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Probabilities and Schrodinger' s Cat--Comment on Popper's Interpretation for Probability

Tan Tian-rong

Published Jan 1, 2004• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

It is expounded that a statistical distribution is a realistic distribution, while a probability distribution is its idea image; a statistical distribution is objective distribution, while a probability distribution depends on observers. In quantum mechanics, the confusion between statistical distributions and probability distributions creates two mistakes: misreading a probability distribution as a realistic distribution and misreading a subjective uncertainty as an objective uncertainty. Schrodinger' s cat is an imagery that opens out these two mistakes.

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Quantum State Analysis : Probability theory as logic in Quantum mechanics

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Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.

•Jan 1, 2007•0 citations
It is expounded that a statistical distribution is a realistic distribution, while a probability distribution is its idea image; a statistical distribution is objective distribution, while a probability distribution depends on observers. In quantum mechanics, the confusion between statistical distributions and probability distributions creates two mistakes: misreading a probability distribution as a realistic distribution and misreading a subjective uncertainty as an objective uncertainty. Schrodinger' s cat is an imagery that opens out these two mistakes.
The propensity interpretation of probability is introduced faithfully with Popper's original description. It is shown that the propensity interpretation itself has little to do with the central problem of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, some insights of Popper seem to have meanings in modern interpretations of quantum mechanics. Especially, the relation to stochastic mechanics and stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics is considered. Many respects of the propensity interpretation are on Popper's intention or almost accidentally same with the stochastic interpretation when the stochasticity is considered to be objective. We give also some details to be supplemented for the realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics by means of the stochastic interpretation, most of which are neglected in Popper's consideration.
We reopen Erwin Schrodinger's thought experiment involving a cat in an informationally impenetrable box. A common view is that the cat enters a superposition of alive/dead because of a lack of observation, leading to uncertainty about the state of the cat. We, on the other hand, argue that the cat only enters a superposition if everything about the cat is known prior to the box being closed. The superposition results from a lack of uncertainty inside the box. Rather than interpreting this state of affairs as a live and dead cat interacting with each other, we suggest that the more natural interpretation is that of an inability to precisely position events within spacetime due to the lack of uncertainty. We clarify how stable measurement depends on a diversified portfolio of statistical uncertainty, and how the lack of such uncertainty in Schrodinger's box precludes stabilization.
The concept of probability was prominent in the original foundations of quantum mechanics and continues to be so today. Indeed, the controversies regarding objective and subjective interpretations of probability have again become active. I argue that, although both objective and subjective probabilities have domains of relevance in QM, their roles are quite distinct. Even where both are legitimate, the objective and subjective probabilities differ, both conceptually and numerically. There are quantum probabilities that have no useful subjective interpretations, and there are subjective probabilities that cannot be realized as quantum probabilities.
In the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, the state is described by an abstract wave function in the representation space. Conversely, in a realistic interpretation, the quantum state is replaced by a probability distribution of physical quantities. Bohm mechanics is a consistent example of realistic theory, where the wave function and the particle positions are classically defined quantities. Recently, we proved that the probability distribution in a realistic theory cannot be a quadratic function of the quantum state, in contrast to the apparently obvious suggestion given by the Born rule for transition probabilities. Here, we provide a simplified version of this proof.
Quantum mechanics is basically a mathematical recipe on how to construct physical models. Historically its origin and main domain of application has been in the microscopic regime, although it strictly seen constitutes a general mathematical framework not limited to this regime. Since it is a statistical theory, the meaning and role of probabilities in it need to be defined and understood in order to gain an understanding of the predictions and validity of quantum mechanics. The interpretational problems of quantum mechanics are also connected with the interpretation of the concept of probability. In this thesis the use of probability theory as extended logic, in particular in the way it was presented by E. T. Jaynes, will be central. With this interpretation of probabilities they become a subjective notion, always dependent on one's state of knowledge or the context in which they are assigned, which has consequences on how things are to be viewed, understood and tackled in quantum mechanics. For instance, the statistical operator or density operator, is usually defined in terms of probabilities and therefore also needs to be updated when the probabilities are updated by acquisition of additional data. Furthermore, it is a context dependent notion, meaning, e.g., that two observers will in general assign different statistical operators to the same phenomenon, which is demonstrated in the papers of the thesis. It is also presented an alternative and conceptually clear approach to the problematic notion of "probabilities of probabilities", which is related to such things as probability distributions on statistical operators. In connection to this, we consider concrete numerical applications of Bayesian quantum state assignment methods to a three-level quantum system, where prior knowledge and various kinds of measurement data are encoded into a statistical operator, which can then be used for deriving probabilities of other measurements. The thesis also offers examples of an alternative quantum state assignment technique, using maximum entropy methods, which in some cases are compared with the Bayesian quantum state assignment methods. Finally, the interesting and important problem whether the statistical operator, or more generally quantum mechanics, gives a complete description of "objective physical reality" is considered. A related concern is here the possibility of finding a "local hidden-variable theory" underlying the quantum mechanical description. There have been attempts to prove that such a theory cannot be constructed, where the most well-known impossibility proof claiming to show this was given by J. S. Bell. In connection to this, the thesis presents an idea for an interpretation or alternative approach to quantum mechanics based on the concept of space-time.