Representations of quantum operations – We start by introducing a geometrical representation (real vector space) of quantum states and quantum operations. To do so we exploit an isomorphism from positive matrices to a subcone of the Minkowski future light-cone. Pure states map onto certain light-like vectors, whilst the axis of revolution encodes the overall probability of occurrence for the state. This extension of the Generalized Bloch Sphere enables us to cater for non-trace-preserving quantum operations, and in particular to view the per-outcome effects of generalized measurements. We show that these consist of the product of an orthogonal transform about the axis of the cone of revolution and a positive real symmetric linear transform. In the case of a qubit the representation becomes all the more interesting since it elegantly associates, to each measurement element of a generalized measurement, a Lorentz transformation in Minkowski space. We formalize explicitly this correspondence between ‘observation of a quantum system’ and ‘special relativistic change of inertial frame’. To end this part we review the state-operator correspondence, which was successfully exploited by Choi to derive the operator-sum representation of quantum operations. We go further and show that all of the important theorems concerning quantum operations can in fact be derived as simple corollaries of those concerning quantum states. Using this methodology we derive novel composition laws upon quantum states and quantum operations, Schmidt-type decompositions for bipartite pure states and some powerful formulae relating to the correspondence. Quantum cryptography – The key principle of quantum cryptography could be summarized as follows. Honest parties communicate using quantum states. To the eavesdropper these states are random and non-orthogonal. In order to gather information she must measure them, but this may cause irreversible damage. Honest parties seek to detect her mischief by checking whether certain quantum states are left intact. Thus tradeoff between the eavesdropper’s information gain, and the disturbance she necessarily induces, can be viewed as the power engine behind quantum cryptographic protocols. We begin by quantifying this tradeoff in the case of a measure distinguishing two non-orthogonal equiprobable pure states. A formula for this tradeoff was first obtained by Fuchs and Peres, but we provide a shorter, geometrical derivation (within the framework of the above mentioned conal representation). Next we proceed to analyze the Information gain versus disturbance tradeoff in a scenario where Alice and Bob interleave, at random, pairwise superpositions of two message words within their otherwise classical communications. This work constitutes one of the few results currently available regarding d-level systems quantum cryptography, and seems to provide a good general primitive for building such protocols. The proof crucially relies on the state-operator correspondence formulae derived in the first part, together with some methods by Banaszek. Finally we make use of this analysis to prove the security of a ‘blind quantum computation’ protocol, whereby Alice gets Bob to perform some quantum algorithm for her, but prevents him from learning her input to this quantum algorithm.
Representations of quantum operations – We start by introducing a geometrical representation (real vector space) of quantum states and quantum operations. To do so we exploit an isomorphism from positive matrices to a subcone of the Minkowski future light-cone. Pure states map onto certain light-like vectors, whilst the axis of revolution encodes the overall probability of occurrence for the state. This extension of the Generalized Bloch Sphere enables us to cater for non-trace-preserving quantum operations, and in particular to view the per-outcome effects of generalized measurements. We show that these consist of the product of an orthogonal transform about the axis of the cone of revolution and a positive real symmetric linear transform. In the case of a qubit the representation becomes all the more interesting since it elegantly associates, to each measurement element of a generalized measurement, a Lorentz transformation in Minkowski space. We formalize explicitly this correspondence between ‘observation of a quantum system’ and ‘special relativistic change of inertial frame’. To end this part we review the state-operator correspondence, which was successfully exploited by Choi to derive the operator-sum representation of quantum operations. We go further and show that all of the important theorems concerning quantum operations can in fact be derived as simple corollaries of those concerning quantum states. Using this methodology we derive novel composition laws upon quantum states and quantum operations, Schmidt-type decompositions for bipartite pure states and some powerful formulae relating to the correspondence. Quantum cryptography – The key principle of quantum cryptography could be summarized as follows. Honest parties communicate using quantum states. To the eavesdropper these states are random and non-orthogonal. In order to gather information she must measure them, but this may cause irreversible damage. Honest parties seek to detect her mischief by checking whether certain quantum states are left intact. Thus tradeoff between the eavesdropper’s information gain, and the disturbance she necessarily induces, can be viewed as the power engine behind quantum cryptographic protocols. We begin by quantifying this tradeoff in the case of a measure distinguishing two non-orthogonal equiprobable pure states. A formula for this tradeoff was first obtained by Fuchs and Peres, but we provide a shorter, geometrical derivation (within the framework of the above mentioned conal representation). Next we proceed to analyze the Information gain versus disturbance tradeoff in a scenario where Alice and Bob interleave, at random, pairwise superpositions of two message words within their otherwise classical communications. This work constitutes one of the few results currently available regarding d-level systems quantum cryptography, and seems to provide a good general primitive for building such protocols. The proof crucially relies on the state-operator correspondence formulae derived in the first part, together with some methods by Banaszek. Finally we make use of this analysis to prove the security of a ‘blind quantum computation’ protocol, whereby Alice gets Bob to perform some quantum algorithm for her, but prevents him from learning her input to this quantum algorithm.
We represent generalized density matrices of a d-complex dimensional quantum system as a subcone of a real pointed cone of revolution in Rd2, or indeed a Minkowskian cone in ${E}^{{1,d}^{2}\ensuremath{-}1}.$ Generalized pure states correspond to certain future-directed lightlike vectors of ${E}^{{1,d}^{2}\ensuremath{-}1}.$ This extension of the generalized Bloch sphere enables us to cater for non-trace-preserving quantum operations, and in particular to view the per-outcome effects of generalized measurements. We show that these consist of the product of an orthogonal transform about the axis of the cone of revolution and a positive real linear transform. We give detailed formulas for the one-qubit case and express the post-measurement states in terms of the initial-state vectors and measurement vectors. We apply these results in order to find the information gain versus disturbance trade-off in the case of two equiprobable pure states. Thus we recover Fuchs and Peres's formula in an elegant manner.
The counter-intuitive features of Quantum Mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of classical computers and classical communication devices. The area of quantum information processing studies how representing information by quantum states can help achieving such improvements.In this research, we use basic notions of quantum information (mainly entanglement, Bloch sphere, and geometrical distances between quantum states) for analyzing relations of quantum states to each other and quantum cryptographic protocols.Entanglement is an important feature of quantum states. Intuitively (and, partly, inaccurately), entanglement represents quantum (non-classical) correlations between several different quantum systems. Entanglement is one of the most important quantum phenomena, and it has many uses in quantum information, quantum communication, and quantum computing.Some quantum states can be geometrically represented by the Bloch sphere: the unit sphere in the three-dimensional Euclidean space. The "standard" quantum states, to which the laws of Quantum Mechanics directly apply, are called pure states. Other states are the mixed states: probability distributions ("mixtures") of several pure states. The points on the Bloch sphere are the pure states, and those inside the Bloch sphere are the mixed states. This geometrical representation is useful and intuitive for many purposes.We provide a geometrical analysis of entanglement for all the quantum mixed states of rank 2 (all the mixtures of exactly two pure states): for any such state (in any dimension), we define a generalized Bloch sphere by using the two pure states, and we analyze this state and its neighbor states inside this Bloch sphere. We look at the set of non-entangled states ("separable states") in the Bloch sphere and characterize it into exactly five possible classes. We give examples for each class and prove that there are no other classes. In addition, we suggest possible definitions of "entanglement measures" by using the "trace distance" from the nearest separable state.Many types of distances between quantum states can be defined. One of the most useful distances is the trace distance, which bounds the "distinguishability" between the states. The trace distance is very useful in quantum information and quantum cryptography, and it also has a simple geometrical interpretation: it is half of the Euclidean distance between the states in the Bloch sphere.Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols make it possible for two participators to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret random shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited. Several important QKD protocols, including the first protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84), have their unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting. We discuss a slightly different protocol, named "BB84-INFO-z", and prove it secure against a broad class of attacks (the collective attacks). Moreover, we make use of the "trace distance" for making our security proof more "composable" than similar security proofs for BB84: namely, for making a step towards proving that the secret key remains secret even when the two participators actually use it for cryptographic purposes.
We exploit a well-known isomorphism between complex Hermitian 2 × 2 matrices and 4 , which yields a convenient real vector representation of qubit states. Because these do not need to be normalized we find that they map onto a Minkowskian future cone in 1,3 , whose vertical cross-sections are nothing but Bloch spheres. Pure states are represented by light-like vectors, unitary operations correspond to special orthogonal transforms about the axis of the cone, positive operations correspond to pure Lorentz boosts. We formalize the equivalence between the generalized measurement formalism on qubit states and the Lorentz transformations of special relativity, or more precisely elements of the restricted Lorentz group together with future-directed null boosts. The note ends with a discussion of the equivalence and some of its possible consequences.
Cryptographic protocols can be classified by the type of security against eavesdropping which they provide. There exist mathematically secure schemes whose security relies on mathematical proofs (like the Vernam cipher discussed below) or conjectures (like public key RSA encryption) about the complexity of deciphering the message without possessing the correct key. The majority of current secure public Internet connections rely on such schemes. Alternatively, a cryptographic setup may provide a physically secure method for communicating. In these setups the security is provided by the physical laws governing the communication protocol. Here we first discuss a provably secure classical communication protocol and then quantum methods for distributing the necessary keys. The BB84 protocol relies on the impossibility of perfectly distinguishing non-orthogonal quantum states from one copy of the quantum system. The scheme was invented in 1984 and is the first of its kind. In contrast, the Ekert91 protocol makes use of Bell correlations between entangled pairs of photons. These correlations are destroyed when Eve attempts to make a measurement on one of the particles but also when imperfections, such as decoherence processes, affect the scheme. As long as no such “elements of reality” are introduced, and Bell correlations violating local realism can be generated by Alice and Bob, no eavesdropper can be present.
Entanglement is the resource that most sharply distinguishes quantum information processing from its classical counterpart, and this thesis examines it from two complementary directions: how it can be detected and quantified, and how it, together with the broader machinery of quantum correlations, interference, and measurement, can be put to use. We first study two simple, measurable conditions that detect bipartite entanglement, and show that the extent to which either is violated yields a lower bound on the negativity of a state. The bound is established for two qubits, extended to systems of arbitrary finite dimension, and sharpened when partial knowledge of the Schmidt vectors is available. We then turn to discrete-outcome quantum sensor networks, in which one seeks only to determine which detectors, or which group or spatial pattern of detectors, has responded to a signal. Working in the weak-interaction regime, where the output states are nonorthogonal, we use minimum-error and unambiguous state discrimination to show that entangled initial states and collective measurements confer an advantage when detectors are grouped, and we develop a shift-operator formalism that gives closed-form success probabilities for the detection of shifted patterns in one- and two-dimensional arrays. Next we consider the problem of learning two unknown pure qubit states, together with their probabilities of occurrence, from a scrambled stream; we show that receiving the systems in identically prepared pairs supplies exactly the extra quantum information needed, since the resulting two-qubit state in the symmetric subspace has a unique decomposition into pure product states, which we recover by tomography. Finally, we show how interference and measurement can convert information encoded in the phases of quantum amplitudes into information encoded in their magnitudes, amplifying the amplitudes that carry useful information and suppressing those that do not, and we apply this technique to states produced by the quantum approximate optimization algorithm for the MaxCut and minimum-vertex-cover problems. Throughout, a single theme recurs: the correlations and superpositions permitted by quantum mechanics are at once something to be measured and something to be exploited.
The work in this thesis can be divided into three parts. The first two parts deal with optical quantum communication protocols and the third part deals with quantum cryptography. The first part of the thesis is a step towards reformulating quantum protocols in terms of coherent states. Quantum communication protocols are typically formulated in terms of abstract qudit states and operations. This leaves the question of an experimental realization open. Direct translation of these protocols, say into single photons with some d-dimensional degree of freedom, are typically challenging to realize. Multi-mode coherent states, on the other hand, can be easily generated experimentally. Reformulation of protocols in terms of these states has been a successful strategy for implementation of quantum protocols. Quantum key distribution and the quantum fingerprinting protocol have both followed this route. In Chapter 3, we characterize the Gram matrices of multi-mode coherent states in an attempt to understand the class of communication protocols, which can be implemented using these states. We also derive the closure of the Gram matrices, which can be implemented in this way, so that we also characterize those matrices, which can be approximated arbitrarily well using multi-mode coherent states. \n \nIn the second part of the thesis, Chapter 4, we describe our collaboration with an experimental group to implement the quantum fingerprinting protocol and examine the tradeoffs between the resources required to implement such protocols. It is seen that it is difficult to implement the quantum fingerprinting protocol experimentally for large input sizes. This leads us to study the tradeoff between the two resources expended during optically implemented simultaneous message passing communication protocols: the duration of the protocol and the energy required to run it. We derive general bounds on the growth of these quantities which are valid for all optical protocols. We also develop tighter bounds for the growth of these resources for protocols implementing quantum fingerprinting with coherent states. \n \nFinally in Chapter 5, we venture into quantum cryptography. We introduce a new setting for two-party cryptography with temporarily trusted third parties. In this setting, in addition to Alice and Bob, there are third parties, which Alice and Bob both trust to be honest during the course of the protocol. However, once the protocol concludes, there is no guarantee over the behaviour of these third parties. It is possible that they collaborate and act adversarially against the honest parties. We implement a variant of bit commitment in this setting, which we call erasable bit commitment. In this primitive, Alice has the choice of either opening or erasing her commitment after the commit phase. The ability to ask for an erasure allows Alice to ask the trusted nodes to erase her commitment in case the trust period is about to expire. However, this ability also makes erasable bit commitment weaker than the standard version of bit commitment. In addition to satisfying the security requirements of bit commitment, our protocol also does not reveal any information about the commitment to the third parties. Lastly, our protocol for this primitive requires a constant number of trusted third parties and can tolerate a small number of dishonest trusted nodes as well as implementation errors.