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Cambridge University Press eBooks

Reichenbachian common cause systems

Gábor Hofer‐Szabó, Miklós Rédei, László E. Szabó

Published May 16, 2013• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Confronted with a common cause incomplete probability space (X, S, p)in which a direct causal influence between the correlated events is excluded, one can have in principle two strategies aiming at saving the Common Cause Principle: one may try to argue that S is not “rich enough” to contain a common cause, but there might exist a larger probability space (X′, S′, p′) that already contains a common cause of the correlation. As we have seen in Chapter 3 this strategy always works in the sense that it is always possible to enlarge (X, S, p) in such a way that the enlarged probability space already contains an event C that satisfies the Reichenbachian conditions.

DOI
10.1017/cbo9781139094344.008

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2 Screening Off and Explanation: Formal Properties

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Arguably, the most important feature of Reichenbach-style common causes is that they screen o their e ects.In this chapter we will consider a few constructions based on this idea which extend, or transform, Reichenbach's original notion.A part of the literature refers to events de ned as meeting Reichenbach's conjunctive fork conditions as ("Reichenbachian") "common causes"; see e.g.Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2004).Hofer-Szabó et al. (2000) and Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2006) even go so far as to state that Reichenbach himself de ned common causes as the middle elements of conjunctive forks with correlated extreme elements; in other words, that ful lling the statistical requirements for being the middle element of a conjunctive fork is su cient to be a common cause for the correlated events.Due to the reasons already presented in section 1.3 we are reluctant to adhere to this tradition.Nevertheless, the main results of this work (see chapter 5) pertain to problems posed in various papers by the above-cited authors.Therefore, some slight terminological changes are in order. De nition 9 [Statistical CommonCause] Let Ω, F, P be a probability space.Let A, B ∈ F. If there exists C ∈ F di erent from both A and B such that P(AB | C) = P(A | C)P(B | C); P(AB | C ⊥ ) = P(A | C ⊥ )P(B | C ⊥ ); P(A | C) > P(A | C ⊥ ); P(B | C) > P(B | C ⊥ ), then C is called a statistical common cause of A and B.

•Aug 19, 2014•0 citations
Confronted with a common cause incomplete probability space (X, S, p)in which a direct causal influence between the correlated events is excluded, one can have in principle two strategies aiming at saving the Common Cause Principle: one may try to argue that S is not “rich enough” to contain a common cause, but there might exist a larger probability space (X′, S′, p′) that already contains a common cause of the correlation. As we have seen in Chapter 3 this strategy always works in the sense that it is always possible to enlarge (X, S, p) in such a way that the enlarged probability space already contains an event C that satisfies the Reichenbachian conditions.
A condition is formulated in terms of the probabilities of two pairs of correlated events in a classical probability space which is necessary for the two correlations to have a single (Reichenbachian) common-cause and it is shown that there exists pairs of correlated events, probabilities of which violate the necessary condition. It is concluded that different correlations do not in general have a common common-cause. It is also shown that this conclusion remains valid even if one weakens slightly Reichenbach's definition of common-cause. The significance of the difference between common-causes and common common-causes is emphasized from the perspective of Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.
Causal closedness and common cause closedness Assuming that Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is valid, one is led to the question of whether our probabilistic theories predicting probabilistic correlations can be causally rich enough to also contain the causes of all the correlations they predict. The aim of this chapter is to formulate precisely and investigate this question. According to the Common Cause Principle, causal richness of a theory T would manifest in T 's being causally closed (complete) in the sense of being capable of explaining the correlations by containing a common cause of every correlation between causally independent events A, B . This feature of a theory is formulated in the next two definitions of causal closedness. In both definitions ( X, S, p )is a probability space and R ind is a two-place causal independence relation that is assumed to have been defined between elements of S . We treat the relation R ind as a variable in the problem of causal closedness; hence, at this point we leave open what properties R ind should have to be acceptable as a causal independence relation – later we will return to the issue of how to specify it. Definition 4.1 The probability space ( X, S, p ) is called causally closed with respect to R ind , if for every correlation Corr p ( A, B ) > 0 with A ϵ S and B ϵ S such that R ind ( A, B ) holds, there exists a common cause C of some type in S .
Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is the claim that if two events are correlated, then either there is a causal connection between the correlated events that is responsible for the correlation or there is a third event, a so called (Reichenbachian) common cause, which brings about the correlation. The paper reviews some results concerning Reichenbach's notion of common cause, results that are directly relevant to the problem of how one can falsifY Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle. Special emphasis will be put on the question of whether EPR-type correlations can have an explanation in terms of Reichenbachian common causes. Most of the results to be recalled indicate that falsifYing Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle is much more tricky than one may have thought and that, contrary to some claims in the literature, there is no conclusive proof yet that the EPR correlations predicted by ordinary, non-relativistic quantum mechanics cannot have a common cause; furthermore, recent results about possible Reichenbachian common causes of correlations predicted by quantum field states between spacelike separated local observable algebras in algebraic quantum field theory strongly indicate that there may very well exist Reichenbachian common causes of superluminal correlations predicted by quantum field theory.
It is shown that, given any finite set of pairs of random events in a Boolean algebra which are correlated with respect to a fixed probability measure on the algebra, the algebra can be extended in such a way that the extension contains events that can be regarded as common causes of the correlations in the sense of Reichenbach's definition of common cause. It is shown, further, that, given any quantum probability space and any set of commuting events in it which are correlated with respect to a fixed quantum state, the quantum probability space can be extended in such a way that the extension contains common causes of all the selected correlations, where common cause is again taken in the sense of Reichenbachs definition. It is argued that these results very strongly restrict the possible ways of disproving Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle.
In principle, there are two ways to interpret Reichenbach's Common Cause Principle in general, each determined by how one views the status of the Principle with respect to the conditions of its validity: the Principle can be viewed as a falsifiable or a nonfalsifiable principle. In the falsificationist interpretation, the Common Cause Principle is a claim that can possibly and conclusively be shown not to hold for some empirically given events and their correlations; in the nonfalsificationaist interpretation, the Common Cause Principle cannot be falsified conclusively – whatever the actual circumstances. Is the Common Cause Principle falsifiable or nonfalsifiable?
Arguably, the most important feature of Reichenbach-style common causes is that they screen o their e ects.In this chapter we will consider a few constructions based on this idea which extend, or transform, Reichenbach's original notion.A part of the literature refers to events de ned as meeting Reichenbach's conjunctive fork conditions as ("Reichenbachian") "common causes"; see e.g.Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2004).Hofer-Szabó et al. (2000) and Hofer-Szabó and Rédei (2006) even go so far as to state that Reichenbach himself de ned common causes as the middle elements of conjunctive forks with correlated extreme elements; in other words, that ful lling the statistical requirements for being the middle element of a conjunctive fork is su cient to be a common cause for the correlated events.Due to the reasons already presented in section 1.3 we are reluctant to adhere to this tradition.Nevertheless, the main results of this work (see chapter 5) pertain to problems posed in various papers by the above-cited authors.Therefore, some slight terminological changes are in order. De nition 9 [Statistical CommonCause] Let Ω, F, P be a probability space.Let A, B ∈ F. If there exists C ∈ F di erent from both A and B such that P(AB | C) = P(A | C)P(B | C); P(AB | C ⊥ ) = P(A | C ⊥ )P(B | C ⊥ ); P(A | C) > P(A | C ⊥ ); P(B | C) > P(B | C ⊥ ), then C is called a statistical common cause of A and B.