Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

American Philosophical Quarterly

Causation Sans Time

Sam Baron, Kristie Miller

Published Jan 1, 2015• 10 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Is time necessary for causation? We argue that, given a counterfactual theory of causation, it is not. We defend this claim by considering cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. These cases involve laws of nature that govern entanglement. These laws make possible the evaluation of causal counterfactuals between space-like separated entangled particles. There is, for the proponent of a counterfactual theory of causation, a possible world in which causation but not time exists that can be reached by "stripping out" time from the actual world, leaving (some) quantum mechanical laws intact.

Related papers

On quantum entanglement, counterfactuals, causality and dispositions

Tomasz Bigaj

Abstract The existence of non-local correlations between outcomes of measurements in quantum entangled systems strongly suggests that we are dealing with some form of causation here. An assessment of this conjecture in the context of the collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is the primary goal of this paper. Following the counterfactual approach to causation, I argue that the details of the underlying causal mechanism which could explain the non-local correlations in entangled states strongly depend on the adopted semantics for counterfactuals. Several relativistically-invariant interpretations of spatiotemporal counterfactual conditionals are discussed, and the corresponding causal stories describing interactions between parts of an entangled system are evaluated. It is observed that the most controversial feature of the postulated causal connections is not so much their non-local character as a peculiar type of circularity that affects them.

Synthese•Jan 12, 2017•6 citations

Relativity, Quantum Entanglement, Counterfactuals, and Causation

Luke Fenton-Glynn, Thomas Kroedel

We investigate whether standard counterfactual analyses of causation (CACs) imply that the outcomes of space-like separated measurements on entangled particles are causally related. Although it has sometimes been claimed that standard CACs imply such a causal relation, we argue that a careful examination of David Lewis’s influential counterfactual semantics casts doubt on this. We discuss ways in which Lewis’s semantics and standard CACs might be extended to the case of space-like correlations. 1 Introduction2 Measurement Outcomes and Counterfactual Analyses of Causation3 Lewis’s Analysis 1 of Counterfactuals (‘Asymmetry-by-Fiat’) 3.1 Analysis 1 3.2 A frame-relative reading of Analysis 1 3.3 Frame-invariant readings of Analysis 1 3.4 Discussion4 Lewis’s Analysis 2 of Counterfactuals (‘Closest Worlds’)5 Extending the Everyday Concept of Cause6 Conclusion

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Oct 11, 2013•21 citations

Non-locality and Possible World: A Counterfactual Perspective on Quantum Entanglement

Tomasz Bigaj

This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals) enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis’s famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactual semantics to strengthen Bell’s theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation.

De Gruyter eBooks•Dec 31, 2006•9 citations

Causation

With Fredrik Andersen

This chapter focuses specifically on the notion of causation. Unless a causal interpretation can be given of quantum mechanics, there is a fundamental discontinuity between the quantum realm and everything else in the world. The quantum-theoretical dualism of waves and particles makes the same entity appear both as matter and as force. There are of course challenges to other basic ontological categories that come from quantum physics, such as to notions of continuity and identity. Both in philosophy and physics, there is a frequent assumption that causation is the provider or vehicle of determinism, via causal necessitation. The indeterminism of quantum physics leaves people with a more practical concern about causation. A feature of causation that makes predictions fallible is that causal processes are extremely sensitive to a change in context. The genuine interaction of multiple factors should therefore be seen as a symptom of causation rather than as something that needs to be analysed away by theoretical abstraction.

Routledge eBooks•May 11, 2018•0 citations

Causation

Peter J. Lewis

Abstract What are the consequences of quantum mechanics for the structure of causal explanation? It depends on the interpretation you choose. According to a hidden variable theory like Bohm’s, a measurement on one particle can have instantaneous effects on another, no matter how distant. This nonlocality is in prima facie conflict with special relativity. The prospects for constructing a local hidden variable theory are assessed, in particular by invoking backward-in-time causation. Many-worlds theories do not invoke nonlocal causation. However, they do entail that microcausal explanations are in terms of waves, not particles, and they inject consideration of the observer’s location among the worlds into causal explanations. Spontaneous collapse theories like GRW do invoke nonlocal causation; the prospects for a local spontaneous collapse theory are investigated. All of the major interpretations of quantum mechanics modify the structure of causal explanation from the received classical ideal.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Aug 18, 2016•0 citations

Chapter 5. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIOTEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALS

TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALSne general (and straightforward) observation which can be made based on chapters 3 and 4 is that there is more than one way to employ Lewis's semantic framework for counterfactual conditionals in the analysis of quantum entangled states.The main reason is that, as we indicated at the end of chapter 2, there may be various ways to define the similarity relation between possible worlds, and this relation is indispensable for the evaluation of counterfactual statements.To characterize the relation of similarity it is necessary to decide which facts from the actual world are salient with respect to the affinity of possible worlds with it, and which are not.We have already reiterated (and this assessment is unanimously, if mostly tacitly, accepted by all who make use of Lewis's semantics in quantum mechanics) that in the context of the quantummechanical phenomena there is no room for law-breaking possible worlds; therefore Lewis's requirement that the number of unlawful events ("miracles") be minimized cannot act as a criterion of similarity between possible worlds.Only singular, individual and contingent facts can set one possible world apart from another, and only such facts can be taken into account when comparing possible worlds with respect to their affinity with the actual world.But it has already been argued that not all facts taking place in the actual world should count towards similarity.It is imperative, then, to make clear how to tell apart those facts that count from those that do not. "ASYMMETRY BY FIAT" SOLUTION REVIVEDIt seems evident that two dominant intuitions regarding the evaluation of quantum counterfactuals have emerged from the extensive discussion in the two previous chapters.However, it will be much more convenient to describe them in terms of extensions to one of Lewis's alternative approaches to counterfactuals rather than in terms of the similarity relation.As we recall (sec.2.3.3),Lewis indicates that the problem with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactuals can find its solution not only within his O 1 It should be stressed, however, that some authors question the assumed asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.For example H. Price, who defends the idea of backward causation, argues that when evaluating counterfactuals we should hold fixed not the past of the antecedent-event, but rather what is epistemologically accessible to us (see Price 1996, pp.169-170, 178-179).2 It is a matter of choice whether to include or exclude the surface of the light cones in the respective "pasts" of e.We will follow the convention according to which, in the first case, the surface of the forward light cone is excluded from the past, but in the second case the surface of the backward light cone is included in it.

De Gruyter eBooks•Dec 31, 2006•0 citations
Is time necessary for causation? We argue that, given a counterfactual theory of causation, it is not. We defend this claim by considering cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. These cases involve laws of nature that govern entanglement. These laws make possible the evaluation of causal counterfactuals between space-like separated entangled particles. There is, for the proponent of a counterfactual theory of causation, a possible world in which causation but not time exists that can be reached by "stripping out" time from the actual world, leaving (some) quantum mechanical laws intact.
Abstract The existence of non-local correlations between outcomes of measurements in quantum entangled systems strongly suggests that we are dealing with some form of causation here. An assessment of this conjecture in the context of the collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is the primary goal of this paper. Following the counterfactual approach to causation, I argue that the details of the underlying causal mechanism which could explain the non-local correlations in entangled states strongly depend on the adopted semantics for counterfactuals. Several relativistically-invariant interpretations of spatiotemporal counterfactual conditionals are discussed, and the corresponding causal stories describing interactions between parts of an entangled system are evaluated. It is observed that the most controversial feature of the postulated causal connections is not so much their non-local character as a peculiar type of circularity that affects them.
We investigate whether standard counterfactual analyses of causation (CACs) imply that the outcomes of space-like separated measurements on entangled particles are causally related. Although it has sometimes been claimed that standard CACs imply such a causal relation, we argue that a careful examination of David Lewis’s influential counterfactual semantics casts doubt on this. We discuss ways in which Lewis’s semantics and standard CACs might be extended to the case of space-like correlations. 1 Introduction2 Measurement Outcomes and Counterfactual Analyses of Causation3 Lewis’s Analysis 1 of Counterfactuals (‘Asymmetry-by-Fiat’) 3.1 Analysis 1 3.2 A frame-relative reading of Analysis 1 3.3 Frame-invariant readings of Analysis 1 3.4 Discussion4 Lewis’s Analysis 2 of Counterfactuals (‘Closest Worlds’)5 Extending the Everyday Concept of Cause6 Conclusion
This book uses the formal semantics of counterfactual conditionals to analyze the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics. Counterfactual conditionals (subjunctive conditionals) enter the analysis of quantum entangled systems in that they enable us to precisely formulate the locality condition that purports to exclude the existence of causal interactions between spatially separated parts of a system. They also make it possible to speak consistently about alternative measuring settings, and to explicate what is meant by quantum property attributions. The book develops the possible-world semantics of quantum counterfactuals using David Lewis’s famous approach as a starting point but modifying it significantly in order to achieve compatibility with the demands of the special theory of relativity as well as quantum mechanics. There have been several attempts to use counterfactual semantics to strengthen Bell’s theorem and its cognates such as the GHZ and Hardy theorems. These are critically evaluated in the book. Finally, a counterfactual reconstruction of the EPR argument and Bell’s theorem is proposed that sheds a new light on their philosophical consequences regarding the relations between realism and local causation.
This chapter focuses specifically on the notion of causation. Unless a causal interpretation can be given of quantum mechanics, there is a fundamental discontinuity between the quantum realm and everything else in the world. The quantum-theoretical dualism of waves and particles makes the same entity appear both as matter and as force. There are of course challenges to other basic ontological categories that come from quantum physics, such as to notions of continuity and identity. Both in philosophy and physics, there is a frequent assumption that causation is the provider or vehicle of determinism, via causal necessitation. The indeterminism of quantum physics leaves people with a more practical concern about causation. A feature of causation that makes predictions fallible is that causal processes are extremely sensitive to a change in context. The genuine interaction of multiple factors should therefore be seen as a symptom of causation rather than as something that needs to be analysed away by theoretical abstraction.
Abstract What are the consequences of quantum mechanics for the structure of causal explanation? It depends on the interpretation you choose. According to a hidden variable theory like Bohm’s, a measurement on one particle can have instantaneous effects on another, no matter how distant. This nonlocality is in prima facie conflict with special relativity. The prospects for constructing a local hidden variable theory are assessed, in particular by invoking backward-in-time causation. Many-worlds theories do not invoke nonlocal causation. However, they do entail that microcausal explanations are in terms of waves, not particles, and they inject consideration of the observer’s location among the worlds into causal explanations. Spontaneous collapse theories like GRW do invoke nonlocal causation; the prospects for a local spontaneous collapse theory are investigated. All of the major interpretations of quantum mechanics modify the structure of causal explanation from the received classical ideal.
TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF SPATIO-TEMPORAL COUNTERFACTUALSne general (and straightforward) observation which can be made based on chapters 3 and 4 is that there is more than one way to employ Lewis's semantic framework for counterfactual conditionals in the analysis of quantum entangled states.The main reason is that, as we indicated at the end of chapter 2, there may be various ways to define the similarity relation between possible worlds, and this relation is indispensable for the evaluation of counterfactual statements.To characterize the relation of similarity it is necessary to decide which facts from the actual world are salient with respect to the affinity of possible worlds with it, and which are not.We have already reiterated (and this assessment is unanimously, if mostly tacitly, accepted by all who make use of Lewis's semantics in quantum mechanics) that in the context of the quantummechanical phenomena there is no room for law-breaking possible worlds; therefore Lewis's requirement that the number of unlawful events ("miracles") be minimized cannot act as a criterion of similarity between possible worlds.Only singular, individual and contingent facts can set one possible world apart from another, and only such facts can be taken into account when comparing possible worlds with respect to their affinity with the actual world.But it has already been argued that not all facts taking place in the actual world should count towards similarity.It is imperative, then, to make clear how to tell apart those facts that count from those that do not. "ASYMMETRY BY FIAT" SOLUTION REVIVEDIt seems evident that two dominant intuitions regarding the evaluation of quantum counterfactuals have emerged from the extensive discussion in the two previous chapters.However, it will be much more convenient to describe them in terms of extensions to one of Lewis's alternative approaches to counterfactuals rather than in terms of the similarity relation.As we recall (sec.2.3.3),Lewis indicates that the problem with the temporal asymmetry of counterfactuals can find its solution not only within his O 1 It should be stressed, however, that some authors question the assumed asymmetry of counterfactual dependence.For example H. Price, who defends the idea of backward causation, argues that when evaluating counterfactuals we should hold fixed not the past of the antecedent-event, but rather what is epistemologically accessible to us (see Price 1996, pp.169-170, 178-179).2 It is a matter of choice whether to include or exclude the surface of the light cones in the respective "pasts" of e.We will follow the convention according to which, in the first case, the surface of the forward light cone is excluded from the past, but in the second case the surface of the backward light cone is included in it.