DOES IDENTITY HOLD A PRIORI IN STANDARD QUANTUM MECHANICS?
Jonas R. Becker Arenhart, Décio Krause
We discuss an argument by Francesco Berto to the effect that quantum particles have well-defined identity conditions: Berto holds they are objects individuated by metaphysical ingredients such as haecceities. With this argument Berto intends to attack a general tenet that characterizes a version of the so-called Received View on quantum non-individuality; according to this view, roughly speaking, quantum particles are not individuals, they don’t have well-defined identity conditions. Now, the version of the Received View attacked by Berto relates the metaphysical thesis about the lack of individuality with a linguistic thesis that the relation of identity makes no sense for quantum entities; it is this linguistic facet of the view that provides for its own rather direct representation in systems of non-reflexive logics such as quasi-set theory. Recall that non-reflexive logics are logics where, in some cases, the relation of identity may fail to hold between a given kind of terms. We discuss the argument, which Berto intends to be wholly a priori , in terms of pure conceptual analysis, and find it at fault. As we see it, the argument begs relevant questions against the friend of the Received View, given that it conceives some of the core concepts involved in the analysis as already involving the notion of identity that the Received View refuses to attribute to quantum entities. We also advance a general framework in which it is presented a more general way of addressing such issues, one which we believe is able to escape from such purely a priori analysis and provide for a more cooperative work between metaphysics and science.
•Nov 20, 2018•2 citations