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Series on knots and everything

Quantum Numbers and the Particle

Published Aug 1, 1995• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Comments provided on high energy physics and the particle/quantum number concept from the standpoint regarding the basic interactions of Chapter 7; the particle is the conceptual carrier of a set of quantum numbers; the view of the particle as a Newtonian object with modifications is flawed; an alternative basis for the classification of the quantum numbers due to Noyes is described; it is compared with the Standard Model.

DOI
10.1142/9789812796141_0008

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Comments provided on high energy physics and the particle/quantum number concept from the standpoint regarding the basic interactions of Chapter 7; the particle is the conceptual carrier of a set of quantum numbers; the view of the particle as a Newtonian object with modifications is flawed; an alternative basis for the classification of the quantum numbers due to Noyes is described; it is compared with the Standard Model.
Abstract The basic ideas of particle physics are reviewed, in the detector context, by exploiting several notions introduced in previous chapters. Quantum pictures are regarded as related to parallel transport along the detector with respect to a free-particle connection and a modification obtained by adding a quantum interaction morphism. The quantum interaction is seen to arise by merging the classical interaction with a quantum ‘ingredient’ constituted by a special generalised semi-density on particle momenta.
According to classical physics, particles are basic constituents of the physical world. Quantum theory is much less friendly to particles; in particular, relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) creates serious obstacles for the idea that particles are fundamental. Apparently, when moving from the domain of RQFT to that of classical mechanics (CM), particles have to emerge at some stage. It is standard to assume that this emergence has been completed at the level of quantum mechanics, halfway between RQFT and CM, even though particles of the same kind in many-particle quantum mechanics have the curious feature of being ‘entities without identity’. Against this ‘Received View’ about the nature of quantum particles we outline and defend an Alternative View (AV), in which the emergent character of particles is emphasized. According to this AV, the step to a particle theory has not yet been made in quantum mechanics: conditions have still to be satisfied in order to make the particle concept applicable. If these conditions are met, the quantum particles that emerge are distinguishable individuals possessing physically defined identities, in stark contrast to what the Received View asserts. We will compare and contrast the two Views, both from a physical and a logical/conceptual point of view. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.
Abstract According to classical physics particles are basic building blocks of the world. These classical particles are distinguishable objects, individuated by unique combinations of physical properties. By contrast, in quantum mechanics the received view is that particles of the same kind (“identical particles”) are physically indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This doctrine rests on the quantum mechanical (anti)symmetrization postulates together with the “factorist” assumption that each single particle is represented in exactly one factor space of the tensor product Hilbert space of a many-particle system. Even though standard in theoretical physics and the philosophy of physics, the assumption of factorism and the ensuing indistinguishability of particles are problematic. Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable with the everyday meaning of “particle”, and also with how this term is used in the practice of physics. Moreover, it is a consequence of the standard view that identical quantum particles remain indistinguishable even in the classical limit, which makes a smooth transition to the classical particle concept impossible. Lubberdink (1998; 2009) and Dieks and Lubberdink (2011) have proposed an alternative conception of quantum particles that does not rely on factorism and avoids these difficulties. We further explain and discuss this alternative framework here. One of its key consequences is that particles in quantum theory are not fundamental but emergent; another that once they have emerged, quantum particles are always physically distinguishable and thus possess a physically grounded identity.
The basic concepts of space and time have undergone radical changes in the course of history, which render the Newtonian notions of elementary particles obsolete. This was inherent in the formulations of quantum mechanics, as the zitterbewegung of quantum-mechanical free particles are not the same as that of classical ones. The quantum field theories do not fare any better as particles and the corresponding fields are inseparable concepts. As physical concepts are becoming fuzzy, the definition of what constitutes an experimental "discovery" of an elementary particle is being revised. In these attempts, the quasi-particles, which are simple mathematical conveniences, tend to be reclassified as physical entities. The current model depictions of physical vacuum as superconducting medium do not accommodate a picture of elementary particles as individual entities. It is a situation where interactions and interactants become entangled and description of either one independent of the other is unattainable.
It is widely believed that particles in quantum mechanics are metaphysically strange; they are not individuals (the view of Cassirer 1956), in some sense of the term, and perhaps they are not even objects at all, a suspicion raised by Quine(1976a, 1990). In parallel it is thought that this di¤erence, and especially the status of quantum particles as indistinguishable, accounts for the di¤erence between classical and quantum statistics- a view with long historical credentials. 1 ‘Indistinguishable’here mean permutable; that states of a¤airs di¤ering only in permutations of particles are the same- which, satisfyingly, are described by quantum entanglements, so clearly in a way that is conceptually new. And, indeed, distinguishable particles in quantum mechanics, for which permutations yield distinct states, do obey classical statistics, so there is something to this connection. But it cannot be the whole story if, as I will argue, at least in one notable tradition, classical particle descriptions may also be permutable (so classical
Abstract This chapter presents the theory of quasi-sets, and argues that this offers an appropriate set-theoretic formalism for non-individual quantum objects. The basic idea is that in a quasi-set, there may exist elements for which the traditional concept of identity does not apply — these elements are called the ‘m-atoms’. Thus, a quasi-set may have a cardinal but not an associated ordinal. The other elements can be regarded as standard elements of a set. Hence, the theory encompasses a copy of Zermelo-Frankel set theory with Urelement. A number of alternatives are also presented with a view to possible physical applications, such as allowing the cardinality of a quasi-set to vary in time and thereby accommodating aspects of relativistic quantum theory. The formal framework is also applied to the development of quantum statistics, which can be naturally captured by the theory.