) condition is not to be seen ‘as the formulation of local causality, but as a consequence thereof’ and stressed how difficult he found it to articulate this consequence. He left the question of any strict inconsistency between violation of factorizability and special relativity theory unresolved, a not insignificant shift from his thinking up to the early 1980s.
Bell's Theorem demonstrates that factorizable theories for the EPR experiment (EPR) cannot reproduce the quantum correlations. Factorizability is motivated by various locality conditions. So to understand the nature of nonlocality in EPR, we first need to understand the conceptual relations between factorizability, these various locality conditions and the nature of the quantum correlations. That is the main focus of my thesis. My main conclusion is that these conceptual relations are more subtle than the literature has usually suggested. Chapter 1 is a general introduction. In Chapter 2, I review the general framework of factorizable stochastic theories for EPR. I argue that factorizability can be motivated by various locality conditions, even in theories that admit time-dependent states and take the measurement interactions to be neither instantaneous, nor simultaneous. In Chapter 3, I focus on Cartwright' s (1989) and Humphreys' (1989) theories of probabilistic causation for singular events, which are based on modifications of traditional causal linear modelling. I argue (against Cartwright) that local models for EPR in the framework of these theories are committed to factorizability; and so they cannot reproduce the EPR correlations. In Chapter 4, I turn to Stochastic-Einstein Locality (SEL). Hellman (1982) proposed that SEL with some provisos characterizes the No-Superluminal-Action (NSA) of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and he argued that SEL is not violated in EPR. Butterfield (1994) proposed that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) characterizes the lack of superluminal Lewisian causation, and he argued that SEL is violated in EPR. I argue that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) is motivated by NSA and spatiotemporal separability. Thus, the violation of SEL might arise from the failure of spatiotemporal separability. And this failure is compatible with NSA and superluminal Lewisian causation. Accordingly, Hellman's and Butterfield's views need not be in tension. In Chapter 5, I focus on the implications for nonlocality of Jarrett's (1984) analysis of factorizability into "locality" and "completeness". I argue that although this analysis cannot distinguish between failures of factorizability which are compatible with STR and those which are not, it is significant for clarifying the implications of Bell's theorem for nonlocality. In Chapter 6, I qmsider three arguments that are intended to deny superluminal causal propagation in EPR, and a fourth argument that is intended to establish the opposite conclusion. I argue that in various ways these arguments have gone wrong. Three of these argument rely on implicit assumptions that have been overlooked. Accordingly, two of them reached a reasonable conclusion, i.e. the failure of separability, for the wrong reasons; whereas the third reached a wrong conclusion, i.e. that the failure of the contiguity of causal processes explains the failure of factorizability in EPR. The fourth relies on a wrong assumption, and thus it reaches a too strong conclusion, that the EPR correlations require superluminal action. My main conclusion is that the quantum correlations require nonseparability . In Chapter 7, I focus on decision theory in the context of EPR. In both EPR and the famous Newcomb's problem (NewProb), there are unscreenable-off correlations. I argue that NewProb can be related to EPR, in the sense that a NewProb can be realized by that experiment.
Fifty years after the publication of Bell's theorem, there remains some controversy regarding what the theorem is telling us about quantum mechanics, and what the experimental violations of Bell inequalities are telling us about the world. This chapter represents my best attempt to be clear about what I think the lessons are. In brief: there is some sort of nonlocality inherent in any quantum theory, and, moreover, in any theory that reproduces, even approximately, the quantum probabilities for the outcomes of experiments. But not all forms of nonlocality are the same; there is a distinction to be made between action at a distance and other forms of nonlocality, and I will argue that the nonlocality required to violate the Bell inequalities need not involve action at a distance. Furthermore, the distinction between forms of nonlocality makes a difference when it comes to compatibility with relativistic causal structure.
Bell's theorem is 50 years old. Still there is a controversy about its implications. Much of it has its roots in confusion regarding the premises from which the theorem can be derived. Some claim that a derivation of Bell's inequalities requires just locality assumption, and nothing more. Violations of the inequalities are then interpreted as ``nonlocality'' or ``quantum nonlocality''. We show that such claims are unfounded and that every derivation of Bell's inequalities requires a premise -- in addition to locality and freedom of choice -- which is either assumed tacitly, or unconsciously, or is embedded in a single compound condition (like Bell's ``local causality''). The premise is equivalent to the assumption of existence of additional variables which do not appear in the quantum formalism (in form of determinism, or joint probability for outcomes of all conceivable measurements, or ``additional causes`'', or ``hidden variables'', ``complete description of the state'' or counterfactual definiteness, etc.). A certain irony is that perhaps the main message of violation of Bell's inequalities is that our notion of locality should be based on an operationally well-defined no-signalling condition, rather than on local causality.
In papers published in the 25 years following his famous 1964 proof, John Bell refined and reformulated his views on locality and causality. Although his formulations of local causality were in terms of probability, he had little to say about that notion. But assumptions about probability are implicit in his arguments and conclusions. Probability does not conform to these assumptions when quantum mechanics is applied to account for the particular correlations Bell argues are locally inexplicable. This account involves no superluminal action and there is even a sense in which it is local, but it is in tension with the requirement that the direct causes and effects of events be nearby. Introduction I never met John Bell, but his writings have supplied me with a continual source of new insights as I read and reread them over 40 years. As I worked toward a rather different understanding of quantum mechanics he was foremost in my mind as a severe but honest critic of such attempts. We all would love to know what Einstein would have made of Bell's theorem. I confess that the deep regret I feel that Bell cannot respond to this paper is sometimes assuaged by a sense of relief. Locality and Local Causality In his seminal 1964 paper [1], John Bell expressed locality as the requirement that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past. [2, p. 14] This seems to require that the result of a measurement would have been the same, no matter what operations had been performed on such a distant system. But suppose the result of a measurement were the outcome of an indeterministic process. Then the result of the measurement might have been different even if exactly the same operations (if any) had been performed on that distant system. So can no indeterministic theory satisfy the locality requirement? Bell felt no need to address that awkward question in his 1964 paper [1], since he took the EPR argument to establish that any additional variables needed to restore locality and causalitywould have to determine a unique result of ameasurement.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.
We review John Stewart Bell's works and analyze his arguments regarding nonlocality as he developed them from 1964 until his sudden and unexpected death in 1990. Although the alleged nonlocal character of quantum mechanics is inextricably related to the formulation of the Bell theorem, that relation is usually inappropriately posed and disagrees with Bell's own formulation. The departure from the clear line of reasoning that Bell tried to convey has contributed to a polarization of part of the scientific community. That the interpretation of a result whose empirical verification deserved a Nobel Prize remains so controversial is unfortunate. We show how the correct appreciation of Bell's rationale calls for reformulating a widespread argument on quantum nonlocality, yielding a more balanced perspective of the problem. We highlight a more formal proof of quantum mechanics' violation of local causality. Finally, we mention a few alternatives that may justify considering quantum mechanics as a local theory.