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Making NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign as Secure as Standard Worst-Case Problems over Ideal Lattices.

Damien Stehlé, Ron Steinfeld

Published Jan 1, 2013• 45 citations
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Related papers

Making NTRU as Secure as Worst-Case Problems over Ideal Lattices

Damien Stehlé, Ron Steinfeld

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A provably secure variant of NTRU cryptosystem

Danilo Ciaffi

In 1996 Hoffstein, Pipher ad Silverman presented NTRUEncrypt, which is to date the fastest known lattice-based encryption scheme. Its moderate key-sizes, excellent asymptotic performance and conjectured resistance to quantum attacks make it a perfect candidate to succeed where factorization and discrete log fail. Unfortunately, no security proof has been produced for NTRUEncrypt nor for its signature counterpart NTRUSign. In 2013 Stehle and Steinfield proposed to apply some mild modification to the encryption and signature scheme to make them provably secure, under the assumed quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to a family of lattices related to some cyclotomic fields. In particular they showed that if the secret key polynomials of the encryption scheme are chosen from discrete Gaussians, then the public key, i.e their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform. The security will then follow from the hardness of the R-LWE problem.The aim of this thesis is to present Stehle's and Steinfield's work in a slightly more accessi-ble form, providing some more background and details in some points.

•Oct 12, 2018•0 citations

Efficient Identity-Based Encryption over NTRU Lattices

Léo Ducas, Vadim Lyubashevsky, Thomas Prest

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2014•276 citations

A Provably Secure Variant of ETRU Based on Extended Ideal Lattices Over Direct Product of Dedekind Domains

Reza Ebrahimi Atani, Shahabaddin Ebrahimi Atani, Amir Hassani Karbasi

Jarvis and Nevins presented ETRU in 2013 which has applausive performance with moderate key-sizes and conjectured resistance to quantum computers. ETRU, as an efficient NTRUEncrypt-like cryptosystem, is over the ring of Eisenstein integers that is faster with smaller keys for the same or better level of security than does NTRUEncrypt which is a desirable alternative to public-key cryptosystems based on factorisation and discrete logarithm problem. However, because of its construction, doubts have regularly arisen on its security. In this paper, we propose how to modify ETRU to make it provably secure, under our modified assumption of quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to extended ideal lattices related to some extensions of cyclotomic fields structures. We describe the structure of all generated polynomial rings of quotient over direct product of Dedekind domains Z and Z[ζ3], where ζ3 is complex cube root of unity. We give a detailed description to show that if the private key polynomials of the ETRU are selected from direct product of some Dedekind domains using discrete Gaussians, then the public key, which is their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform over its range. The security then proves for our main system from the already proven hardness of the R-SIS and R-LWE problems by their extensions.

•Dec 1, 2018•4 citations

Provably Secure NTRUEncrypt over More General Cyclotomic Rings.

Yang Yu, Guangwu Xu, Xiao-Yun Wang

NTRUEncrypt is a fast and standardized lattice-based public key encryption scheme, but it lacks a proof of security.Stehlé and Steinfeld (EUROCRYPT 2011) first gave a variant of NTRUEncrypt, denoted by pNE, over power-of-2 cyclotomic rings.The pNE scheme is provably secure assuming the hardness of worst-case problems over ideal lattices.Recently, Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017) proposed a pNE variant over prime cyclotomic rings, but it requires the parameters to be of rather larger sizes.In this paper, working with canonical embedding, we modify the key generation algorithm of pNE scheme to make it applicable to general cyclotomic rings.Through an improved analysis, we provide tighter parameters of pNE over prime power cyclotomic rings.To be more specific, even for the general case, our parameters are as good as that obtained by Stehlé and Steinfeld for the case of power-of-2; compared to that of Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017), the sizes of our parameters get significantly reduced.Thus our result not only applies to a larger class of rings but also enjoys greater efficiency.In proving our results, we have developed some technical tools which may be of general interest.Some remarks on further extension of the work (e.g., for more general polynomial rings) have also been made.

•Jan 1, 2017•4 citations
In 1996 Hoffstein, Pipher ad Silverman presented NTRUEncrypt, which is to date the fastest known lattice-based encryption scheme. Its moderate key-sizes, excellent asymptotic performance and conjectured resistance to quantum attacks make it a perfect candidate to succeed where factorization and discrete log fail. Unfortunately, no security proof has been produced for NTRUEncrypt nor for its signature counterpart NTRUSign. In 2013 Stehle and Steinfield proposed to apply some mild modification to the encryption and signature scheme to make them provably secure, under the assumed quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to a family of lattices related to some cyclotomic fields. In particular they showed that if the secret key polynomials of the encryption scheme are chosen from discrete Gaussians, then the public key, i.e their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform. The security will then follow from the hardness of the R-LWE problem.The aim of this thesis is to present Stehle's and Steinfield's work in a slightly more accessi-ble form, providing some more background and details in some points.
Jarvis and Nevins presented ETRU in 2013 which has applausive performance with moderate key-sizes and conjectured resistance to quantum computers. ETRU, as an efficient NTRUEncrypt-like cryptosystem, is over the ring of Eisenstein integers that is faster with smaller keys for the same or better level of security than does NTRUEncrypt which is a desirable alternative to public-key cryptosystems based on factorisation and discrete logarithm problem. However, because of its construction, doubts have regularly arisen on its security. In this paper, we propose how to modify ETRU to make it provably secure, under our modified assumption of quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to extended ideal lattices related to some extensions of cyclotomic fields structures. We describe the structure of all generated polynomial rings of quotient over direct product of Dedekind domains Z and Z[ζ3], where ζ3 is complex cube root of unity. We give a detailed description to show that if the private key polynomials of the ETRU are selected from direct product of some Dedekind domains using discrete Gaussians, then the public key, which is their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform over its range. The security then proves for our main system from the already proven hardness of the R-SIS and R-LWE problems by their extensions.
NTRUEncrypt is a fast and standardized lattice-based public key encryption scheme, but it lacks a proof of security.Stehlé and Steinfeld (EUROCRYPT 2011) first gave a variant of NTRUEncrypt, denoted by pNE, over power-of-2 cyclotomic rings.The pNE scheme is provably secure assuming the hardness of worst-case problems over ideal lattices.Recently, Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017) proposed a pNE variant over prime cyclotomic rings, but it requires the parameters to be of rather larger sizes.In this paper, working with canonical embedding, we modify the key generation algorithm of pNE scheme to make it applicable to general cyclotomic rings.Through an improved analysis, we provide tighter parameters of pNE over prime power cyclotomic rings.To be more specific, even for the general case, our parameters are as good as that obtained by Stehlé and Steinfeld for the case of power-of-2; compared to that of Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017), the sizes of our parameters get significantly reduced.Thus our result not only applies to a larger class of rings but also enjoys greater efficiency.In proving our results, we have developed some technical tools which may be of general interest.Some remarks on further extension of the work (e.g., for more general polynomial rings) have also been made.