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arXiv:quant-ph/0412148

Quantum Mechanics and Reality

Virendra Singh

Published Dec 20, 2004• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.quant-ph/0412148

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We begin by discussing ``What exists?'', i.e. ontology, in Classical Physics which provided a description of physical phenomena at the macroscopic level. The microworld however necessitates a introduction of Quantum ideas for its understanding. It is almost certain that the world is quantum mechanical at both microscopic as well as at macroscopic level. The problem of ontology of a Quantum world is a difficult one. It also depends on which interpretation is used. We first discuss some interpretations in which Quantum Mechanics does not provide a complete framework but has to be supplemented by extra ingredients e.g. (i) Copenhagen group of interpretations associated with the names of Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, von-Neumann, and (ii) de-Broglie-Bohm interpretations. We then look at some interpretations in which Quantum mechanics is supposed to provide the entire framework such as (i) Everett-deWitt many world, (ii) quantum histories interpretations. We conclude with some remarks on the rigidity of the formalism of quantum mechanics, which is sharp contrast to it's ontological fluidity.
According to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, the apparent paradoxes of quantum theory require no change either in our philosophical attitude toward scientific theories or in the formalism of quantum mechanics itself. Rather, the unaltered theory can be understood as a literal description of physical reality. But the physical reality thus described is one of many noninteracting, approximately classical worlds. These worlds enter the theory not at the fundamental level—they are nowhere to be found in the basic formalism—but at a higher, emergent level; in this sense they are (ontologically speaking) on a par with the ontology of the special sciences.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
Abstract What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.
This paper deals with the development of, and the current discussion about, the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The following topics are discussed: 1. The Copenhagen Interpretation, 2. Formal Problems of Quantum Mechanics, 3. Process of Measurement and the Equation of Motion, 4. Macroscopic Level of Description, 5. Search for Hidden Variables, 6. The Notion of “Reality” and Epistemology of Quantum Mechanics, 7. Quantum Mechanics and the Explanation of Life. The Bohr-Einstein dialogue on the validity of the quantum mechanical description of physical reality lasted over two decades. Since the early nineteen fifties, Wiper has provided much of the point and counterpoint of the continuing discussion on the interpretation and epistemology of quantum mechanics. We have explored Wiper's views in some detail against the background of historical development and current debate.
This paper re-opens the debate on the failure of quantum mechanics to provide an understandable view of micro-reality. A critique is offered of the commonly accepted ‘Copenhagen Interpretation’ of a theory that is only a mathematical approach to the level of reality characterized by atoms and electrons. This critique is based on the oldest approach to thinking about nature for over 2500 years, known as Natural Philosophy. Quantum mechanics (QM) was developed over the first quarter of the 20th Century, when scientists were enthralled by a new philosophy known as Positivism, whose foundations were based on the assumption that material objects exist only when measured by humans – this central assumption conflates epistemology (knowledge) with ontology (existence). The present critique rejects this human-centered view of reality by assuming material reality has existed long before (and will persist long after) human beings (“Realism”). The defensive view that the micro-world is too different to understand using regular thinking (and only a mathematical approach is possible) is rejected totally. At least 12 earlier QM interpretations are critically analyzed, indicating the broad interest in “what does QM mean?” The standard theory of quantum mechanics is thus constructed on only how the micro-world appears to macro measurements - as such, it cannot offer any view of how the foundations of the world are acting when humans are not observing it - this has generated almost 100 years of confusion and contradiction at the very heart of physics. Significantly, we live in a world that is not being measured by scientists but is interacting with itself and with us. QM has failed to provide explanations: only recipes (meaningless equations), not insights. Physics has returned to the pre-Newtonian world of Ptolemaic phenomenology: only verifiable numbers without real understanding. The focus needs to be on an explicit linkage between the micro-world, when left to itself, and our mental models of this sphere of material reality, via the mechanism of measurement. This limits the role of measurement to confirming our mental models of reality but never confusing these with a direct image of ‘the thing in itself’. This implies a deep divide between reality and appearances, as Kant suggested. This paper includes an original analysis of several major assumptions that have been implicit in Classical Mechanics (CM) that were acceptable in the macroscopic domain of reality, demonstrated by its proven successes. Unfortunately, only a few of these assumptions were challenged by the developers of QM. We now show that these other assumptions are still generating confusions in the interpretation of QM and blocking further progress in the understanding of the microscopic domain. Several of these flawed assumptions were introduced by Newton to support the use of continuum mathematics as a model of nature. This paper proposes that it is the attempt to preserve continuum mathematics (especially calculus), which drives much of the mystery and confusion behind all attempts at understanding quantum mechanics. The introduction of discrete mathematics is proposed to help analyze the discrete interactions between the quintessential quantum objects: the electrons and their novel properties. A related paper demonstrates that it is possible to create a point-particle theory of electrons that explains all their peculiar (and ‘paradoxical’) behavior using only physical hypotheses and discrete mathematics without introducing the continuum mathematical ideas of fields or waves. Another (related) paper proves that all the known results for the hydrogen atom can also be exactly calculated from this new perspective with the discrete mathematics. * Surrey, B.C. Canada (604) 542-2299 spsi99@telus.net Version 2.015 08-05-2017 Begun 23-06-2008 {pp. 82, 70.2 Kw; 800 KB}
Formulations of quantum mechanics (QM) can be characterized as realistic, operationalist, or a combination of the two. In this paper a realistic theory is defined as describing a closed system entirely by means of entities and concepts pertaining to the system. An operationalist theory, on the other hand, requires in addition entities external to the system. A realistic formulation comprises an ontology, the set of (mathematical) entities that describe the system, and assertions, the set of correct statements (predictions) the theory makes about the objects in the ontology. Classical mechanics is the prime example of a realistic physical theory. A straightforward generalization of classical mechanics to QM is hampered by the inconsistency of quantum properties with classical logic, a circumstance that was noted many years ago by Birkhoff and von Neumann. The present realistic formulation of the histories approach originally introduced by Griffiths, which we call 'compatible quantum theory (CQT)', consists of a 'microscopic' part (MIQM), which applies to a closed quantum system of any size, and a 'macroscopic' part (MAQM), which requires the participation of a large (ideally, an infinite) system. The first (MIQM) can be fully formulated based solely on the assumption of a Hilbert space ontology and the noncontextuality of probability values, relying in an essential way on Gleason's theorem and on an application to dynamics due in large part to Nistico. Thus, the present formulation, in contrast to earlier ones, derives the Born probability formulas and the consistency (decoherence) conditions for frameworks. The microscopic theory does not, however, possess a unique corpus of assertions, but rather a multiplicity of contextual truths ('c-truths'), each one associated with a different framework. This circumstance leads us to consider the microscopic theory to be physically indeterminate and therefore incomplete, though logically coherent. The completion of the theory requires a macroscopic mechanism for selecting a physical framework, which is part of the macroscopic theory (MAQM). The selection of a physical framework involves the breaking of the microscopic 'framework symmetry', which can proceed either phenomenologically as in the standard quantum measurement theory, or more fundamentally by considering the quantum system under study to be a subsystem of a macroscopic quantum system. The decoherent histories formulation of Gell-Mann and Hartle, as well as that of Omnès, are theories of this fundamental type, where the physical framework is selected by a coarse-graining procedure in which the physical phenomenon of decoherence plays an essential role. Various well-known interpretations of QM are described from the perspective of CQT. Detailed definitions and proofs are presented in the appendices.