Spin is one of the most elusive concepts in physics. It is a property of otherwise indistinguishable particles. Indistinguishability is a classical concept. It implies the existence of a "classical Pauli cell." However, the classical Pauli cell — unlike the quantum Pauli cell — contains not two but only one particle, for classical particles possess no spin, as Pauli stressed. Nevertheless spin arises endophysically — as a property of the "interface" which forms between an observing subsystem and the rest of its Hamiltonian universe, provided the latter is three-dimensional. In a spatially one-dimensional universe, the "micro-time-reversals" in the observer only generate a back-and-forth perturbation in the environment. If the observer is two-dimensional, the micro-time-reversals no longer produce straight perturbations alone. The observer rotates in successive time slices in opposite directions relative to an external particle. The particle therefore performs the opposite rotation, relative to the observer, in the next, time-inverted ("white"), time slice. Nevertheless, the particle seemingly performs the same rotation as in the preceding black (non-time-inverted) time slice, as far as the observer is concerned. For during a white time slice, all external motions are perceived to take place in the opposite direction, as mentioned. Thus all particles always have the same spin in a two-dimensional universe. Two spins arise in three dimensions. A spinning particle now in addition either approaches or recedes from the observer. This makes two otherwise equal particles distinguishable. Since, of particles in random motion, one half approaches and the other half recedes from the observer, they all fall into two different spin classes. More important, two equal particles in adjacent classical Pauli cells tend to have opposite spins. This makes them distinguishable — so that the two now share the combined cell. However, something strange happens during the next time slice: the partner which formerly had the one spin acquires the other and vice versa — the two swap their identities. This is because the direction of external path motions is inverted from one time slice to the next, as mentioned. The two particles become maximally correlated. "Endo" Pauli cells having two correlated occupants therefore exist classically. If the same fact held good in the real world, "most" properties of atoms and molecules (Kossel pairs) and superfluids (Cooper pairs) would be nonexistent exophysically. It would be correct to say: Endochemistry is different from exochemistry.
Spin is one of the most elusive concepts in physics. It is a property of otherwise indistinguishable particles. Indistinguishability is a classical concept. It implies the existence of a "classical Pauli cell." However, the classical Pauli cell — unlike the quantum Pauli cell — contains not two but only one particle, for classical particles possess no spin, as Pauli stressed. Nevertheless spin arises endophysically — as a property of the "interface" which forms between an observing subsystem and the rest of its Hamiltonian universe, provided the latter is three-dimensional. In a spatially one-dimensional universe, the "micro-time-reversals" in the observer only generate a back-and-forth perturbation in the environment. If the observer is two-dimensional, the micro-time-reversals no longer produce straight perturbations alone. The observer rotates in successive time slices in opposite directions relative to an external particle. The particle therefore performs the opposite rotation, relative to the observer, in the next, time-inverted ("white"), time slice. Nevertheless, the particle seemingly performs the same rotation as in the preceding black (non-time-inverted) time slice, as far as the observer is concerned. For during a white time slice, all external motions are perceived to take place in the opposite direction, as mentioned. Thus all particles always have the same spin in a two-dimensional universe. Two spins arise in three dimensions. A spinning particle now in addition either approaches or recedes from the observer. This makes two otherwise equal particles distinguishable. Since, of particles in random motion, one half approaches and the other half recedes from the observer, they all fall into two different spin classes. More important, two equal particles in adjacent classical Pauli cells tend to have opposite spins. This makes them distinguishable — so that the two now share the combined cell. However, something strange happens during the next time slice: the partner which formerly had the one spin acquires the other and vice versa — the two swap their identities. This is because the direction of external path motions is inverted from one time slice to the next, as mentioned. The two particles become maximally correlated. "Endo" Pauli cells having two correlated occupants therefore exist classically. If the same fact held good in the real world, "most" properties of atoms and molecules (Kossel pairs) and superfluids (Cooper pairs) would be nonexistent exophysically. It would be correct to say: Endochemistry is different from exochemistry.
As part of a probabilistic reconstruction of quantum theory (QT), we show that spin is not a purely quantum mechanical phenomenon, as has long been assumed. Rather, this phenomenon occurs before the transition to QT takes place, namely in the area of the quasi-classical (here better quasi-quantum) theory. This borderland between classical physics and QT can be reached within the framework of our reconstruction by the replacement p→M(q,t), where p is the momentum variable of the particle and M(q,t) is the momentum field in configuration space. The occurrence of spin, and its special value 1/2 , is a consequence of the fact that M(q,t) must have exactly three independent components Mk(q,t) for a single particle because of the three-dimensionality of space. In the Schrödinger equation for a "particle with spin zero", the momentum field is usually represented as a gradient of a single function S. This implies dependencies between the components Mk(q,t) for which no explanation exists. In reality, M(q,t) needs to be represented by three functions, two of which are rotational degrees of freedom. The latter are responsible for the existence of spin. All massive structureless particles in nature must therefore be spin-one-half particles, simply because they have to be described by 4 real fields, one of which has the physical meaning of a probability density, while the other three are required to represent the momentum field in three-dimensional space. We derive the Pauli-Schrödinger equation, the correct value g=2 of the gyromagnetic ratio, the classical limit of the Pauli-Schrödinger equation, and clarify some other open questions in the borderland between classical physics and QT.
Quantum mechanics is usually defined in terms of some loosely connected axioms and rules. Such a foundation is far from the beauty of, e.g., the `principles' underlying classical mechanics. Motivated, in addition, by notorious interpretation problems, there have been numerous attempts to modify or `complete' quantum mechanics. A first attempt was based on so-called hidden variables; its proponents essentially tried to expel the non-classical nature of quantum mechanics. More recent proposals intend to complete quantum mechanics not within mechanics proper but on a `higher (synthetic) level'; by means of a combination with gravitation theory (R Penrose), with quantum information theory (C M Caves, C A Fuchs) or with psychology and brain science (H P Stapp). I think it is fair to say that in each case the combination is with a subject that, per se , suffers from a very limited understanding that is even more severe than that of quantum mechanics. This was acceptable, though, if it could convincingly be argued that scientific progress desperately needs to join forces. Quantum mechanics of a closed system was a beautiful and well understood theory with its respective state being presented as a point on a deterministic trajectory in Liouville space---not unlike the motion of a classical N -particle system in its 6N -dimensional phase-space. Unfortunately, we need an inside and an outside view, we need an external reference frame, we need an observer. This unavoidable partition is the origin of most of the troubles we have with quantum mechanics. A pragmatic solution is introduced in the form of so-called measurement postulates: one of the various incompatible properties of the system under consideration is supposed to be realized (i.e. to become a fact, to be defined without fundamental dispersion) based on `instantaneous' projections within some externally selected measurement basis. As a result, the theory becomes essentially statistical rather than deterministic; furthermore there is an asymmetry between the observed and the observing. This is the point where consciousness may come in. Complemented by an introduction and several appendices, Henry Stapp's book consists essentially of three parts: theory, implications, and new developments. The theory part gives a very readable account of the Copenhagen interpretation, some aspects of a psychophysical theory, and, eventually, hints towards a quantum foundation of the brain--mind connection. The next part, `implications', summarizes some previous attempts to bridge the gap between the working rules of quantum mechanics and their possible consequences for our understanding of this world (Pauli, Everett, Bohm, Heisenberg). The last section, `new developments', dwells on some ideas about the conscious brain and its possible foundation on quantum mechanics. The book is an interesting and, in part, fascinating contribution to a field that continues to be a companion to `practical' quantum mechanics since its very beginning. It is doubtful whether such types of `quantum ontologies' will ever become (empirically) testable; right now one can hardly expect more than to be offered some consistent `grand picture', which the reader may find more or less acceptable or even rewarding. Many practicing quantum physicists, though, will remain unimpressed. The shift from synthetic ontology to analytic ontology is the foundation of the present work. This means that fundamental wholes are being partitioned into their ontologically subordinate components by means of `events'. The actual event, in turn, is an abrupt change in the Heisenberg state describing the quantum universe. The new state then defines the tendencies associated with the next actual event. To avoid infinite regression in terms of going from one state of tendencies to the next, consciousness is there to give these events a special `feel', to provide a status of `intrinsic actuality'. The brain of an alert human observer is similar in an important way to a quantum detection device: it can amplify small signals to large macroscopic effects. On the other hand, actual events are not postulated to occur exclusively in brains. They are more generally associated with the formation of records. Records are necessarily part of the total state of the universe: it is obvious that the state of the universe cannot undergo a Schrödinger dynamics and at the same time record its own history. `The full universe consists therefore of an exceedingly thin veneer of relatively sluggish, directly observable properties resting on a vast ocean or rapidly fluctuating unobservable ones.' The present ideas also bear on how the world should be seen to develop. While conventional cosmology encounters problems as to how to define the intial conditions, which would enter the governing equations of motion, here `the boundary conditions are set not at some initial time, but gradually by a sequence of acts that imposes a sequence of constraints. After any sequence of acts there remains a collection of possible worlds, some of which will be eliminated by the next act.' Connected with those acts is `meaning': there has always been some speculation about the special significance of local properties in our understanding of the world. One could argue that correlations (even the quantum correlations found, e.g., in the EPR-experiments) were as real as anything else. But also Stapp stresses the special role of locality: the `local observable properties, or properties similar to them are the natural, and perhaps exclusive, carriers of meaning in the quantum universe. From this point of view the quantum universe tends to create meaning.' This sounds like an absolute concept: meaning not with respect to something else, but defined intrinsically---not easy to digest. The role of consciousness in the developing quantum universe requires more attention. `The causal irrelevance of our thoughts within classical physics constitutes a serious deficiency of that theory, construed as a description of reality.' This is taken to be entirely different within quantum mechanics. `The core idea of quantum mechanics is to describe our activities as knowledge-seeking and knowledge-using agents.' `21st century science does not reduce human beings to mechanical automata. Rather it elevates human beings to agents whose free choices can, according to the known laws, actually influence their behaviour.' An example with respect to perception is discussed: `Why, when we look at a triangle, do we experience three lines joined at three points and not some pattern of neuron firings?' The brain `does not convert an actual whole triangle into some jumbled set of particle motions; rather it converts a concatenation of separate external events into the actualization of some single integrated pattern of neural activity that is congruent to the perceived whole triangle.' How convincing is this proposal? It is hard to tell. I think Henry Stapp did a good job, but there are tight limitations to any such endeavour. Quantum mechanics is often strange indeed, but it also gives rise to our classical world around us. For the emergence of classicality jumps and measurement projections (the basic phenomena connected with those fundamental events of choice) are not needed. Therefore, I doubt whether the explanation of the evolution of our world really allows (or requires) that much free choice. On the other hand, most scientist will agree that empirical science was not possible without free will: we could not ask independent questions if this asking was part of a deterministic trajectory. The fact that the result of a quantum measurement is indeterminate (within given probabilities) does certainly not explain free will. How about the type of measurment? The experimentalist will have to assume that he can select the pertinent observable within some limits. But given a certain design the so-called pointer basis (producing stable measurement results) is no longer a matter of free choice. `The main theme of classical physics is that we live in a clocklike universe.' Today it is often assumed that the universe was a big (quantum-) computer or a cellular automaton. Many would be all too happy to leave that rather restrictive picture behind. But where to go? Stapp suggests giving consciousness a prominent role: `The most profound alteration of the fundamental principles was to bring consciousness of human beings into the basic structure of the physical theory.' How far we are able to go in this direction will depend on the amount of concrete research results becoming available to support this view.
Spin, still a concept or property not fully exploited, has already impacted the world in many ways with its many applications. The history of how spin came to light and how it was interpreted and developed as investigations were conducted is of particular interest with the many odd outcomes of experiments concerning this intrinsic property. This article will sort out the historical outline of how spin was first indicated in theories and how it was eventually embraced as a fundamental property of quantum particles in an attempt to holistically review the process of recognition of this remarkable concept. Through this review, it becomes apparent how the recognition and development of a concept involves the intellect of a broad range of physicists who are willing to view things from both classical and quantum perspectives particularly when it comes to new concepts as spin. How elements like luck and chance play a role will also be revealed. As it turns out, our intuitions about the world around us may not be the ultimate truth, especially when it comes to Quantum Mechanics. Space Quantization was once thought of as no more than a theoretical outcome, however, experiments anyway impose this reality on physicists requiring them to abandon stubborn biases. Admittedly, not every speculation was correct, the analogy of “Spin” was an unfortunate one. But this article shows that this is just how understanding the mysteries of the quantum world really unfolds.
An objective physics must keep the observer at bay. The goal of keeping the observer outside can, paradoxically, be achieved only if the observer is explicitly included in a larger picture — which then is observer-independent again. When proceeding in this way, one realizes that the world is necessarily defined only on the interface between the observer and the rest of the universe. Since this interface is inaccessible as an object, there seems to be no solution left for internal observers like us. We cannot step out of our own world in order to adopt the role of a "superobserver." Hence we cannot understand the world. Unexpectedly, there is a loophole: "model universes" can be set up which contain an explicit (microscopically specified) internal observer. As an example, it is possible to set up a classical molecular dynamics simulation of an excitable system which would act as a simplified "observer" in a larger artificial universe simulated in the same manner. One then, in addition to the observer, needs a "measuring apparatus" and an "object." The former could be a fluidic amplifier that acts like a power brake; the latter could be an ordinary particle in the universe in question that acts on the input piston of the pressure amplifier. (Three "reservoirs" would also be needed as an initial condition: "food" for the observer, a high pressure compartment to power the amplifier, and a set of "cool" particles allowing one to keep the first amplifier of the measuring chain sensitive for a while.) In such a scenario, the "interface" can be studied by us since we are on the outside. While it is still too early to do this explicitly in detail, it perhaps already makes sense to think about it and look at simplified cases. We may for example assume that all micromotions in the observer fall into two equivalence classes — backward and forward motion — that are pairwise identical under time reversal. This would occur, for example, if the observer consisted of many equal pendulums of the same period. Such an idealization is admissible for starters. Then, while in reality it is the observer who alternates between black and white time slices — in the sense that every motion in the observer repeats itself in the opposite direction — to the observer it is the rest of the universe which alternates between being time-inverted or not. That is, relative to the observer, the external reality is subject to a succession of rapid causality reversals. This impression will be incorrigible. The incorrigibility goes so far that even macroscopic records cannot correct for the "hallucinatory" impressions generated in the internal observer by the behavior of a micro-object. This is counterintuitive. At first sight there is no reason apparent why an "objectively presenting machinery" should not be able to overcome the limitation. However, a causality vacillation is "too deep" a property of the interface to be overridden by any auxiliary machinery in the universe in question. From this fact it follows that many objective features of the world (including macroscopic ones) which appear on the interface are only "observer-objective" but not really (exo) objective. Collectively, these properties form a set undetectable to the observer since the fact that they exist only for him is nowhere represented. In the absence of a "tag" they represent what could be called the "Kafkaesque part of physics." A cure for this disability is impossible to obtain from the inside of the universe in question. Nevertheless the inhabitants can embark on an endophysical program of their own in principle — if we assume they are sophisticated enough on the macro level (consisting, for example, of many excitable systems as an advanced neuronal network). That is, they can build a still lower level universe themselves. Endophysics therefore becomes "level invariant" science. In this way the inhabitants can begin to doubt the exo-objective nature of certain phenomena. In particular, "observer-centered" phenomena are likely to kindle their suspicion. Does it make sense in our own world to mark observer-centered phenomena with an "exophysical question mark" as well? At least five types of phenomena in our own world are "observer-centered." They each arise from a privilege, viz.: • Bohr's privilege ("Which reality am I to create by deciding to measure either the position or the momentum?") • Heisenberg's privilege ("Where in the chain am I to place the cut?") • Wheeler's privilege. ("For how long am I to wait before choosing what to measure?") • Bell's privilege ("Which nonlocal correlations at a distance am I to generate?") • Everett's privilege ("What choice of world am I happy with?") Analogs of all these suspicion-generating privileges exist in the model universe. The possibility of doing "meta-experiments" (as one would advise the inhabitants of the lower world to perform) therefore arises as an option for the inhabitants — as well as us. A glimpse of what lies behind the curtain is therefore accessible in principle, it appears.
According to the prevailing belief, the spin of the electron or of some other particle is a mysterious internal angular momentum for which no concrete physical picture is available, and for which there is no classical analog. However, on the basis of an old calculation by Belinfante [Physica 6, 887 (1939)], it can be shown that the spin may be regarded as an angular momentum generated by a circulating flow of energy in the wave field of the electron. Likewise, the magnetic moment may be regarded as generated by a circulating flow of charge in the wave field. This provides an intuitively appealing picture and establishes that neither the spin nor the magnetic moment are ‘‘internal’’—they are not associated with the internal structure of the electron, but rather with the structure of its wave field. Furthermore, a comparison between calculations of angular momentum in the Dirac and electromagnetic fields shows that the spin of the electron is entirely analogous to the angular momentum carried by a classical circularly polarized wave.
Like a virtual reality lacking an escape button, the world can be studied only from within. Nevertheless, lower level worlds can be built in which the "interface" between an explicit observer and the rest of the universe can be scrutinized. The interface depends sensitively on microscopic assignment conditions ("which particle belongs to the observer, which to the rest"). Furthermore, the successive distorted interfaces (observer-relative worlds) are neither constant nor intertransformable. They form an "objective reality of the subjective type." An example is an advanced classical molecular dynamics simulation of the future. Here an excitable subsystem (fluid neuron) is the "observer," a cooled fluidic amplifier the "measuring chain" and a microparticle the "object." Unexpectedly, knowledge of the macrostate of the observer and the "pointer" of the measuring chain is insufficient for predicting the reality on the interface. This can be seen best from a simplified case. The observer is a collection of pendulums of equal periods (T) and equal phases, but with the signs of the phases randomly different. All motions in the rest of the universe then acquire a "zigzag" character relative to the observer. The resulting distortion of the world depends on a further parameter, the thermal noise energy of the observer (E). After every micro-time-reversal T, this energy is imposed on the object through the measuring chain, which then acts in the other direction. Bohr's example of the blind man's cane is re-encountered: it is impossible to simultaneously get a tactile sensation of an object by means of a cane and feel the end of the cane as it is held in one's hand. Similarly, the high-mass pointer on the measuring apparatus can only mediate the distorted behavior of the micro-object in a "frozen" fashion. Both the zigzag and its frozen representation are only a mirage. In the next interface valid at the next moment in time, both are different. However, the difference is nowhere represented — so it does not exist, in the mirage. Nevertheless, an empirical "unmasking" is possible within the model universe. Analogous "blind-sight experiments" can be performed on our own level. Therefore it will be possible to find out whether the real world too is only an interface reality — a mirage.