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European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Dutch Books and nonclassical probability spaces

Leszek Wroński, Michał Tomasz Godziszewski

Published Jul 29, 2016• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We investigate how Dutch Book considerations can be conducted in the context of two classes of nonclassical probability spaces used in philosophy of physics. In particular we show that a recent proposal by B. Feintzeig to find so called “generalized probability spaces” which would not be susceptible to a Dutch Book and would not possess a classical extension is doomed to fail. Noting that the particular notion of a nonclassical probability space used by Feintzeig is not the most common employed in philosophy of physics, and that his usage of the “classical” Dutch Book concept is not appropriate in “nonclassical” contexts, we then argue that if we switch to the more frequently used formalism and use the correct notion of a Dutch Book, then all probability spaces are not susceptible to a Dutch Book. We also settle a hypothesis regarding the existence of classical extensions of a class of generalized probability spaces.

DOI
10.1007/s13194-016-0158-9

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We investigate how Dutch Book considerations can be conducted in the context of two classes of nonclassical probability spaces used in philosophy of physics. In particular we show that a recent proposal by B. Feintzeig to find so called “generalized probability spaces” which would not be susceptible to a Dutch Book and would not possess a classical extension is doomed to fail. Noting that the particular notion of a nonclassical probability space used by Feintzeig is not the most common employed in philosophy of physics, and that his usage of the “classical” Dutch Book concept is not appropriate in “nonclassical” contexts, we then argue that if we switch to the more frequently used formalism and use the correct notion of a Dutch Book, then all probability spaces are not susceptible to a Dutch Book. We also settle a hypothesis regarding the existence of classical extensions of a class of generalized probability spaces.
Dutch book arguments have been applied to beliefs about the outcomes of measurements of quantum systems, but not to beliefs about quantum objects prior to measurement. In this paper, we prove a quantum version of the probabilists' Dutch book theorem that applies to both sorts of beliefs: roughly, if ideal beliefs are given by vector states, all and only Born-rule probabilities avoid Dutch books. This theorem and associated results have implications for operational and realist interpretations of the logic of a Hilbert lattice. In the latter case, we show that the defenders of the eigenstate-value orthodoxy face a trilemma. Those who favor vague properties avoid the trilemma, admitting all and only those beliefs about quantum objects that avoid Dutch books.
Through extended consideration of two wide classes of case studies -- dilute gases and linear systems -- I explore the ways in which assumptions of probability and irreversibility occur in contemporary statistical mechanics, where the latter is understood as primarily concerned with the derivation of quantitative higher-level equations of motion, and only derivatively with underpinning the equilibrium concept in thermodynamics. I argue that at least in this wide class of examples, (i) irreversibility is introduced through a reasonably well-defined initial-state condition which does not precisely map onto those in the extant philosophical literature; (ii) probability is explicitly required both in the foundations and in the predictions of the theory. I then consider the same examples, as well as the more general context, in the light of quantum mechanics, and demonstrate that while the analysis of irreversibility is largely unaffected by quantum considerations, the notion of statistical-mechanical probability is entirely reduced to quantum-mechanical probability.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.
Recently, there has been some discussion of how Dutch book arguments might be used to demonstrate the rational incoherence of certain hidden variable models of quantum theory (Feintzeig [2015]; Feintzeig and Fletcher [2017]; Wroński and Godziszewski [2017]). In this paper, we argue that the ‘form of inconsistency’ underlying this alleged irrationality is deeply and comprehensively related to the more familiar ‘inconsistency’ phenomenon of contextuality. Our main result is that the hierarchy of contextuality due to Abramsky and Brandenburger ([2011]) corresponds to a hierarchy of additivity/convexity-violations that yields formal Dutch books of different strengths. We then use this result to provide a partial assessment of whether these formal Dutch books can be given a convincing normative interpretation.
Foundational issues in statistical mechanics and the more general question of how probability is to be understood in the context of physical theories are both areas that have been neglected by philosophers of physics. This book fills an important gap in the literature by providing a most systematic study of how to interpret probabilistic assertions in the context of statistical mechanics. The book explores both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of probability, and takes full measure of work in the foundations of probability theory, in statistical mechanics, and in mathematical theory. It will be of particular interest to philosophers of science, physicists and mathematicians interested in foundational issues, and also to historians of science.
Probability measures can be constructed using the measure-theoretic techniques of Caratheodory and Hausdorff. Under these constructions one obtains first anouter measureover “events” or “propositions.” Then, if one restricts this outer measure to themeasurablepropositions, one finally obtains a classical probability theory. What I argue is that outer measures can also be used to yield the structures of probability theories in quantum mechanics, provided we permit them to range over at least someunmeasurablepropositions. I thereby show that nonclassical probability theories can be seen to arise naturally within the framework of possible worlds semantics.