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Multi-party computation from any linear secret sharing scheme secure against adaptive adversary : the zero-error case

Ventzislav Nikov, Svetla Nikova⋆, Bart Preneel

Published Jan 1, 2003• 4 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

We use a general treatment of both information-theoretic and cryptographic settings for Multi-Party Computation (MPC), based on the underlying linear secret sharing scheme. Our goal is to study the Monotone Span Program (MSP), which is the result of local multiplication of shares distributed by two given MSPs as well as the access structure that this resulting MSP computes. First, we expand the construction proposed by Cramer et al. multiplying two different general access structures and we prove some properties of the resulting MSP M. Next we expand the definition of multiplicative MSPs and we prove that when one uses dual MSPs only all players together can compute the product, i.e., the construction proposed by Cramer et al. gives only multiplicative MPC. Third, we propose a solution for the strongly multiplicative MPC (in presence of adversary). The knowledge of the resulting MSP and the access structure it computes allows us to build an analog of the algebraic simplification protocol of Gennaro et al. We show how to achieve in the computational model MPC secure against adaptive adversary in the zero-error case, through the application of homomorphic commitments. There is an open problem how efficiently we can determine Γ the access structure of the resulting MSP M. This open problem reflects negatively on the efficiency of the proposed solution.

Related papers

Span Programs and General Secure Multi-Party Computation

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The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, as an abstraction of previously proposed cryptographic protocols we propose two cryptographic primitives: homomorphic shared commitments and linear secret sharing schemes with an additional multiplication property. We describe new constructions for general secure multi-party computation protocols, both in the cryptographic and the information-theoretic (or secure channels) setting, based on any realizations of these primitives. Second, span programs, a model of computation introduced by Karchmer and Wigderson, are used as the basis for constructing new linear secret sharing schemes, from which the two above-mentioned primitives as well as a novel verifiable secret sharing scheme can efficiently be realized. Third, note that linear secret sharing schemes can have arbitrary (as opposed to threshold) access structures. If used in our construction, this yields multi-party protocols secure against general sets of active adversaries, as long as in the cryptographic (information-theoretic) model no two (no three) of these potentially misbehaving player sets cover the full player set. This is a strict generalization of the threshold-type adversaries and results previously considered in the literature. While this result is new for the cryptographic model, the result for the information-theoretic model was previously proved by Hirt and Maurer. However, in addition to providing an independent proof, our protocols are not recursive and have the potential of being more efficient.

BRICS Report Series•Jan 28, 1997•17 citations

On the Complexity of Verifiable Secret Sharing and Multi-Party Computation.

Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damgård, Stefan Dziembowski

We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure. We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure. In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players. For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes. We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does not hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given blac...

•Jan 1, 2000•4 citations

Efficient Construction of Secure Multiparty Computation Realizing Practical Functionality

礼央 江利口

Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for a set of players to interactively compute a function without revealing their private inputs.MPC is of theoretical and practical importance due to its many interesting applications including voting, sealed-bid auctions and privacy-preserving machine learning.It has been an active research area in cryptography and many different approaches have been proposed to enhance security, functionality and efficiency in the literature.In particular, there are general constructions proving the existence of MPC for arbitrary functions under a set of desirable security notions.However, these general results do not give a satisfactory solution to constructing concrete protocols that are efficient enough to use in practice.It is therefore more effective to give concrete and efficient constructions of MPC protocols tailored to specific functionalities and security notions required in practical applications.In this thesis, we study different approaches to realize efficient MPC for functionalities of practical importance with enhanced security notions including non-threshold adversary structures and malicious security.We attain improvement in communication and round complexity by focusing on specific classes of functions or limited but still non-threshold adversary structures.The main contributions of this thesis consist of five parts, which concern the following specific MPC tasks: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) for symmetric functions and linear classifiers, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for low-degree polynomials, verifiably multiplicative secret sharing (VMSS), private information retrieval (PIR), and distributed noise generation for differential privacy.Concretely, we first propose efficient constructions of NIMPC protocols tailored to symmetric functions and linear classifiers.Our protocols improve the best-known communication complexity of existing protocols.In addition, we reveal that a previously proposed method to enhance security of NIMPC does not satisfy specified security requirements and we also fix the problem.Secondly, we propose constructions of HSS schemes that tolerate multipartite and general adversary structures assuming homomorphic encryption.Our schemes support parallel evaluation of a single low-degree polynomial and hence achieve better communication complexity than if we simply execute the previous HSS schemes in parallel.Thirdly, we present VMSS schemes tolerating multipartite adversary structures.Our schemes have smaller communication complexity than those obtained from the previous constructions applicable to general adversary structures.In the fourth part, we study the optimal communication complexity of error-correcting PIR.We asymptotically characterize it as a function of the database size and as a corollary, obtain more communication-efficient error-correcting PIR schemes than the previous ones.Finally, we provide three kinds of MPC protocols for generating noise drawn from probability distributions providing differential privacy.We improve the round or communication complexity of the previous protocols for distributed noise generation.We also extend our protocols so that they provide differential privacy against malicious adversaries.

•Mar 23, 2023•0 citations

On the complexity of verifiable secret sharing and multiparty computation

Ronald Cramer, Ivan Damgård, Stefan Dziembowski

We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure.We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure.In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players.For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary.Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes.We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does hot hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given black-box access for free to an idealized secret sharing scheme secure for the access structure in question, it is not possible to handle all relevant access structures efficiently, not even if the adversary is passive and static.In other words, general MPC can only be black-box reduced efficiently to secret sharing if extra properties of the secret sharing scheme used (such as linearity) are assumed.

ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)•May 1, 2000•52 citations

Multiparty Computations Information-Theoretically Secure Against an Adaptive Adversary

Stefan Dziembowski

In this thesis we study a problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) and Multiparty Computations (MPC) in a model where private channels between the players and a broadcast channel is available. The adversary is active, adaptive and has an unbounded computing power. The thesis is based on two papers [CDD00, CDD 99]. In [CDD00] we assume that the adversary can corrupt any set from a given adversary structure. In this setting we study a problem of doing efficient VSS and MPC given an access to a secret sharing scheme (SS). For all adversary structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes. We then show

•Jan 1, 2002•0 citations

Multiparty computation unconditionally secure against Q^2 adversary structures

Adam Smith, Anton Štiglić

We present here a generalization of the work done by Rabin and Ben-Or. We give a protocol for multiparty computation which tolerates any Q^2 active adversary structure based on the existence of a broadcast channel, secure communication between each pair of participants, and a monotone span program with multiplication tolerating the structure. The secrecy achieved is unconditional although we allow an exponentially small probability of error. This is possible due to a protocol for computing the product of two values already shared by means of a homomorphic commitment scheme which appeared originally in a paper of Chaum, Evertse and van de Graaf.

arXiv:cs/9902010•Feb 8, 1999•8 citations
We use a general treatment of both information-theoretic and cryptographic settings for Multi-Party Computation (MPC), based on the underlying linear secret sharing scheme. Our goal is to study the Monotone Span Program (MSP), which is the result of local multiplication of shares distributed by two given MSPs as well as the access structure that this resulting MSP computes. First, we expand the construction proposed by Cramer et al. multiplying two different general access structures and we prove some properties of the resulting MSP M. Next we expand the definition of multiplicative MSPs and we prove that when one uses dual MSPs only all players together can compute the product, i.e., the construction proposed by Cramer et al. gives only multiplicative MPC. Third, we propose a solution for the strongly multiplicative MPC (in presence of adversary). The knowledge of the resulting MSP and the access structure it computes allows us to build an analog of the algebraic simplification protocol of Gennaro et al. We show how to achieve in the computational model MPC secure against adaptive adversary in the zero-error case, through the application of homomorphic commitments. There is an open problem how efficiently we can determine Γ the access structure of the resulting MSP M. This open problem reflects negatively on the efficiency of the proposed solution.
The contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, as an abstraction of previously proposed cryptographic protocols we propose two cryptographic primitives: homomorphic shared commitments and linear secret sharing schemes with an additional multiplication property. We describe new constructions for general secure multi-party computation protocols, both in the cryptographic and the information-theoretic (or secure channels) setting, based on any realizations of these primitives. Second, span programs, a model of computation introduced by Karchmer and Wigderson, are used as the basis for constructing new linear secret sharing schemes, from which the two above-mentioned primitives as well as a novel verifiable secret sharing scheme can efficiently be realized. Third, note that linear secret sharing schemes can have arbitrary (as opposed to threshold) access structures. If used in our construction, this yields multi-party protocols secure against general sets of active adversaries, as long as in the cryptographic (information-theoretic) model no two (no three) of these potentially misbehaving player sets cover the full player set. This is a strict generalization of the threshold-type adversaries and results previously considered in the literature. While this result is new for the cryptographic model, the result for the information-theoretic model was previously proved by Hirt and Maurer. However, in addition to providing an independent proof, our protocols are not recursive and have the potential of being more efficient.
We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure. We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure. In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players. For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes. We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does not hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given blac...
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for a set of players to interactively compute a function without revealing their private inputs.MPC is of theoretical and practical importance due to its many interesting applications including voting, sealed-bid auctions and privacy-preserving machine learning.It has been an active research area in cryptography and many different approaches have been proposed to enhance security, functionality and efficiency in the literature.In particular, there are general constructions proving the existence of MPC for arbitrary functions under a set of desirable security notions.However, these general results do not give a satisfactory solution to constructing concrete protocols that are efficient enough to use in practice.It is therefore more effective to give concrete and efficient constructions of MPC protocols tailored to specific functionalities and security notions required in practical applications.In this thesis, we study different approaches to realize efficient MPC for functionalities of practical importance with enhanced security notions including non-threshold adversary structures and malicious security.We attain improvement in communication and round complexity by focusing on specific classes of functions or limited but still non-threshold adversary structures.The main contributions of this thesis consist of five parts, which concern the following specific MPC tasks: non-interactive MPC (NIMPC) for symmetric functions and linear classifiers, homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) for low-degree polynomials, verifiably multiplicative secret sharing (VMSS), private information retrieval (PIR), and distributed noise generation for differential privacy.Concretely, we first propose efficient constructions of NIMPC protocols tailored to symmetric functions and linear classifiers.Our protocols improve the best-known communication complexity of existing protocols.In addition, we reveal that a previously proposed method to enhance security of NIMPC does not satisfy specified security requirements and we also fix the problem.Secondly, we propose constructions of HSS schemes that tolerate multipartite and general adversary structures assuming homomorphic encryption.Our schemes support parallel evaluation of a single low-degree polynomial and hence achieve better communication complexity than if we simply execute the previous HSS schemes in parallel.Thirdly, we present VMSS schemes tolerating multipartite adversary structures.Our schemes have smaller communication complexity than those obtained from the previous constructions applicable to general adversary structures.In the fourth part, we study the optimal communication complexity of error-correcting PIR.We asymptotically characterize it as a function of the database size and as a corollary, obtain more communication-efficient error-correcting PIR schemes than the previous ones.Finally, we provide three kinds of MPC protocols for generating noise drawn from probability distributions providing differential privacy.We improve the round or communication complexity of the previous protocols for distributed noise generation.We also extend our protocols so that they provide differential privacy against malicious adversaries.
We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure.We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure.In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players.For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary.Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes.We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does hot hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given black-box access for free to an idealized secret sharing scheme secure for the access structure in question, it is not possible to handle all relevant access structures efficiently, not even if the adversary is passive and static.In other words, general MPC can only be black-box reduced efficiently to secret sharing if extra properties of the secret sharing scheme used (such as linearity) are assumed.
In this thesis we study a problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) and Multiparty Computations (MPC) in a model where private channels between the players and a broadcast channel is available. The adversary is active, adaptive and has an unbounded computing power. The thesis is based on two papers [CDD00, CDD 99]. In [CDD00] we assume that the adversary can corrupt any set from a given adversary structure. In this setting we study a problem of doing efficient VSS and MPC given an access to a secret sharing scheme (SS). For all adversary structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary. Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes. We then show
We present here a generalization of the work done by Rabin and Ben-Or. We give a protocol for multiparty computation which tolerates any Q^2 active adversary structure based on the existence of a broadcast channel, secure communication between each pair of participants, and a monotone span program with multiplication tolerating the structure. The secrecy achieved is unconditional although we allow an exponentially small probability of error. This is possible due to a protocol for computing the product of two values already shared by means of a homomorphic commitment scheme which appeared originally in a paper of Chaum, Evertse and van de Graaf.