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Synthese

The received view on quantum non-individuality: formal and metaphysical analysis

Jonas R. Becker Arenhart

Published Dec 26, 2015• 42 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11229-015-0997-5

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We discuss an argument by Francesco Berto to the effect that quantum particles have well-defined identity conditions: Berto holds they are objects individuated by metaphysical ingredients such as haecceities. With this argument Berto intends to attack a general tenet that characterizes a version of the so-called Received View on quantum non-individuality; according to this view, roughly speaking, quantum particles are not individuals, they don’t have well-defined identity conditions. Now, the version of the Received View attacked by Berto relates the metaphysical thesis about the lack of individuality with a linguistic thesis that the relation of identity makes no sense for quantum entities; it is this linguistic facet of the view that provides for its own rather direct representation in systems of non-reflexive logics such as quasi-set theory. Recall that non-reflexive logics are logics where, in some cases, the relation of identity may fail to hold between a given kind of terms. We discuss the argument, which Berto intends to be wholly a priori , in terms of pure conceptual analysis, and find it at fault. As we see it, the argument begs relevant questions against the friend of the Received View, given that it conceives some of the core concepts involved in the analysis as already involving the notion of identity that the Received View refuses to attribute to quantum entities. We also advance a general framework in which it is presented a more general way of addressing such issues, one which we believe is able to escape from such purely a priori analysis and provide for a more cooperative work between metaphysics and science.
One recent debate in philosophy of physics has centered whether quantum particles are individuals or not. The received view is that particles are not individuals and the standard methodology is to approach the question via the structure of quantum theory. I challenge both the received view and the standard methodology. I contend not only that the structure of quantum theory is not the right place to look for conditions of individuality that quantum particles may or may not satisfy, but also that there is an important role for traditional metaphysics to play. Consequently, my work brings together the philosophy of physics and traditional metaphysics literatures to shed new light on the debate over the individuality of quantum particles. I defend a set of conditions of individuality and argue that quantum particles satisfy these conditions thereby defending the view that particles are individuals in opposition to the received view. I also challenge a second feature of the standard methodology insofar as I challenge the significance of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in terms of which much discussion in the philosophy of physics literature is framed. My work is significant in a number of additional ways as well. My work implies that the dominant explanation for quantum statistics in terms of non-individuality is incorrect and it also undermines the ontic-structural realists metaphysical underdetermination challenge to the scientific realist.