Any limit to observer self-knowledge implies an uncertainty of external observation. It is proposed that for "homogeneous" observers made up of only a few types of mathematically equal particles, the external world suffers a distortion. The underlying reason is that the observer is effectively replaced by an "observers' ensemble" since he does not know his own state exactly. Between the elements of the ensemble the observer jumps back and forth with a finite rate of "self-permutation." Since the elements of the ensemble are pairwise identical under time reversal, "micro-time-reversals" exist. The consequence is that all measuring chains become "effectively reversible" for the observer. Hence all external objects are subject to "pseudodiffusion." The latter resembles the diffusion postulated as an axiom in stochastic mechanics. This axiom (Nelson's axiom) implies a version of quantum mechanics, as is well known. In consequence a version of quantum mechanics can be derived from classical-deterministic first principles. The question arises of whether a "bootstrap principle" (fixed point theorem) is needed in addition, fixing the value of the diffusion coefficient and hence "Planck's constant" in a universal fashion. However, a fixed value of Planck's constant exists already — in the world of the observer. Other properties of quantum mechanics (like Wheeler's "delayed choice" and Bell's "nonlocality") appear to be implicit, too. Thus, a deterministic local explanation of quantum mechanics is accessible in principle under one condition: that a distinction between two levels of reality (exo and endo), one valid externally and the other only for the internal observer, is introduced. In this case an external reality can, paradoxically, be chosen again, which is not unfamiliar since J. Willard Gibbs made serious use of it almost a century ago. A new principle of parsimony of the world would thereby become visible: The "fancy" things would be true only on the endo level. Quantum mechanics would become an observer-specific endo reality.
Any limit to observer self-knowledge implies an uncertainty of external observation. It is proposed that for "homogeneous" observers made up of only a few types of mathematically equal particles, the external world suffers a distortion. The underlying reason is that the observer is effectively replaced by an "observers' ensemble" since he does not know his own state exactly. Between the elements of the ensemble the observer jumps back and forth with a finite rate of "self-permutation." Since the elements of the ensemble are pairwise identical under time reversal, "micro-time-reversals" exist. The consequence is that all measuring chains become "effectively reversible" for the observer. Hence all external objects are subject to "pseudodiffusion." The latter resembles the diffusion postulated as an axiom in stochastic mechanics. This axiom (Nelson's axiom) implies a version of quantum mechanics, as is well known. In consequence a version of quantum mechanics can be derived from classical-deterministic first principles. The question arises of whether a "bootstrap principle" (fixed point theorem) is needed in addition, fixing the value of the diffusion coefficient and hence "Planck's constant" in a universal fashion. However, a fixed value of Planck's constant exists already — in the world of the observer. Other properties of quantum mechanics (like Wheeler's "delayed choice" and Bell's "nonlocality") appear to be implicit, too. Thus, a deterministic local explanation of quantum mechanics is accessible in principle under one condition: that a distinction between two levels of reality (exo and endo), one valid externally and the other only for the internal observer, is introduced. In this case an external reality can, paradoxically, be chosen again, which is not unfamiliar since J. Willard Gibbs made serious use of it almost a century ago. A new principle of parsimony of the world would thereby become visible: The "fancy" things would be true only on the endo level. Quantum mechanics would become an observer-specific endo reality.
A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}
One of the fundamental conceptual difficulties in quantum mechanics arises from the fact that two of the axioms of the theory concerning the evolution of a microscopic system are contradictory. The first axiom assumes that the state of a quantum system evolving undisturbed by any observer obeys a linear deterministic law expressed by the SchrSdinger equation. The second one (wave-packet reduction principle) states that, when the quantum system interacts with an apparatus devised to measure some of its dynamical variables, its state changes abruptly and stochastically, jumping into a normalized eigenstate of the measured variable. This evolution is not deterministic nor linear and cannot be accounted for by the SchrSdinger equation. As a consequence the internal coherence of the theory becomes questionable. On one side the influence of the apparatus on the quantum system cannot be described as an interaction of the quantum constituents of the measuring macroscopic apparatus with the measured quantum system. On the other side, the impossibility of considering a macroscopic object as made by quantum constituents, i .e . the difficulty of quantum mechanics in describing the behaviour of macroscopic systems, is even more dramatic if we consider the evolution of the closed system consisting of the macroscopic apparatus and of the microscopic system. In such a case the appearance of superpositions of macr0scopically distinguishable states related to the apparatus cannot be avoided. These superpositions contradict both our classical experience and wave-packet reduction principle, which provides for statistical mixtures.
In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.
The three oldest limit statements are — perhaps — the "flaming sword" of the Bible, the notion of "Maya's veil" in India and Anaximander's claim that the Whole (One) is unrecognizable from within (only a cut is recognizable). The first modern limit statement also takes the form of an interface statement. Boscovich's (1755) principle of the difference predicts that "the impressions generated" are invariant under certain objective changes of the universe (as when it "breathes" (increases and decreases in size) along with the observer and all forces. A century later, Maxwell (1872) recognized that a being who is part of a Hamiltonian universe cannot violate the second law of thermodynamics by performing micro observations followed by appropriate shepherding actions (like watching a gas of cold uranium atoms and setting barriers or removing them in an educated fashion using advanced modern gadgetry), whereas a being who is outside the same universe — a "demon" — can easily do the same thing. He thereby was able to predict that micro motions will in general be "impalpable" (p. 154 of his Theory of Heat , 1872). After this prediction had come true, half a century later, Bohr (1927) claimed that his own "complementarity principle" marks the limit of what an internal observer of a classical-continuous world can hope to measure. Four years later, Gödel (1931) discovered his discrete limit (an inaccessibility in finitely many steps of certain implications of a formal system from within). Unlike Bohr's intutive principle, Gödel's is a hard theorem. However, Bohr's also is harder in a sense because it asserted a contradiction between the inside and the outside view, while Gödel only found that a separating boundary existed between reachable and unreachable truths. Bohr's limit would be a "distortion" limit, Gödel's an "inaccessibility" limit. Distortion limits were subsequently also found by Ed Moore in 1956 (an analog to uncertainty in certain dissipative automata) and Donald Mackay in 1957 (irrefutability of certain false statements, like the attribution of free will, to deterministic automata). The subsequent limits of Bob Rosen in 1958 (to self-reproduction in category theory), Rolf Landauer in 1961 (to dissipation-free computation) and Ed Lorenz in 1964 (butterfly effect in chaotic dynamics) appear to be inaccessibility limits again. The same holds good for the finite combinatorial inaccessibility (NP-completeness) discovered in the 1970's. The most recent limit of Yukio Gunji (inconsistency of language games) appears to be a distortion limit again. Do these findings justify the introduction of a new discipline? Two points are in favor of the idea. First, new limits become definable in the fold of the new paradigm. For example, "ultraperspective" (which is inaccessible to animals) plays a fundamental role in both mathematical economics and science. The very notion of limits implies the adoption of two perspectives simultaneously. Second, any distortion limit "splits" the single (exo) reality into many different internally valid (endo) realities. Some of the objective features become interface-specific. This allows a new question to be asked: Can the "mirage properties" implicit in a distortion limit always be identified ("tagged") from the inside, even though they of course cannot be removed by definition? If so, relativity may turn out to be a first example in physics. Related observer-objective phenomena should then occur and be identifiable on the micro level (micro relativity). The famous Goldstein–Kerner "no interaction theorem" (which precludes a frame-dependent description of gases) would acquire a deep significance. Two previously incompatible fundamental theories of physics, namely relativity and quantum mechanics, would be unexpectedly unified by limitology. A third point is in favor of limitology: distortion limits always leave a loophole. They exist because an objective picture (which no longer depends on the observer) can only be obtained by making the observer explicit — a feat impossible to accomplish from the inside. Nevertheless the impossible can be achieved — on the modeling level. The "artificial universe approach" to the real world therefore qualifies as a new type of measurement. At the same time the computer acquires an unexpected fundamental role.