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A Provably Secure Variant of ETRU Based on Extended Ideal Lattices Over Direct Product of Dedekind Domains

Reza Ebrahimi Atani, Shahabaddin Ebrahimi Atani, Amir Hassani Karbasi

Published Dec 1, 2018• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Jarvis and Nevins presented ETRU in 2013 which has applausive performance with moderate key-sizes and conjectured resistance to quantum computers. ETRU, as an efficient NTRUEncrypt-like cryptosystem, is over the ring of Eisenstein integers that is faster with smaller keys for the same or better level of security than does NTRUEncrypt which is a desirable alternative to public-key cryptosystems based on factorisation and discrete logarithm problem. However, because of its construction, doubts have regularly arisen on its security. In this paper, we propose how to modify ETRU to make it provably secure, under our modified assumption of quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to extended ideal lattices related to some extensions of cyclotomic fields structures. We describe the structure of all generated polynomial rings of quotient over direct product of Dedekind domains Z and Z[ζ3], where ζ3 is complex cube root of unity. We give a detailed description to show that if the private key polynomials of the ETRU are selected from direct product of some Dedekind domains using discrete Gaussians, then the public key, which is their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform over its range. The security then proves for our main system from the already proven hardness of the R-SIS and R-LWE problems by their extensions.

DOI
10.22108/jcs.2018.106856.0

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Background: The imminent threat posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers to classical public-key infrastructure specifically RSA and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), whose security rests on the conjectured computational intractability of integer factorisation and the discrete logarithm problem respectively has propelled lattice-based cryptography to the centre of global post-quantum standardisation efforts. On 13 August 2024, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published three landmark Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS): FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, derived from SPHINCS+), with FIPS 206 (FN-DSA, derived from FALCON) in advanced draft. The first three of these standards rest on algebraic structures intimately connected to classical number theory: polynomial rings over integer quotients, cyclotomic fields, and the algebraic geometry of ideal lattices in rings of integers of number fields. Objectives: This article provides: (1) a rigorous mathematical exposition of the lattice problems underpinning NIST’s post-quantum standards, specifically the Learning With Errors (LWE), Ring-LWE (RLWE), Module-LWE (MLWE), Short Integer Solution (SIS), and NTRU problems, and their connections to algebraic number theory; (2) a comparative performance analysis of NIST-standardised lattice-based algorithms against classical RSA and ECC benchmarks; (3) a security analysis examining known classical and quantum attacks on each hard problem; (4) a comparative evaluation of the four NIST-selected algorithms across key size, signature size, and computational benchmarks; and (5) a strategic assessment of the migration challenges facing deployed cryptographic infrastructure. Methods: The study synthesises peer-reviewed literature, NIST official standards documentation (FIPS 203, 204, 205, and draft FIPS 206), and independently published performance benchmarks published between June 2024 and June 2026. Mathematical security analysis is grounded in the worst-case to average-case reductions established by Regev (2005) for LWE and by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev (2013) [11, 18] for Ring-LWE. Performance data are drawn from Garani (2024) [8], the ARM Cortex-M0+ benchmarking study of Ratnayaka and Fischer (2026) [4], and the cross-platform evaluation by Alzahrani et al. (2025) [2]. Results: NIST’s three August 2024 standards establish a comprehensive lattice-based post-quantum portfolio. ML-KEM-768 produces a 1,184-byte public key and 1,088-byte ciphertext, achieving IND-CCA2 security under the MLWE assumption at NIST Level 3 (AES-192 equivalent). ML-DSA-65 produces 1,952-byte public keys and 3,309-byte signatures under the Module-LWE and Module-SIS assumptions at Level 3. FN-DSA-512 (FALCON, draft FIPS 206) produces 897-byte public keys and 666-byte signatures under the NTRU assumption, offering the most compact lattice-based signatures. Performance benchmarks on an Intel Core i7-12700K (3.6 GHz) confirm that ML-KEM key generation is orders of magnitude faster than RSA-3072 key generation. The algebraic structure of cyclotomic polynomial rings ∑₂ⁿ = Z[x]/(x^n + 1) is central to the efficiency of all three lattice-based NIST standards. Conclusion: Lattice-based cryptography, grounded in the algebraic number theory of ideal lattices over cyclotomic fields, provides the most comprehensive and mathematically well-founded response to the quantum computational threat. The August 2024 NIST standardisation of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA represents a landmark in cryptographic history, and the imminent finalisation of FN-DSA will complete the post-quantum toolbox. Organisations should prioritise immediate migration planning, leveraging hybrid classical-quantum schemes during transition, with full transition to NIST post-quantum standards recommended by 2030 per NSA and CISA guidance.

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Jarvis and Nevins presented ETRU in 2013 which has applausive performance with moderate key-sizes and conjectured resistance to quantum computers. ETRU, as an efficient NTRUEncrypt-like cryptosystem, is over the ring of Eisenstein integers that is faster with smaller keys for the same or better level of security than does NTRUEncrypt which is a desirable alternative to public-key cryptosystems based on factorisation and discrete logarithm problem. However, because of its construction, doubts have regularly arisen on its security. In this paper, we propose how to modify ETRU to make it provably secure, under our modified assumption of quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to extended ideal lattices related to some extensions of cyclotomic fields structures. We describe the structure of all generated polynomial rings of quotient over direct product of Dedekind domains Z and Z[ζ3], where ζ3 is complex cube root of unity. We give a detailed description to show that if the private key polynomials of the ETRU are selected from direct product of some Dedekind domains using discrete Gaussians, then the public key, which is their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform over its range. The security then proves for our main system from the already proven hardness of the R-SIS and R-LWE problems by their extensions.
In 1996 Hoffstein, Pipher ad Silverman presented NTRUEncrypt, which is to date the fastest known lattice-based encryption scheme. Its moderate key-sizes, excellent asymptotic performance and conjectured resistance to quantum attacks make it a perfect candidate to succeed where factorization and discrete log fail. Unfortunately, no security proof has been produced for NTRUEncrypt nor for its signature counterpart NTRUSign. In 2013 Stehle and Steinfield proposed to apply some mild modification to the encryption and signature scheme to make them provably secure, under the assumed quantum hardness of standard worst-case lattice problems, restricted to a family of lattices related to some cyclotomic fields. In particular they showed that if the secret key polynomials of the encryption scheme are chosen from discrete Gaussians, then the public key, i.e their ratio, is statistically indistinguishable from uniform. The security will then follow from the hardness of the R-LWE problem.The aim of this thesis is to present Stehle's and Steinfield's work in a slightly more accessi-ble form, providing some more background and details in some points.
Since the presentation of NTRU public-key cryptosystem by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman, its favorable properties, such as easily created keys, high speed, excellent performance and conjectured resistance to quantum computers, have made it to be of great use. This paper proposes an enhanced scheme based on the hard learning with error over ring (R-LWE) problem to improve the security of the modified NTRUEncrypt presented by Stehle and Steinfled. We used part of the padding ideas of Fujisaki and Okamoto to obtain this scheme. It is semantically secure in strong sense of indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks in the random oracle model assuming the quantum hardness of standard worst-case problem over ideal lattices. It is also possible to arbitrarily decrease the error probability, and even to eliminate it completely. We gave the detailed analysis using the known results from classic works. Furthermore, this scheme owns many advantages such as the uniformity of public key, usual assumptions and the freedom for coding messages.
NTRUEncrypt is a fast and standardized lattice-based public key encryption scheme, but it lacks a proof of security.Stehlé and Steinfeld (EUROCRYPT 2011) first gave a variant of NTRUEncrypt, denoted by pNE, over power-of-2 cyclotomic rings.The pNE scheme is provably secure assuming the hardness of worst-case problems over ideal lattices.Recently, Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017) proposed a pNE variant over prime cyclotomic rings, but it requires the parameters to be of rather larger sizes.In this paper, working with canonical embedding, we modify the key generation algorithm of pNE scheme to make it applicable to general cyclotomic rings.Through an improved analysis, we provide tighter parameters of pNE over prime power cyclotomic rings.To be more specific, even for the general case, our parameters are as good as that obtained by Stehlé and Steinfeld for the case of power-of-2; compared to that of Yu, Xu and Wang (PKC 2017), the sizes of our parameters get significantly reduced.Thus our result not only applies to a larger class of rings but also enjoys greater efficiency.In proving our results, we have developed some technical tools which may be of general interest.Some remarks on further extension of the work (e.g., for more general polynomial rings) have also been made.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security foundations of current asymmetric cryptographic schemes, which primarily rely on the perceived difficulty of integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Shor's algorithm, in particular, demonstrates that a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break these schemes efficiently, necessitating the development of quantum-resistant alternatives. This paper explores the construction of quantum-secure primitives utilizing ideal lattices, a specialized class of lattices that offer enhanced efficiency and structural advantages compared to general lattices. We delve into the theoretical underpinnings of ideal lattices, including the Ring Learning With Errors (Ring-LWE) problem and the NTRU problem, which are believed to be hard even for quantum computers. The paper reviews the evolution of lattice-based cryptography, analyzes the security reductions from worst-case lattice problems to average-case problem instances relevant for cryptographic constructions, and discusses the practical implications for key encapsulation mechanisms and digital signatures. We examine the current state of ideal lattice-based schemes, such as those standardized by NIST, and consider their performance characteristics, key sizes, and resistance to known attacks, including side-channel vulnerabilities. Our analysis highlights that ideal lattices provide a robust and efficient foundation for building the next generation of asymmetric cryptographic primitives, moving beyond the vulnerabilities inherent in factoring-based systems.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant existential threat to the security of contemporary public-key cryptographic systems, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which underpin global digital communication and secure transactions. These systems rely on the computational hardness of problems like integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem, which are efficiently solvable by Shor's algorithm on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. This paper comprehensively rethinks the foundations of public-key cryptography by exploring ideal lattice-based schemes as a promising, quantum-secure alternative. We delve into the mathematical underpinnings of ideal lattices, particularly focusing on their compact representation and efficient arithmetic derived from polynomial rings. We elucidate how the conjectured hardness of ideal lattice problems, such as the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) problem and the Ideal Shortest Vector Problem (Ideal-SVP), provides robust security against both classical and quantum adversaries. Through a detailed analysis of their cryptographic properties, efficiency benefits, and security guarantees, we argue for the critical role of ideal lattices in forging the next generation of resilient public-key infrastructures. This research highlights the advantages of ideal lattices in terms of performance and security compactness, making them leading candidates in the ongoing standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography.
Background: The imminent threat posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers to classical public-key infrastructure specifically RSA and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC), whose security rests on the conjectured computational intractability of integer factorisation and the discrete logarithm problem respectively has propelled lattice-based cryptography to the centre of global post-quantum standardisation efforts. On 13 August 2024, the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published three landmark Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS): FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, derived from CRYSTALS-Kyber), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA, derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA, derived from SPHINCS+), with FIPS 206 (FN-DSA, derived from FALCON) in advanced draft. The first three of these standards rest on algebraic structures intimately connected to classical number theory: polynomial rings over integer quotients, cyclotomic fields, and the algebraic geometry of ideal lattices in rings of integers of number fields. Objectives: This article provides: (1) a rigorous mathematical exposition of the lattice problems underpinning NIST’s post-quantum standards, specifically the Learning With Errors (LWE), Ring-LWE (RLWE), Module-LWE (MLWE), Short Integer Solution (SIS), and NTRU problems, and their connections to algebraic number theory; (2) a comparative performance analysis of NIST-standardised lattice-based algorithms against classical RSA and ECC benchmarks; (3) a security analysis examining known classical and quantum attacks on each hard problem; (4) a comparative evaluation of the four NIST-selected algorithms across key size, signature size, and computational benchmarks; and (5) a strategic assessment of the migration challenges facing deployed cryptographic infrastructure. Methods: The study synthesises peer-reviewed literature, NIST official standards documentation (FIPS 203, 204, 205, and draft FIPS 206), and independently published performance benchmarks published between June 2024 and June 2026. Mathematical security analysis is grounded in the worst-case to average-case reductions established by Regev (2005) for LWE and by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev (2013) [11, 18] for Ring-LWE. Performance data are drawn from Garani (2024) [8], the ARM Cortex-M0+ benchmarking study of Ratnayaka and Fischer (2026) [4], and the cross-platform evaluation by Alzahrani et al. (2025) [2]. Results: NIST’s three August 2024 standards establish a comprehensive lattice-based post-quantum portfolio. ML-KEM-768 produces a 1,184-byte public key and 1,088-byte ciphertext, achieving IND-CCA2 security under the MLWE assumption at NIST Level 3 (AES-192 equivalent). ML-DSA-65 produces 1,952-byte public keys and 3,309-byte signatures under the Module-LWE and Module-SIS assumptions at Level 3. FN-DSA-512 (FALCON, draft FIPS 206) produces 897-byte public keys and 666-byte signatures under the NTRU assumption, offering the most compact lattice-based signatures. Performance benchmarks on an Intel Core i7-12700K (3.6 GHz) confirm that ML-KEM key generation is orders of magnitude faster than RSA-3072 key generation. The algebraic structure of cyclotomic polynomial rings ∑₂ⁿ = Z[x]/(x^n + 1) is central to the efficiency of all three lattice-based NIST standards. Conclusion: Lattice-based cryptography, grounded in the algebraic number theory of ideal lattices over cyclotomic fields, provides the most comprehensive and mathematically well-founded response to the quantum computational threat. The August 2024 NIST standardisation of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA represents a landmark in cryptographic history, and the imminent finalisation of FN-DSA will complete the post-quantum toolbox. Organisations should prioritise immediate migration planning, leveraging hybrid classical-quantum schemes during transition, with full transition to NIST post-quantum standards recommended by 2030 per NSA and CISA guidance.